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1 General Introduction
As a social science, economics is concerned with the study of all kinds of social in-
teractions. Perhaps most prominently, Garry Becker has demonstrated how applying
economic analysis to a wider range of human behavior and social interactions, in-
cluding nonmarket environments, constitutes a powerful tool to obtain novel insights.
Following this view, the questions explored in this thesis deal with market as well as
nonmarket interactions, and they are analyzed using both microeconomic theory and
experimental economics as methods.
The thesis has three self-contained chapters each contributing to a different topic
in microeconomics. In the second chapter, I revisit the well-known problem of price
discrimination in the light of the recent rise of online tracking technologies. In an
environment where consumers search for the offers of competing sellers sequentially,
the ability of sellers to condition their offers on a consumer’s search history has radical
implications for equilibrium search behavior and prices, sometimes leading to a rever-
sal of the theoretical predictions obtained from existing models of price discrimination.
Under what conditions and why tracking of search histories is beneficial or detrimen-
tal for consumers, sellers and overall welfare are the main questions addressed in this
chapter. Related to a quite different strand of research, the third and fourth chapter
present and discuss findings from two experiments designed to explore the determi-
nants of distributional preferences. While we already know a lot about what types of
distributional preferences prevail in different contexts, we know relatively little about
the general mechanisms underlying the formation of them. In an attempt to reduce
this gap, the third chapter explores the role of people’s experience of economic success
on two factors possibly shaping people’s preferences: their belief about the importance
of luck and their fairness ideal. Another human trait underlying distributional pref-
erences is investigated in chapter four, which deals with the potential consequences of
rank-loss aversion.
In chapter 2, titled Consumer Search with and without Tracking, I develop a tractable
framework with sequential consumer search to address the effect of tracking on market
outcomes. The type of tracking this chapter focuses on is one of the most basic fea-
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tures of nowadays tracking technologies which is to enable websites to observe a user’s
browsing history through the use of third-party cookies. Tracking search histories is
informative about consumers’ valuations because continuing to search is costly and,
thus, depends on how much a consumer likes the offers she has already encountered.
Hence, given the equilibrium search rule, a consumer who has already sampled offers
from multiple sellers is then more likely to have a picky taste than a consumer with
an empty search history. With tracking and for a wide range of conditions, the unique
equilibrium price path is increasing whereas without tracking, an average uniform price
prevails. The welfare effects of this form of tracking largely depend on how tracking af-
fects consumers’ search persistence. For intermediate search costs, tracking based price
discrimination exacerbates the hold-up problem and leads to inefficiently low search
persistence. For high search costs instead, tracking prevents a market breakdown as
low prices conditional on short search histories secure consumers a positive surplus
from search. In addition, I explore whether consumers would block tracking if they
could dynamically opt out from it. Interestingly, tracking prevails endogenously since
disclosing their search history is always individually rational for consumers, irrespective
of the overall effect on consumer surplus.
In chapter 3, titled Heterogeneous Fairness Views, I experimentally investigate the
effect of experiencing economic success on preferences for redistribution though two
channels: beliefs about the role of luck and fairness ideals. The design consists of a
real effort and a spectator redistribution phase, allowing me to observe distributive
preferences in the absence of any self-interest. Experiencing success (high income)
raises the acceptance of inequality whereas experiencing failure (low income) reduces it
both when income is assigned randomly and when it is based on relative performance.
Using a treatment in which the process determining income is unobservable, I can infer
beliefs about the role of luck from actual distributive choices. I find that successful
spectators redistribute as if the process was random whereas unsuccessful spectators
act in the opposite way. Thus, preferences are more aligned under uncertainty. The
results provide strong evidence against an effective self-serving bias in beliefs about
the role of luck. Instead, I find evidence in support of the claim that success makes
individuals adopt a more libertarian fairness ideal.
Finally, chapter 4, titled Relative Earnings and Rank-Loss Aversion, presents the
results of a laboratory experiment on income rank loss-aversion when a better ranking
neither implies additional gains nor less disadvantageous inequality. After successful
completion of a real-effort task, participants distribute additional money either to the
participant ranked one position above or one position below themselves. When the
difference with respect to the poorer recipient is sufficiently small, a trade-off between
raising inequality and maintaining the earned income rank emerges. A theory of so-
3cial preferences with income rank concerns predicts that under such circumstances,
people will distribute less to the poorer recipient than they do otherwise. Moreover,
participants with high degres of rank-loss aversion will distribute the majority of the
additional money to the richer recipient, leading to an increase of overall inequality.
The latter prediction is strongly supported in the data, which show a significant in-
crease from 17% to 30% in the relative frequency of these inequality increasing choices.
Evidence in support of a decline of the average transfer is not fully conclusive, yet the
coefficients support the direction of the predictions.

2 Consumer Search with and with-
out Tracking1
2.1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers learn about products and their prices only by searching
different sellers sequentially. Often, the expected number of searches varies greatly
across consumers as tastes and preferences are rarely homogeneous. Hence, observing
a consumer’s search history might convey relevant information to sellers. For instance,
think of two consumers A and B (Alice and Bob), and suppose that both are looking
for a suit for the job market. Since it is the first suit they buy for a long time, neither
of them has a particular preference before they search and they visit the stores of
different brands in a random order. While searching, Alice realizes that she is fine with
almost any cut and color and thus does not need to search long. Instead, Bob finds
that most cuts and colors do not suit him well, requiring him to search longer. When
finally encountering his ideal suit, Bob’s willingness to pay for it is, most likely, higher
than Alice’. This is because Bob not only obtains utility from getting a new suit,
but from having the right cut and color as well. In contrast, none of those features
matter to Alice, implying that she is willing to pay less. In this environment with
niche consumers like Bob and mass consumers like Alice, observing search histories
may inform sellers about consumers’ preferences and is thus going to provoke sellers’
attention. Evidently, tracking a consumer’s search process has become a widely used
practice both for online and brick and mortar businesses and it will most likely be even
1I am very grateful to Martin Peitz, Alessandro Lizzeri, Andrew Rhodes, Nicolas Schutz, Sandro
Sheliga, Thomas Tro¨ger, Chengsi Wang and Asher Wolinsky for valuable and helpful comments.
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more prevalent in the future due to exponentially improving technologies.2 However,
progress in understanding even the most general implications of tracking has been
hindered by the lack of tractable models.
The questions I address in this paper are the following: What is the effect of tracking
on market outcomes such as search behavior and prices? Does tracking always raise
profits or can it - perhaps contrary to common wisdom - also benefit consumers while
making sellers worse off? Do the welfare effects depend on the level of search costs?
Finally, can tracking prevail in equilibrium if consumers possess measures to prevent
it?
To address these questions, I propose a tractable framework of consumer search with
tracking. Moreover, I account for consumer heterogeneity with respect to the nicheness
of their taste as laid out in the introductory example. Since search with tracking
compares with ordered search, the framework provides the first model of ordered search
with heterogeneous consumers. Tracking search histories enables sellers to receive
imperfect signals about a consumer’s type and thus to learn about their preferences
because stopping probabilities are type-dependent. In the baseline version of the model,
there always exists a unique equilibrium with a price path that is strictly increasing in
the order of search.
I evaluate the welfare consequences of tracking by comparing the tracking equilib-
rium with the equilibrium when tracking is not available. In general, niche types like
Bob are made worse off from tracking while mass types like Alice are made better off
because they are more likely to benefit from low prices at early sellers. The welfare
consequences of tracking largely depend on its effect on consumers’ search persistence,
which is the number of sellers they are at most willing to sample if they do not en-
counter a sufficient match at earlier sellers. In general, tracking raises welfare if it
leads to weakly higher search persistence and reduces it otherwise. For a wide range
of intermediate search costs, search persistence decreases due to tracking since higher
prices conditional on long search histories reduce the incentive for consumers to con-
tinue searching. However, search persistence can be lower without tracking if search
costs are high. This happens when the market breaks down without tracking because
the no-tracking price is inevitably too high.
2For example, Google places cookies on a user’s computer if the retailer’s website visited uses
Google-Analytics for customer management, or if the retailer has joined one of the Google owned ad-
networks Doubleclick or Adwords. Indeed, Mikians et al. (2012) find that both Google-Analytics and
Doubleclick but also other online services providers and advertising networks such as those powered
by Facebook or Yahoo are prevalent on the majority of the 200 most popular shopping websites.
Mikians et al. (2012) also used automated bots to mimic different consumer types. Evidently, the
bots’ browsing histories had been tracked as searches for the same keyword yielded different search
results and prices.
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Overall, it seems without any doubt that tracking fundamentally changes market
outcomes, irrespectively of the model used. Consequently, one of the most essential
questions appears to be whether we should expect to encounter tracking in markets if it
is not imposed exogeneously. In fact, online tracking often requires a consumer’s (silent)
consent. For example, a consumer must not delete her cookies to enable online retailers
to observe her search history.3 I therefore apply the novel framework of sequential
consumer search to investigate whether tracking can arise endogenously. In addition to
choosing a stopping strategy, consumers are able to opt out from tracking and thereby
prevent sellers from observing their search history at any stage during the search process
in this extension of the model. Surprisingly, the unique equilibrium outcome always
exhibits full disclosure. The intuition behind this result goes back to Milgrom and
Roberts (1986) and their striking unraveling argument. For any alternative equilibrium
candidate in which a subset of possible search histories is not disclosed, there always
exists a consumer whose search history belongs to the depicted subset and who is better
off from allowing tracking.
The full disclosure prediction provides a rational explanation for why only few peo-
ple delete their cookies or select the ‘do not track”-request option provided by their
web browsers.4 Moreover, the analysis provides a useful benchmark for thinking about
the regulation of personal data processing. Although both sellers and consumers indi-
vidually prefer tracking, it may make particularly sellers worse off when it leads to a
lower search persistence, which is typically the case for intermediate search costs. As
even welfare might decrease due to the forgone matching surplus, there is potential for
welfare-increasing regulation when the level of search costs lies in the depicted range.
The model builds on the following assumptions. Consumers must sample sellers se-
quentially at a cost s > 0 to learn about prices set by sellers and match values, which
are independently distributed random variables. Consumers are ex ante heterogeneous
as they draw match values from different distributions. To keep the model tractable,
those distributions are simplified to two-point distributions. While one of the values is
normalized to zero for all types, consumers differ with respect to their positive match
value. Besides, the probability of drawing a positive match value is assumed to be a
3In the aftermath of several bills being introduced in the US to regulate tracking, all major web
browsers integrated the option to send a “do not track”-request into their software. In addition,
the European general data protection regulation law (GDPR) mandates to inform consumers when
personal information is being processed. As browsing data qualifies as personal information, it requires
websites to explicitly ask consumers to agree to the use of cookies. For more information about the
interpretation and application of the law, also refer to the “Article 29 Data Protection Working Party”
by the European Commission or the paper by Borgesius and Poort (2017).
4A study of German internet users from 2013 (”Maßnahmen der Internetnutzer: Digitaler Selb-
stschutz und Verzicht, conducted by the GfK) shows that while 70% are worried about their privacy,
only 29% regularly delete their cookies.
8 2 Consumer Search
function of the match value itself. In the main part of this paper, I assume that the
matching probability is decreasing in the “conditional” (positive) match value. That
is, high conditional match values coincide with low matching probabilities and vice
versa. The assumption seems reasonable in markets consisting of mass and niche con-
sumers as illustrated in the introductory example. Niche consumers have a particular
taste hampering their willingness to consider most products suitable. However, once
they encounter a product meeting their individual requirements, their utility from the
product is relatively high. In contrast, mass consumers find most products satisfactory
but only have an average willingness to pay for them.
When sellers learn about their position in a consumer’s search process through track-
ing, search becomes perfectly ordered from their perspective. The analysis shows that
consumers must then expect increasing prices in any equilibrium, leading to a sim-
ple stopping rule which lets only those consumers without previous matches continue
search. Due to the interplay of consumer heterogeneity and the optimal stopping rule,
expected demand from consumers with longer search histories is less elastic and, thus,
prices indeed increase in the order of search. Consumer heterogeneity also leads to
novel predictions regarding the effect of search costs on prices. As intuition suggests,
consumers’ search persistence is weakly decreasing in the level of search costs. How-
ever, the fact that consumers sample fewer sellers does not imply reduced competition
and higher prices. From a seller’s perspective, the probability of facing a consumer
with a longer search history decreases while the probability of facing a consumer with
a short search history increases when consumers sample fewer sellers. As demand from
the latter group is more elastic, the equilibrium price is decreasing in search costs. This
counterintuitive result provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical finding that
low search cost environments like the internet sometimes lead to higher prices (Ellison
and Ellison, 2014).
The dynamics described above help to understand the welfare implications of track-
ing. Generally, reduced asymmetric information due to tracking has diametrically
opposed effects on consumer surplus. On the one hand, lower prices for short search
histories have a positive market expansion effect. On the other hand, improved price
discrimination reduces surplus from niche consumers who search longer. Importantly,
tracking is not detrimental to every niche consumer per se due to the order effect. In
other words, both a mass type like Alice and a niche type like Bob can benefit from
lower prices at the beginning of search under tracking. Hence, the detrimental effect
of price discrimination on consumer surplus is mitigated because learning about a con-
sumer’s types does not take place instantaneously but sequentially. If search costs are
negligible such that consumers without a match never stop their search before they
have sampled all sellers, tracking can be favorable both for consumers and sellers.
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Otherwise, tracking affects consumers’ search persistence and changes consumers’ and
sellers’ surplus in diametrically opposed ways. The longer a consumer’s search history,
the larger the share of the matching surplus sellers can extract with tracking. There-
fore, the expected surplus from sampling an additional seller necessarily falls below
search costs beyond some fixed search history. Because the hold-up problem prevents
an equilibrium with lower prices, search persistence decreases due to tracking. This
effect is most pronounced for an intermediate level of search costs and implies less
matches from consumers like Bob with a high willingness-to-pay, leaving sellers with
less profits and reducing total welfare while the average consumer is still better off from
tracking due to lower initial prices.
In contrast, tracking may also raise everyone’s surplus for high search costs. Unless
consumers sample only a single seller under search without tracking, the no-tracking
price always exceeds the price set by the first seller under search with tracking. Yet,
sampling only a single seller in equilibrium may not be consistent with the stopping
rule for any level of search costs. Then, there is a range of high search costs where
the market with tracking is still active whereas it breaks down without tracking, thus
implying significant welfare losses from unrealized matches. The reason why a no-
tracking equilibrium with a search persistence of one or few sellers may not exist is
because of the adverse effects of search persistence on prices. When the expected
surplus from search is negative given the level of search costs and the no-tracking
price, a lower search persistence could reduce the price and make sampling the first
seller worthwhile again. However, stopping search as early as implied by a low search
persistence is not sequentially rational given the reduced price. Moreover, randomizing
over sampling the first seller cannot change sellers’ belief about the average search
history in the market, and, thus, cannot restore the equilibrium with active search if
this inconsistency problem prevails at the beginning of the search process.
In an extension, I study the complementary case of a matching probability function
which is weakly increasing in the conditional match value. Such a positive relationship
is likely to prevail in markets where consumer heterogeneity is mainly determined by
heterogeneous budget sets rather than differences in taste. Hence, the two distinct
cases of an in- and decreasing matching probability function refer to markets that are
likely to be inherently different from one another. Also, market outcomes stand in stark
contrast to the baseline version of the model since the price is now weakly decreasing
in the order of search. The comparative statics of tracking compare with those for a
decreasing matching probability, except for the market breakdown result, which cannot
obtain in this specification. Besides, the result that tracking arises endogenously is
robust to this extension of the model.
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2.2 Literature
The paper relates to two broad strands in the literature. On the one hand, the search
framework developed contributes to the literature on consumer search by embedding
ex ante consumer heterogeneity into a model of ordered search, two areas, which so
far have been studied only in separation. On the other hand, this paper studies a
consumer’s privacy data disclosure problem in a sequential search framework and thus
relates to the literature on the economics of privacy. More precisely, it complements
existing research on the consumer’s data protection problem which has mostly been
addressed using static models with exogenous data as opposed to a dynamic search
environment with endogenous data contained in search histories. I first review the
literature on consumer search before providing an overview about the paper’s relation
to the economics of privacy literature.
In the seminal paper by Diamond (1971), consumers search for prices in a ran-
dom order. Despite multiple sellers producing a homogeneous good, sellers charge
the monopoly price because demand is completely inelastic for any price below the
monopoly price due to the hold-up problem. As a consequence, consumers, rationally
expecting monopoly prices, are better off from not searching at all. Wolinsky (1986)
shows that this counter-intuitive result, often referred to as the Diamond Paradox, dis-
appears when products are differentiated and consumers thus search not only for prices
but product fit as well. Anderson and Renault (1999) complement Wolinsky (1986) by
showing how both the Diamond Paradox and the Bertrand outcome arise in the limit
as either the degree of product differentiation or the level of search costs vanishes. The
model by Wolinsky (1986) with the extension of Anderson and Renault (1999) (hence-
forth WAR) has since then become the workhorse model of consumer search for many
researchers. As in their model, I assume that consumers’ preferences are heterogeneous
by modeling match values as independently and identically distributed shocks. As op-
posed to WAR however, I assume that these shocks are identically distributed only for
a particular consumer type but differently distributed across types. That is, consumer
heterogeneity is revealed not only ex post after sampling sellers, but already prevails
ex ante even before search begins, thus leading to type-dependent search behavior.
Even though consumers sample sellers in no particular order in my model, tracking
enables sellers to learn about their position in a consumer’s search proces, which is
the defining assumption in the research on ordered search and thus perhaps the closest
literature this paper relates to. Arbatskaya (2007) shows that search cost heterogeneity
can explain why prices might increase in the order of search even when consumers
search for a homogeneous product. Zhou (2011) considers ordered search in the WAR
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model with differentiated products. He also finds that prices increase in the order
of search in equilibrium for the reason that later sellers possess a larger monopoly
power over remaining consumers. As prices depend on a seller’s position, which in
turn, can be inferred perfectly from a consumer’s search history, Zhou (2011), in fact,
also studies search history-based price discrimination. In a related work, Armstrong
and Zhou (2010) analyze a seller’s optimal strategy to discriminate between “fresh”
and returning consumers. In contrast to this paper, which allows for search histories
of arbitrary length, they restrict attention to a duopoly version of the WAR model
and mainly focus on a seller’s incentive to deter consumer search by offering buy-now
discounts.
Besides, even though Zhou (2011) provides a solution to the WAR model with or-
dered search for a specific distribution of match values, the model is not tractable
enough to account for additional consumer heterogeneity that might create potentially
countervailing effects regarding price discrimination and search behavior. Indeed, I
find that tracking often leads to more efficient search by raising consumers’ search per-
sistence, which stands in stark contrast to Zhou’s finding that ordered search leads to
inefficiently low search. Moreover, his very intuitive price dispersion result disappears
if the number of sellers grows and the difference in monopoly power becomes arbitrar-
ily small due to the infinite number of remaining sellers. That is, ordered search or
tracking plays no role when the number of sellers is large, suggesting that the WAR
model might not capture all important aspects of search markets.
Several papers building on the WAR model and focusing on particular applications
of ordered search share this property with the work by Zhou (2011). Among others,
Armstrong et al. (2009), Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011) and Moraga-Gonza´lez and
Petrikaite˙ (2013) have studied how higher quality, more advertising, or merging with
a competitor can make a subset of sellers more salient and thereby lead to partially
ordered search. Importantly, search in these models is ordered only with respect to the
first, salient seller as it would otherwise become intractable.
Though quite different from this paper, some authors have also explored in detail
applications of ordered search that are more closely related to internet search and
tracking. In Chen and He (2011), a monopoly platform uses an auction to determine
the order in which sellers are shown to consumers. As they assume that some sellers’
products are more relevant to consumers than others, the mechanism places those
sellers at the top consumers have the highest valuations for. De Cornie`re (2016) studies
a platform using a keyword matching mechanism to determine a consumer’s search
order. If sellers choose to be associated with a keyword the consumer entered and
pay an advertsising fee, they obtain a prominent position in the search list. In both
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papers, the authors start from the fact that sellers vary in terms of their relevance
to particular consumers. While it is modeled explicitly only in De Cornie`re (2016),
they thus presuppose that consumers are somewhat ex ante heterogeneous. However,
tracking occurs at a single instant prior to actual search in their papers whereas it
is modeled as a dynamic process enabling sellers to learn gradually about consumers
from search histories in my framework.
Other papers study ex ante consumer heterogeneity within the the WAR model more
explicitly but (have to) restrict attention to random search. Moraga-Gonza´lez et al.
(2017) study price formation when consumers have different search costs. As changes
in the distribution of search costs affect both the extensive and intensive search margin,
they find that lower search costs can increase the price charged from actively searching
consumers.5 To understand the effect of targetability or in other words, the quality
of search, Yang (2013) studies a seller’s choice whether to serve a mass product many
consumers like or a niche product appealing only to few. By assuming that consumers
draw positive match values only from sellers serving their preferred category and that
the probability of encountering a respective seller depends both on the quality of search
and the category’s coverage in the market, he shows how the long-tail effect is driven
by the quality of search. Bar-Isaac et al. (2012) also study the long-tail effect, but
do not model ex ante heterogeneity on the side of consumers. Though conceptually
similar, the approach taken by Yang (2013) to model mass versus niche consumers is
different from mine. Instead of introducing different product categories for mass and
niche consumers, I assume that mass consumers are more likely to find any product
suitable due to their less restrictive taste compared to niche consumers.
While search history based pricing has received relatively little attention in the lit-
erature, purchase history based price discrimination has been studied extensively. In
the absence of online shopping and related privacy concerns, this literature with early
works by Hart and Tirole (1988), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999)
deals with consumers making purchase decisions in multiple periods. As a consumer’s
revealed choice for a particular seller is a signal of her willingness to pay, it affects
prices she obtains in future periods. A common prediction in this literature is con-
sumer poaching : a seller’s strategy to offer low prices to those consumers who have
revealed their preference for the competitor’s product in the previous period. As a
consequence of low prices in later periods, prices also become competitive in the initial
period. However, when accounting for the possibilty of strategic waiting, Chen and
Zhang (2009) identify a novel and opposing incentive to price high in the initial period
5I discuss the effect of search cost heterogeity in my framework in section 7.
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as it allows to better learn about the willingness to pay of those consumers who still
make a purchase.
More closely related to the economics privacy, Taylor (2004) considers purchase
history-based customer lists as valuable information one firm would want to sell to an-
other firm if a consumer’s valuations for different products are correlated. He finds that
privacy protection policies are necessary if consumers are naive, but not so otherwise
as the willingness to pay of sophisticated consumers in the first period decreases when
anticipating exploitation in future periods. Acquisti and Varian (2005) reaches similar
conclusions in a monopoly model where they also model the consumer’s decision to
remain anonymous as in my model. Conitzer et al. (2012) also study the consumer’s
privacy choice in a model similar to Acquisti and Varian (2005) but introduce a cost
to maintain anonymity.
Motivated by the rising concern for internet privacy, a number of authors have re-
visited the consumer’s data protection problem and extended the analysis of Conitzer
et al. (2012). Taylor and Wagman (2014) compare the welfare implications of main-
taining privacy across different oligopoly models and find ambiguous effects. In Montes
et al. (2017), competing firms can buy data containing consumers’ private information
from an intermediary unless consumers pay a “privacy cost” to remain anonymous.
Since paying the cost also reveals some private information, a higher “privacy cost”
may in fact raise consumer surplus. Belleflamme and Vergote (2016) study an environ-
ment where a monopolist is able to detect private information with some probability
unless consumers use a costly technology to maintain privacy. Similarly to the pre-
vious authors, they find that the availability of such a technology makes consumers
worse off. The results I obtain are quite different. Although more privacy protection
would yield a higher surplus in some cases, consumers never use the technology despite
its availability at no cost. Besides, the papers mentioned above apply a static model
where information about consumers exists from an exogenous source. If sellers can
rely on the availability of informative big data, that approach may be quite accurate.
However, if informative data is rare, sellers might pay more attention to a consumer’s
search history for the product they sell, as studied in this paper.
2.3 Search Model
There is a continuum of consumers i ∈ [0, 1] and a finite number of firms N . Firms are
selling a horizontally differentiated product. The goods can be produced at constant
marginal cost, which is normalized to zero. Sellers set their prices and can condition
them on different search histories, if these are observed.
14 2 Consumer Search
Consumers. Consumers sample sellers sequentially in no particular order and with
free recall. They search for both prices and product fitness and pay a sampling cost
s > 0 for each seller. Consumer i obtains utility uik = vik − pk if she purchases from
seller k ∈ N, where pk is the price and vik captures her seller specific match utility.
Match utilities for sellers’ products (vi1, vi2, ..., viN) are random draws from the set
vik ∈ {0, xi} and independently and identically distributed across sellers. The condi-
tional match value xi defines consumer i’s type. A type is randomly drawn ex ante
from the compact set X with v = inf(X) and v¯ = sup(X) from the log-concave dis-
tribution F (x). To avoid corner solutions, assume that v > 0 is sufficiently small.
Denote by g(x) = Prob(v = x) the matching probability, which is type xi’s probability
of drawing a positive match value vik = xi > 0 at a random seller k. The matching
probability function g(x) is asumed to be log-concave and monotone decreasing, imply-
ing that high conditional match values correspond to low matching probabilities and
vice versa. This assumptions seems to fit well many markets where the main difference
between consumers is the extent to which they care about all features of a product.
In the introductory example, Bob cares both about the cut and the color of his new
suit while Alice does not. Consequently, Bob has a lower matching probability than
Alice. However, his conditional match value is higher because he obtains utility from
all features of the suit. A decreasing matching probability function extends this hetero-
geneity between picky niche consumers and accepting mass consumers to a continuous
type space. Section 2.5 contains an extension of the baseline model to the case of a
weakly increasing matching probability function.
Additionally, both consumers and sellers know only the distribution of types F (·)
and a particular consumer’s type xi must be learned during search. Notice that this
assumption holds in the example concerning Alice and Bob looking for a new suit.
Neither of them knows about their preferences over suits ex ante. Instead, they find
out about how picky they are while searching. While this simplifying assumption may
seem stark, it actually renders the purpose of search more realistic. In other words,
because consumers do not know their conditional match value, they truly search for
both price and product fit as in the WAR model. Technically, consumers must not
have perfect information about their type xi ex ante to prevent a market breakdown
result as in the Diamond Paradox. 6 If all consumers knew their types, sellers would
always have an incentive to deviate from any price leaving a strictly positive surplus to
actively searching consumers. This is because sellers know that any actively searching
consumer’s conditional match value must exceed the expected price as the consumer
6If information is sufficiently imperfect, the hold-up problem has no bite and consumers will find
search worthwhile. Thus, no information about xi is a simplifying but not strictly necessary assump-
tion.
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would not have incurred the search costs otherwise. Hence, in the only equilibrium
with perfectly informed consumers, no consumer would search.
While the random match value framework I use is more stylized than in WAR, it
allows me to handle the complexity arising from incorporating consumer heterogeneity
into a model of search with tracking. Recently, several authors have passed on the
continuous match value distribution (for individual consumers) as well in order to gain
tractability, see for example Chen and He (2011), Anderson and Renault (2015) or
Armstrong and Zhou (2011).
Search history. The search history h is what other sellers observe from an arriving
consumer under search with tracking. I assume that other sellers cannot observe the
price of previously sampled products. Further, nothing can be learned from knowing
a particular sellers’ identity since match values are uncorrelated across sellers. Conse-
quently, the total number of past sellers a consumer has sampled is a sufficient statistic
to update the posterior beliefs about her type. Hence, h ∈ N.
Timing. Players move in the following order. First, sellers set prices conditional on
any feasible search history. Under search without tracking, they set an unconditional
price. Prior to searching, nature draws each consumer’s type. Next, consumers search
by sampling sellers sequentially at a cost s per seller. Under search with tracking,
sellers observe the consumer’s search history when being sampled. Consumers observe
the respective price and match value and decide whether to purchase, to return to a
previous seller, or to stop search.
Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium notion I consider is perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (PBE). Sellers choose pricing strategies to maximize expected profits given
other sellers’ prices and consumers’ stopping rule. Consumers maximize surplus by
choosing an optimal (possibly non-stationary) stopping rule. Both sellers’ beliefs about
a consumer’s type and consumers’ expectations regarding prices need to be consistent
with the equilibrium stopping rule and equilibrium pricing. Since equilibrium pricing
strategies will be deterministic, I assume that consumers have passive beliefs if they
observe a non-equilibrium price.7 I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
7This restriction seems reasonable as an individual consumer is of mass zero here. Hence, an off-
equilibrium discriminatory price for a single consumer followed by an out of equilibrium action by this
very consumer does not change expected demand at any other seller and thus gives no rise to expect
subsequent prices to be different from the equilibrium prices.
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2.3.1 Search With Tracking
I begin by analyzing the equilibrium under search with tracking and search history
based price discrimination and then turn to the analysis of search without tracking.
When consumers sample sellers sequentially, their decision about when to stop
searching not only depends on the available match values and prices, but also on prices
they expect at forthcoming sellers. The main result of this section is that that there is
a unique PBE in which prices satisfy p1 < p2 < ... < pN . Therefore, I seek to construct
such an equilibrium first and assume that consumers expect pe1 ≤ pe2 ≤ ...peN . Second,
I show that these beliefs are the only beliefs permissible under rational expectations.
In the following analysis, it facilitates notation to write “seller k” when referring to
the k’s seller a consumer has sampled. The index k thus does not denote a specific
seller for all consumers. Moreover, note that prior to sampling seller k, the consumer’s
history h equals k − 1 while it is h = k thereafter. Besides, I omit the subscript i for
brevity when it does not lead to ambiguous statements.
Optimal stopping. If vik = xi at some seller k, a consumer has no incentive to
continue to search as she expects at most to obtain xi again but to pay a higher price
at any forthcoming seller. Therefore, consumers encountering a match vik = xi buy if
xi ≥ pk and stop searching without making a purchase otherwise. Whether consumers
prefer continuing to search after a history of h unsuccessful matches depends on the
continuation value from sampling seller h+1, denoted by Vh+1. Then, a consumer with
history h samples seller h+ 1 if both vh = 0 and Vh+1 > 0.
8
Lemma 1 After inspecting seller k, the following non-stationary stopping rule, denoted
by R∗, is optimal: Buy if vk = x ≥ pk and continue to search if vk = 0 and Vk+1 > 0.
Otherwise, end search.
Learning. A consumer perfectly learns her type only upon encountering a match
but can learn from the length of her search history otherwise. The optimal stopping
rule R∗ implies that a consumer who has a history h and who is about to sample seller
h + 1 must have received only vik = 0 at any seller k, k ≤ h. As the probability of
not encountering a match at h previous sellers varies with x, the search history h is
informative about one’s type. The expected probability of no match at a single seller
is given by: ∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(t))fk(t)dt,
8Since Vh+1 has no effect on equilibrium prices, its derivation is postponed to the end of this
section. For now, it is sufficient to note that Vh+1 depends on h but not on an individual’s type xi
because consumers do not know their type perfectly but must learn about it from searching.
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where fk is seller k’s posterior belief about a consumer’s type conditional on h = k−1.
Since consumers observe their own history by construction, fk represents their belief
prior to sampling seller k as well. Note that in the following analysis, the initial prior
f(x) without subscript refers to the distribution of types expected by the first seller a
consumer samples. By repeated use of Bayes’ rule, I obtain the posterior belief fk()
for any seller k:
fk(x) =
(
1− g(x))k−1f(x)∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(t))k−1f(t)dt . (2.1)
Consumer demand. The consumer’s optimal stopping rule implies that condi-
tional on a match, a consumer always buys the product from seller k immediately if
xi ≥ pk and pk ≤ pej ∀ j > k. If the latter constraint is not binding in equilibrium,
expected demand from a consumer who is known to be visiting her first firm writes:
D1(p) = P (v ≥ p) =
∫ v¯
p
g(x)f(x)dx,
Based on the posterior fk(), a general expression of seller k’s demand, denoted by
Dk(p), obtains:
Dk(p) =
∫ v¯
p
(
1− g(x))k−1g(x)∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(t))k−1f(t)dtf(x)dx (2.2)
Pricing. Seller k’s demand at price p is given by (2.2) if p ≤ pej ∀ j > k since
consumers might follow an alternative stopping rule otherwise. The following analysis
will show that the constraint is not binding at the equilibrium price and that devi-
ating to a price pk > p
e
j cannot be profitable neither. That is, the profit-maximizing
price is independent of all competitors’ prices and seller k’s problem is equivalent to a
monopolist’s pricing decision:
pk ∈ arg max
p
Dk(p)p (2.3)
The reason why monopoly prices prevail in the presence of competing sellers is sim-
ilar to Diamond (1971), even though he considers consumer search for homogeneous
products. Despite product differentiation however, expectations about future prices
suppress any form of price competition between sellers. This holds for any strictly
positive search friction. The solution to (2.3) yields:
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Lemma 2 The profit-maximizing price is uniquely defined for every seller k. The
sequence of profit-maximizing prices {p+k }k=1,...,N satisfies p+1 < p+2 < .... < p+N .
All omitted proofs are presented in appendix A. Intuitively, prices increase because
consumers with a higher conditional match values need to sample more sellers on
average than consumers with a low conditional match value until they encounter the
first match. Therefore, the relative share of consumers with a high conditional match
value is larger for longer search histories. Consequently, expected demand becomes
more inelastic and profit-maximizing prices increase in a consumer’s search history.
The uniqueness of prices is due to the fact that the RHS of the FOC p = − D(p)
D′(p)
is decreasing in p, which follows from the log-concavity assumption about fk(x) and
g(x).9
The sequence of increasing prices {p+k }k=1,...,N obtained in lemma 2 is optimal con-
ditional on consumers expecting an increasing price path. Consequently, consumers
follow the stopping rule R∗ by lemma 1. Since lemma 2 shows that {p+k }k=1,...,N is the
profit-maximizing sequence of prices given R∗, an equilibrium with prices {p+k }k=1,...,N
and consumer stopping characterized by R∗ indeed exists. Nevertheless, there might
be other equilibria. Instead of expecting an increasing price path, consumers might ini-
tially expect a decreasing or non-monotonic price path, leading to a different stopping
rule and thus to different prices. However, even when allowing for arbitrary consumer
beliefs about prices along their search path, the only beliefs consistent with equilib-
rium pricing of sellers are those of an increasing price sequence given by {p+k }k=1,...,N .10
This can be shown by means of contradiction. Suppose that consumer expectations
{pek}k=1,2,...,N are not increasing in k. First, note that:
Lemma 3 In any PBE, consumer expectations satisfy pek ≥ p+k ∀ k ≤ K∗.
To see intuitively why lemma 3 holds, consider seller j∗ where j∗ denotes the seller
closest to the end of the search process whose expected price pej∗ lies below p
+
j∗ . The
fact that all remaining sellers are expected to charge higher prices by construction has
important implications for seller j∗ when deviating to a price in the neighborhood of
pej∗ . Seller j
∗’s expected demand does not depend on whether arriving consumers have
available matches from previous sellers since sampling j∗ is only worthwhile if they
are in fact willing to buy at pej∗ . That is, seller j
∗ can sell to all consumers whose
9Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) discuss properties of log-concave functions and show that the FOC
for demand functions of the type D(p) =
∫ v¯
p
h(x)dx is decreasing in p if h(x) is log-concave. Hence,
decreasingness follows from log-concavity of both g(x) and fk(x) ∀ k.
10As in other models of consumer search, there always exists an uninteresting equilibrium where
consumers expect prices to be larger than their expected surplus from search. In such an equilibrium,
no consumer searches and setting such high prices indeed constitutes an equilibrium strategy for
sellers.
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match value exceeds the price and thus has full monopoly power over its demand,
implying that his problem can be characterized by (2.3). Nevertheless, the profit
maximizing price need not be equal to p+j∗ due to changes in the distribution of arriving
consumers. This is because consumers may have applied a stopping rule different from
R∗at previous sellers.
Changes in the distribution of arriving consumers must be of the following kind: If
a consumer samples j∗ despite an available match, her conditional match value must
satisfy xi > p
e
j∗ as she already knows her conditional match value and would otherwise
be better off from not sampling j∗. Hence, if due to any alternative stopping rule
demand at seller j∗ changes, it is due to an increase in demand from types xi > pej∗ .
Notably, demand of these additional consumers attracted by the lower expected price
is completely inelastic in the neighborhood of pej∗ . Moreover, note that lemma 2 implies
that any (local) upward deviation to p′j∗ > p
e
j∗ is profitable for seller j
∗ even in the
absence of those additional consumers. Hence, setting a price above pej∗ is for sure
profitable in the presence of this additional, perfectly inelastic demand. Since this is
true for any pej∗ < p
+
j∗ , the argument can be applied repeatedly from the last to the
first seller, yielding lemma 3.
In addition, notice that consumers apply R∗ at the first seller if he sets a price p1
in the neighborhood of p+1 since p
e
k > p
+
1 by lemma 3 ∀ k > 1. By lemma 2, p+1
maximizes the first seller’s profits under the stopping rule R∗. Hence, any alternative
price p′1 > p
+
1 +δ (δ > 0) inducing an alternative stopping rule for some types must yield
strictly lower profits. This is because under any alternative stopping rule, there are
some types who continue searching despite a match vi1 > p1 and return only with some
probability less than one. Consequently, demand and thus profits must be strictly lower
than when consumers apply R∗. It follows that consumers must expect p1 = p+1 in any
PBE. Further, the same argument applies to the second seller a consumer visits and
so forth. Thus, no equilibrium exists, in which consumers do not expect an increasing
price path.
Proposition 2.1 With tracking, in the unique equilibrium, prices increase in the order
of search and consumers follow the stopping-rule R∗. The equilibrium always exists.
Search persistence. While search costs have no effect on equilibrium prices under
search with tracking, they matter for consumers’ search persistence: how long to con-
tinue search if no match occurs. Consumers’ search persistence is captured by K∗ ∈ N.
First, note that K∗ depends on a consumer’s continuation value Vh+1 at any history h.
Its recursive formulation writes:
Vh+1 = E
[
max
{
[vh+1 − ph+1], 0, Vh+2
}]− s.
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To derive an explicit expression for Vh+1, one needs to account for K
∗ since the con-
tinuation value from sampling seller k must contain the option value from continuing
to search at least seller k+ 1, which is feasible only if seller k is sampled first. For any
K∗ and history h < K∗, the continuation value writes:
Vh+1(K
∗, s, p1, p2, ..., pK∗) =
1∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(x))hf(x)dx ·
{
...
K∗∑
j=h+1
(∫ v¯
pj
g(x)(x− pj)
(
1− g(x))j−1f(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted matching surplus
−s
∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(x))j−1f(x)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected search attmepts
)}
. (2.4)
Even though Vh+1(K
∗, s, p1, ..) always depends on all sellers’ prices, equilibrium
search persistence K∗ and search costs s, I omit those arguments for brevity when
it does not affect comprehensibility. The term before the curly brackets is part of the
belief updating regarding the consumer’s type and for h = 0, the term disappears. It
equals the inverse of the total probability of not finding a match after sampling h sellers
and thus normalizes the probability of encountering a match at sellers h + 1, h + 2,
and so forth. The term within the brackets sums over the surpluses from additional
search attempts weighted by the updated consumer’s type after history h + j. Notice
that the sum of additional search attempts goes from any history h to K∗.
For the optimal search persistence K∗, it must hold that Vk(K∗) ≥ 0 ∀ k ≤ K∗
and VK∗+1(K
∗ + 1) < 0. In words, sampling any seller prior to K∗ must be rational.
Moreover, there cannot be another K ′ > K∗ satisfying the first the first condition and
rendering VK∗+1(K
′) ≥ 0. Since continuation values are affected by search costs, K∗
depends on search costs as well. Formally, define Kˆ(s) := {K : Vk(K, s) ≥ 0 ∀ k ≤
K ∈ N}. Then, equilibrium search persistence satisfies K∗ ∈ K(s), where
K(s) :=
{
K : VK+1(K
′, s) < 0 ∀ K ′ ∈ (Kˆ(s) ∩ {k : K ′ > K})}. (2.5)
By construction of K(s), there always exists exactly one K∗ for any given s. Besides,
equation (2.4) shows that for a fixed K∗, Vh+1(K∗, s) is decreasing in s for any history
h. Hence, Kˆ(s′) ⊆ Kˆ(s) for any s′ > s. Consequently, K∗(s) as defined in equation
(2.5) must be weakly decreasing in s. This result is, of course, very intuitive. As prices
are independent of search costs, an increase in search costs reduces the continuation
value for any history h. That is, an increase in search costs can only make consumers
switch from continuing to search given a particular history h to stopping to search
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given the same history, but will never induce a change in the other direction. As a
consequence, search persistence cannot be increasing in search costs.
2.3.2 Search Without Tracking
Without tracking search histories, sellers cannot price discriminate. Therefore, sellers
expect the same demand (elasticity) from any newly arriving consumer. Since given
those expectations, only one price maximizes profits, search without tracking implies
a uniform equilibrium price set by all sellers. As a consequence, consumers have no
incentive to defer the purchase decision after encountering a match and thus their
optimal stopping rule equals R∗. That is, i either buys if xi > pij or leaves the
market without a purchase which is identical to the uniquely optimal stopping rule
when g(x) is decreasing. Consequently, sellers set prices monopolistically. Due to the
simple optimal stopping rule, the distribution of consumer types fk(x) at any seller k is
correctly specified by the posterior belief derived in (2.1). Further, demand functions
- if sellers could discriminate - are given by (2.2), i.e. they are identical to those
under search with tracking. However, only consumers but not sellers can update the
beliefs conditional on different search histories. Hence, the sellers’ expected demand
is composed of the expected demand for each possible search history, weighted by the
respective probabilities. Based on the common prior F (x) and the matching probability
function g(x), sellers can compute the probability that a consumer has a history of
h = 0, 1, 2, ..., K∗ − 1 previous sellers. Note that consumers’ search persistence K∗
depends only on equilibrium prices but does not change in response to any deviating
price. I analyze the equilibrium level of K∗ after discussing the equilibrium pricing.
The probability φk of being in position k = h+1 in a consumer’s search process writes:
φk = (2.6)
1
N
·
k−1∏
j=1
∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(t))fj(t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
no match up to k−1
=
1
N
·
k−1∏
j=1
∫ 1
v
(
1− g(t))jf(t)∫ v¯
v
(
1− g(t))j−1f(t)dtdt
=
1
N
∫ 1
v
(
1− g(t))k−1f(t)dt ∀ k ≤ K∗.
and φk = 0 ∀ k > K∗.
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Notice that φk is the unconditional probability for being in a particular position.
While this is the actual probability of being sampled by a consumer with history
h = k − 1, sellers can condition the probability on the fact that the consumer is still
searching. However, normalizing by 1/
∑K∗
k φk has no effect on a seller’s first order
condition. Expected demand is composed of the expected demand functions for each
possible search history, weighted by the respective probabilities. Denote by D(p) the
expected demand weighing the individual demand functions from D1(p) to DK∗(p)
at the seller’s non-discriminatory unit price p, i.e. D(p) =
∑K∗
k=1 φkDk(p). Sellers
maximize:
Π(p) = p
K∗∑
i=1
φiDi(p) =
K∗∑
i=1
φiDi(p)p =
K∗∑
i=1
φipik(p) (2.7)
where pik(p) equals the profit function of a seller at the k’s position if discrimination
was feasible and where φi is given by (2.6) (see the appendix) and Dk(p) by (2.2). As
log-concavity of the individual demand functions is preserved in this weighted demand
function, I obtain the following:
Proposition 2.2 Without tracking, the unique equilibrium has a uniform price.
Since sellers cannot observe consumers’ strategies before consumers make a purchase,
they must have symmetric beliefs in equilibrium. Given these beliefs, there exists a
unique optimal price, set by all sellers. Thus, consumers must believe that prices are
constant in any PBE. Consequently, the equilibrium with the price maximizing (2.7)
is unique even when allowing for arbitrary expectations ex ante.
Without tracking, there is no price discrimination. Yet, consumer heterogeneity has
another effect on the comparative statics of equilibrium price, which depends on con-
sumers’ search persistence. Intuitively, the more sellers consumers are at most willing
to sample, the smaller the share of consumers with short search histories each seller
can expect because probability mass shifts to longer search histories. Since demand
from consumers with longer search histories is less price elastic, the equilibrium price
increases. Let p(K∗) be the uniform random search price if a consumer’s search per-
sistence equals K∗, then:
Lemma 4 For K∗2 > K
∗
1 , it holds that p(K
∗
2) > p(K
∗
1).
By lemma 4, more persistent search behavior by consumers leads to higher prices.
Thus, consumer heterogeneity implies a novel, and perhaps surprising, effect of search
persistence on the equilibrium price, which is not present in the WAR model.
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2.3.3 Search Persistence under Search Without Tracking
An increase in K∗ as discussed in lemma 4 can be the result either of an increase in
the number of sellers in the market or of a reduction in search costs. The former is
true if search costs are sufficiently low such that K∗ = N . Intuitively, the latter might
be true if 0 < K∗ < N and K∗ increases due to a decrease in search costs. While this
turns out to be correct, it does not follow immediately from the construction of K∗(s)
given in equation (2.5) due to the reverse effect of K∗ on prices.
The full characterization of equilibrium search persistence as a function of search
costs is provided by the lemmata 13, 14 and 15 in appendix A. To summarize, there
exist two disjoint sets of search cost intervals that give rise to a different characterization
of search persistence. By lemma 13, consumers’ search persistence K∗ equals a fixed
number of sellers for a set of relatively large intervals. Lemma 14 and 15 characterize
intervals where consumers continue sampling seller k only with some probability less
than one. That is, only a fraction of consumers without a match samples seller k
while all remaining consumers stop search.11 Between k and K∗, no further radomized
stopping occurs since all continuation values are strictly positive.
To see intuitively why random stopping occurs, consider the following argument. By
lemma 4, the optimal price without tracking is a function of K∗, which, in turn, depends
on the continuation value and thus on the level of search costs. As can be seen from
equation (2.4) by substituting pj = p ∀ j, the continuation value Vh+1 also depends on
the no tracking price p
(
K∗(s)
)
, which in turn, depends on K∗(s). That is, the contin-
uation value under no tracking for any history h is given by Vh+1
(
K∗, p
(
K∗(s)
)
, s
)
.
Ceteris paribus, a rise in search costs thus reduces the continuation value from search
and leads to a lower search persistence K∗. However, if consumers sample fewer sellers
in total, lemma 4 implies that the profit-maximizing price decreases, thus increasing
consumer surplus. When search costs are such that a consumer is just indifferent
between sampling seller k and stopping search, a marginal increase in s has only a
marginal direct effect on the continuation value from search while the indirect effect
through a lower k is large. Without random stopping, the discontinuity in K∗ results
in an inconsistency that rules out an equilibrium in pure strategies. Instead, consumers
shift sellers’ beliefs towards expecting more consumers with shorter search histories by
sampling later sellers only with some probability less than one. This prevents price
jumps and restores the equilibrium.
It remains to analyze the effect of search costs on prices in the absence of tracking.
Considering only the intervals where consumers do not use mixed strategies, higher
11Recall that k identifies a seller’s position in any consumer’s search process and not a unique seller.
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search costs imply a lower K∗ by lemma 13 and thus a decrease in prices by lemma 4.
When search costs are in a region where consumers follow a mixed stopping rule, prices
must decrease as well. Consider an increase in search cost from s = sˆ∗K(K
∗) to some
s > sˆ∗K(K
∗) requiring consumers to sample seller K∗ only with some probability.12
If search costs increase, the equilibrium probability of continuing to search decreases.
This is because it reduces the mass of actively searching consumers with any history
h = K∗− 1 such that sellers expect fewer consumers with long search histories and set
lower prices. Hence, search persistence decreases smoothly in search costs.
Proposition 2.3 Without tracking, the uniquely defined uniform price is weakly de-
creasing in search costs.
The intuition behind this result follows immediately from lemma 4. Lower search
costs increase consumers’ search persistence, which reduces every seller’s share of elastic
demand and, thus, leads to higher prices. Proposition 2.3 provides a micro-founded
theoretical explanation for some empirical papers suggesting that the internet does
not always lead to lower prices despite reducing search costs. For example, Ellison
and Ellison (2014) find that prices for used books are higher online than oﬄine. In
line with my model’s predictions, the authors argue that higher prices obtain because
sellers expect to sell mostly to consumers with high match values when consumers are
willing to search longer due to lower search costs.
It is important to note that a mixed stopping rule that can continuously decrease
a seller’s belief about the average search history need not exist always. That is, con-
sumers’ search persistence may not decrease gradually but may immediately fall from
K∗ > 1 to zero. Then, the no search equilibrium, which always exists, is the only
equilibrium. Formally, define by sˆk(K
∗) ∈ {s : Vk
(
K∗, p
(
K∗(s)
)
, s
)
= 0} the thresh-
old level of search costs such that sampling seller k conditional on p(K∗) and K∗ is
worthwhile if and only if s ≤ sˆk. Then,
Proposition 2.4 If there exists an equilibrium with K∗ = K∗ ≤ N for some level of
search costs such that sˆ1(K
∗) < sˆk(K∗) ∀ 1 < k ≤ K∗, no consumer searches and the
market breaks down if s > sˆ1(K
∗) .
Notably, the no search equilibrium prevails even though the surplus from search
would be positive for consumers if they were able to commit to sampling less than a
certain number of sellers. However, for any price making the first search worthwhile,
the search persistence, resulting from consumer’s sequentially optimal stopping deci-
sion, exceeds the search persistence for which the assumed price is maximizing profit.
Instead, sellers anticipate consumers’ search persistence conditional on initiating search
12The notation is explained in the appendix. For the argument however, it is sufficient to treat
sˆ∗K(K
∗) as some fixed threshold.
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and want to set a higher price, making sampling even the first seller not worthwhile for
consumers. Further, the conditions from proposition 2.4 rule out any mixed stopping
rule as shifting sellers beliefs to a lower average search persistence is not feasible when
the problem occurs at the first seller.
Proposition 2.4 applies if threshold search cost levels are not decreasing in the or-
der of search. Importantly, this always happens for some level of search costs if the
continuation value is not only decreasing with longer search histories. Technically, this
depends on g′(x) as well as x ·g(x). In reality, a situation where the continuation value
increases may in fact be quite common. Without knowing well what he is looking for,
Bob might not be too enthusiastic about getting a new suit prior to searching. While
sampling the first sellers however, Bob might learn that he likes particular kind of but-
tons and becomes excited about finding a suitable shirt. As a consequence, his interim
continuation value from search might well exceed his expected surplus prior to search.
2.4 Comparative Statics of Tracking
As the subsequent analysis will show, the implications of tracking for overall wel-
fare depend on the level of search costs and thus on consumers’ search persistence as
well. Because obtaining predictions that depend on the model’s fundamentals requires
additional structure, I first discuss how the effects of tracking vary with the search
persistence parameter K∗.
2.4.1 General Analysis
The first result concerns equilibrium prices and immediately follows from the sellers’
first order conditions.
Proposition 2.5 For any K∗ > 1, prices with and without tracking satisfy:
p1 < p(K
∗) < pK∗ .
By proposition 2.5, the uniform no-tracking price exceeds the price consumers face
at their first seller when searching with tracking but is strictly below the last seller’s
price. Moreover, a general result regarding profits is available when K∗ under search
with tracking is at least as high as under search without tracking:
Lemma 5 If K∗ is weakly larger under search with tracking, sellers’ profits are strictly
larger under search with than under search without tracking.
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The reason is fairly intuitive. If consumers sample the same number of sellers un-
der both regimes, the aggregated distribution of types from all consumers is identical.
Then, the only difference between tracking and no tracking is that in the former case,
sellers can condition the optimal price on private information about consumers. By
proposition 2.1, prices are increasing in the order of search under tracking and thus
different from a uniform price. Hence, the uniform price is not profit-maximizing if
better information is available, implying that tracking yields higher profits. Impor-
tantly, K∗ is indeed weakly larger under search with tracking in many cases. If search
costs are sufficiently low and the number of sellers not too large, K∗ = N irrespective
of tracking. Consequently, it follows generally that sellers always benefit from tracking
if there are not too many of them or search costs are sufficiently low.
Moreover, the market breakdown result stated in proposition 2.4 implies that if the
continuation value from search is not decreasing in the consumer’s search history, there
exists a threshold search cost level sˆ1(K
∗) such that K∗ = 0 for any s > sˆ1(K∗) under
search without tracking. Thus,
Proposition 2.6 If there exists a K∗ ≤ N such that sˆ1(K∗) < sˆk(K∗) ∀ 1 < k ≤ K∗,
tracking leads to strictly higher consumer surplus and profits for sˆ1 > s > sˆ1(K
∗).
Proposition 2.6 holds irrespective of how much surplus sellers would extract from
consumers via search history-based price discrimination. For s ∈ [sˆ1(K∗), sˆ1), it holds
that V1(p
+
1 , s) ≥ 0 under search with tracking. That is, the market under search with
tracking is active at a level of search costs where the market without tracking is not.
Consequently, tracking raises everyone’s surplus. The reason is that tracking reduces
the information asymmetry between consumers and sellers and thereby leads to suffi-
ciently low prices, making initiating search worthwhile for consumers. In contrast, an
equilibrium with low search persistence and low prices does not exist without tracking
under the conditions of proposition 2.6. Proposition 2.6 also stands in contrast to the
results derived by Zhou (2011). Without ex ante consumer heterogeneity, he finds that
consumer search is inefficiently low when search is ordered and leads to a lower overall
surplus.
As opposed to standard monopolistic group pricing, the following analysis suggests
that tracking may raise overall consumer surplus even when there is no market break-
down in the absence of tracking. Similarly to group price discrimination, it has a market
expansion effect since prices are lower for consumers with a lower expected willingness
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to pay.13 However, discrimination based on search histories is likely to benefit con-
sumers even more than standard group price discrimination. Rather than being part
of mutually exclusive groups, consumers arriving at some seller k have already had
the opportunity to buy at any seller j < k, implying that the different “groups” of
consumers facing different prices are in fact subsets of one another. Moreover, the
market price without tracking is above the first and below the last seller’s price with
tracking by proposition 2.5. Hence, there must exist a threshold history h¯ such that
only consumers with a history h > h¯ pay discriminatory prices exceeding p(K∗). Note
that consumers with a niche taste search longer on average than consumers with a
mass taste do. Hence, in expectation, some types are made better off from tracking
while others are made worth off.
Corollary 2.1 There exists a cut-off type x˜ ∈ X such that a consumer’s expected
surplus is reduced due to tracking if x > x˜.
2.4.2 Linear Matching Probability
In this section, I impose further structure on the model to derive additional analytic
results. In particular, I am interested in observing when the reduction of asymmet-
ric information via tracking can lead to welfare and consumer surplus improvements,
whether tracking always raises industry profit and, how these effects depend on search
costs. Consider a linear matching probability function g(x) = 1 − x and let the type
x be uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The total number of sellers is held constant at
N = 10 but consumers may sample only K∗ ≤ N . Proposition 2.7 summarizes the find-
ings from this section. Importantly, additional computations show that qualitatively
identical results obtain from any linear matching probability function.
Proposition 2.7 There exist two thresholds sp1 < s
p
2 such that profits are strictly larger
under search without tracking if s ∈ (sp1, sp2). Besides, there exist two thresholds sw1 < sw2
such that welfare is strictly larger without tracking if s ∈ (sw1 , sw2 ). Consumers surplus
is always higher under tracking. The market breaks down without tracking for s > sw2 .
The prices under search with tracking can be obtained from solving the maximization
problem as specified in (2.3). Under search without tracking, I observe that prices
increase in K∗.
13In fact, Belleflamme and Peitz (2015) demonstrate how partitioning the demand into smaller
intervals (“groups”) has a non monotonic effect on consumer surplus due to two opposing factors.
Due better information about the willingness to pay sellers charge lower prices from groups with a
lower willingness to pay - eventually leading to an expansion of the market as consumers are served
that would not have bought under the uniform price. However, as this information becomes more
precise, the surplus left to each group is decreasing and approaches zero for infinitesimally small
intervals.
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Figure a) shows the search persistence K∗ as a function of search costs. Figure b) shows consumer
surplus as a function of search costs. Orange represents search without tracking, blue search with
tracking.
Figure 2.1: Search costs, search persistence and consumer surplus
The continuation value for every history and feasible K∗ is given by equation (2.4).
Under search with tracking where continuation values and threshold search cost levels
are decreasing due to increasing prices, K∗ can be derived from the set K as defined
in equation (2.5). For search without tracking, the dependence of the continuation
value on K∗ via its effect on prices imposes an additional constraint on the optimal
K∗ as explained in section 3.3. Beyond Vk(K∗, p(K∗)) ≥ 0 ∀ k < K∗, it requires that
VK∗(K
∗, p(K∗)) ≥ 0 for the price that is optimal conditional on Kj. Lemma 13 specifies
the search cost intervals for every K∗ ≤ N . Pure stopping strategies sometimes lead
to dynamic inconsistencies due to the adverse effect of K∗ on the price p. By lemma
14, consumers with the maximum possible search history in the market randomize over
sampling the “last” seller for some levels of search costs. However, the range of the
intervals where consumers would choose mixed strategies is relatively small compared
to those where they choose pure strategies under the model’s specifications. Therefore,
I omit the calculation of the mixed strategies.14
The sharp drop of K∗ under search without tracking at around s = 0.038 as displayed
in figure (2.1a) illustrates the market breakdown result from proposition 2.4. If s =
0.038, the continuation value from sampling the first seller (expected surplus from
search) falls below zero while to any other interim continuation value would still be
positive. Thus, the threshold search cost is lowest prior to sampling search and the
dynamic search inconsistency problem cannot be prevented by a randomized strategy.
Hence, the market shuts down entirely and K∗ equals zero. As a consequence, consumer
14The length of the intervals where consumers would mix can be inferred from figure (2.1b). The
discontinuities between s = 0.03 and s = 0.04 would disappear if mixed strategies were accounted for.
Importantly, neglecting the mixed stopping behavior does not affect the computation of consumer
surplus, as Vj = 0 if consumers randomize over sampling j.
2.4 Comparative Statics of Tracking 29
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
s
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
profit
(a) Profits
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
s
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
welfare
(b) Welfare
Figure a) shows total profits as a function of search costs. Figure b) shows welfare as a function
of search costs. Orange represents search without tracking, blue search with tracking.
Figure 2.2: Search costs, profits and welfare
surplus is significantly lower under search without tracking when search costs hit the
market-breakdown threshold as shown in figure (2.1b).
Moreover, it can be seen that tracking leads to higher consumer surplus even in
the absence of the market breakdown. For search cost in the neighborhood of the
cut-off level s = 0.038, this is not too surprising. Both consumer surplus with and
without tracking are continuous functions of search costs. Since it is strictly higher
with tracking at s = 0.038, it has to be higher for lower search costs as well. For the
given linear specification of the model, tracking always raises consumer surplus. This
holds irrespective of the fact that for some levels of search costs, consumers sample
fewer sellers with tracking. The foregone consumer surplus from sampling the last
sellers is, however, relatively small due to higher prices conditional on longer search
histories. Thus, consumers always benefit on average.
Note that, surprisingly, tracking is not always maximizing industry profit as can
be seen in figure (3.3a) for intermediate search costs. In particular, this happens if
consumers’ search persistence is significantly lower under search with tracking than
without tracking. More precisely, the benefit of tracking for sellers comes from exploit-
ing detailed information about consumers with long search histories. If search costs
are too high however, consumers with long search histories (and high expected match
values) anticipate that they will be left with almost no surplus and do not continue
sampling additional sellers. While sellers would in general benefit from promising to
leave a surplus to consumers compensating them for search costs, they cannot due to
the hold-up problem.
Thus, the situation when facing a consumer with a long search history is comparable
to Diamond (1971), where sellers have perfect information about a consumer’s will-
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ingness to pay. In other words, the Diamond Paradox applies and consumers forego
search, which mostly harms sellers who would have extracted most of the surplus. Fig-
ure (3.3a) shows that tracking raises sellers’ profits otherwise and especially when the
market would shut down without tracking for high search costs. Figure (3.3b) shows
the effect of tracking on overall welfare, which depends on the level of search costs as
well. There is a wide range of search costs for which foregone profits due to reduced
search persistence cannot be offset by the increase in consumer surplus. For intermedi-
ate search costs, tracking thus reduces welfare. In fact, this is intuitive as the hold-up
problem prevents the realization of matches especially from high value consumers.
2.5 Extension: Increasing Matching Probability
In markets where products are sufficiently complex and have a variety if differentiated
features, the distinction between mass and niche consumers implying g′(x) < 0 seems a
reasonable assumption. However, if products are more standardized, the major source
of different match values may not lie in the nicheness of a consumer’s taste. Rather, a
consumer’s match value will depend on her budget set. For instance, think of consumer
electronics like flat screens. While not every brand’s flat screen constitutes a match due
to different preferences for diameter or energy consumption, the majority of consumers
derive utility from all of its technical features. Consequently, their willingness to pay
depends on mostly on the available income although they (still) buy the product only
if the investigated features meet their individual preferences. Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
find that low income consumers do less comparison shopping but still spend more time
on shopping in total, suggesting that they spend more time than high income consumers
on studying the products they buy. Given high income consumers inspect a product’s
features less carefully than low income consumers, they might be more likely to find
a product suitable. In this section, I therefore analyze the case of a weakly increasing
matching probability function g(x) with g′(x) ≥ 0.
Many of the arguments and results are either identical or simply a reversed version
of those made in the previous section. In those cases, explanations and proofs are
presented in an abbreviated form with complete references to the previous section. I
first show under which conditions there exists an equilibrium that exhibits a decreasing
price path. Second, I show that under those conditions, the equilibrium is unique.
Moreover, I derive the equilibrium without tracking and compare market outcomes.
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2.5.1 Search With Tracking
For g′(x) ≥ 0, consumers with a high conditional match value are more likely to en-
counter a match early. Hence, intuition suggests that lower prices are charged from
consumers with longer search histories in equilibrium. To construct such an equilib-
rium, suppose that consumers’ expectations satisfy pe1 ≥ pe2 ≥ ... ≥ peN .
If consumers expect a decreasing price path, they might prefer to continue searching
despite available matches at previous sellers. As the analysis of alternative expectations
in the case of g′(x) < 0 has shown, this potentially leads to a new category of demand
from consumers who might return to a match after sampling additional sellers. How-
ever, if potential gains from lower prices at forthcoming sellers are sufficiently smaller
than search costs, continuing to search despite a match is not worthwhile. Then, con-
sumers follow R∗ and expected history-dependent demand can be characterized by
equation (2.2) derived in section 3. In contrast to g′(x) < 0, demand from consumers
with long search histories is more elastic if consumers follow R∗ and types with a low
conditional match value search longer on average. I thus obtain the opposite result of
lemma 2.
Lemma 6 Suppose that consumers always use the stopping rule R∗. Then, the se-
quence of profit-maximizing prices is weakly decreasing and unique.
As in the proof of lemma 2, uniqueness is due to log-concavity of the demand function,
which is preserved under R∗ for any seller along a consumer’s search path. Lemma 6
does not yet complement proposition 2.1 for g′(x) ≥ 0. The question remains under
what conditions the continuation value from search after a successful match is always
negative, thus rendering R∗ indeed the optimal stopping rule?
Potential gains from lower prices depend on the changes in the elasticity of expected
demand. Denote the decreasing sequence of optimal prices if consumers follow R∗ by
{p∗k}k=1,..,N , p∗k ≥ p∗k+1 ∀ k < N.
Note that in any PBE where R∗ is the optimal stopping rule, consumers’ expectations
must be correct and thus satisfy pek = p
∗
k. The stopping ruleR∗ is optimal always only if
the continuation value from search conditional on an available match is weakly negative
for all types and for all possible search histories. Extending previous notation, denote
the continuation value conditional from sampling seller k conditional on an existing
match and known type xi by Vk(xi). Formally, Vk(xi) ≤ 0 ∀xi ∈ X, k ≤ N iff
g(x)
(
p∗k − pek+1
)
< s ∀x ∈ X, k ≤ N. (2.8)
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Given any level of search costs s > 0, an upper bound ∆ˆ > 0 for the slope of
g(x) exists such that condition (2.8) holds for all matching probability functions with
g′(x) < ∆ˆ. Consequently, pek = p
+
k ∀k if g′(x) < ∆ˆ. Lemma 7 summarizes these
findings.
Lemma 7 There always exists a ∆ˆ > 0 such that under expectations satisfying pek =
p∗k ∀ k ≤ N , the stopping rule R∗ is optimal and {p∗k}k=1,..,N constitute unique equilib-
rium prices for any matching probability function with 0 ≤ g′(x) < ∆ˆ ∀ x ∈ X.
The stopping rule R∗ thus leads to the price sequence {p∗k}k=1,..,N , which implies
that pek = p
∗
k, rendering R∗ indeed optimal for g′(x) < ∆ˆ. However, other equilibria
could exist for alternative consumer expectations, making some types adopt a stopping
rule different from R∗. However, it is possible to show that any expectations which are
different from {p∗k}k=1,..,N cannot constitute a PBE.15 The steps towards this result are
similar to those made in the previous section. First, observe that
Lemma 8 In any PBE, expectations satisfy pek ≥ p∗k ∀ k ≤ N if ∆ˆ > g′(x).
Intuitively, the statement holds for the following reason. Begin with the last sellers
whose price is expected to be below p∗k, i.e. p
e
k < p
∗
k. If despite alternative expectations,
consumers’ stopping behavior at previous sellers remains unchanged, seller k would
maximize profits by deviating to pk = p
∗
k > p
e
k as this price is profit-maximizing
conditional on R∗.
If instead, consumers’ stopping behavior changes due to alternative expectations,
it can affect only expected demand types with x > x¯ for seller k, where x¯ > pek.
The threshold x¯ characterizes the type whose matching probability g(x¯) is too low to
make sampling seller k despite available matches worthwhile. Consequently, expected
demand from types xi > x¯ can at most in- but not decrease compared to demand
that arises under R∗. Since raising the price to p∗k > pek leads to higher profits even
in the absence of this extra demand by lemma 6, setting a price higher than pek must
constitute a profitable deviation when demand from types xi > x¯ > p
e
k as well. The
same argument can be applied to any seller k′ whose expected price is supposed to
satisfy pek′ < p
∗
k′ , leading to the above lemma. As in the analysis in section 3, the lower
bound on consumers’ expectations leads to equilibrium uniqueness.
Proposition 2.8 In any PBE, expectations must satisfy pek = p
∗
k ∀ k ≤ K∗. Hence,
the equilibrium with the increasing price path characterized by {p∗k}k=1,..,N is unique.
The proof proceeds along the same lines used in proposition 2.1. As the first seller
knows that prices from all forthcoming sellers are expected to be higher than his own
15As it is the case in most search models, there always exists an equilibrium in which consumers
expect arbitrarily high prices and no consumer searches.
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price if he charges a price in the neighborhood of p∗1, he has local monopoly power
over its demand because consumers would follow R∗. Since p∗1 is the profit-maximizing
price under R∗, the first seller will always find it optimal to set a price equal to p+1 .
Given that the first seller sets p1 = p
∗
1, seller 2 can makes consumers follow R∗ (and
thus obtain local monopoly power) by setting p2 = p
∗
2 for the same reasoning. By
repeatedly applying this argument for all forthcoming sellers, one obtains the above
result.
Search persistence. As in the previous analysis, consumers sample up to K∗ sellers
if VK∗
(
s
) ≥ 0 and Vk(s) ≥ 0 ∀ k < K∗ given equilibrium prices. In fact, the fact that
prices are decreasing instead of increasing does not change the computation of K∗.
That is, K∗ ∈ K, where K is given by (2.5). Since Kˆ(s′) ⊆ Kˆ(s) for s′ > s holds
as well, K∗ is decreasing in s, resulting in a set of disjoint search costs intervals for
different K∗.
If continuation values are not always decreasing for higher search histories, there
might be jumps in K∗ such that search persistence decreases by more than one seller
at some search cost threshold. Using previous notation, let sˆk(K) ∈ {s : Vk(K, s) = 0}
define the search cost threshold above which sampling k is not worthwhile for a given
search persistence K. For non-decreasing continuation values, there exists a K such
that sˆk(K) 6= sˆ(K) ∈ min{sˆk(K)}k=1,..,K . Then, K∗ = K only if s ≤ sˆ(K) and K∗ = j
for sˆj′(j) ≥ s > sˆj(K) where seller j’s threshold equals sˆj(K) = sˆ(K). The next
threshold sˆj′(j) is obtained from sˆj′(j) ∈ min{sˆk(j)}k=1,..,Kj and specifies that K∗ = j′
for s > sˆj′(j) and so forth.
2.5.2 Search Without Tracking
Deriving uniform price equilibrium and its uniqueness under search without tracking
is identical to the case of g′(x) < 0. The reason is that due to the uniform price,
consumers follow the same stopping rule R∗. Hence, the seller’s problem is completely
characterized by (2.7) with expected demand given by equation (2.2). Thus:
Lemma 9 A unique uniform price equilibrium exists under random search.
The only difference compared g′(x) < 0 is that demand is now more elastic for higher
degrees of search persistence. That is:
Proposition 2.9 Let p(K∗) be the unit random search price if consumers maximum
willingness to search is K∗. Then,
p(K∗2) < p(K
∗
1) if g
′(x) > 0 and K∗2 > K
∗
1
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Notice that the intuition for the result is a simple reversion of the statement before.
A higher search persistence by consumers increases the probability that a consumer has
a long history. Since probabilities for all feasible search histories must add up to one,
sellers put less weight consumers with short histories and more weight on consumers
with long search histories if K∗ increases. Since demand from consumers with longer
search histories is more price elastic for g′(x) ≥ 0, the profit maximizing price decreases.
Search persistence. For a constant price, the continuation value from search
decreases for longer search histories. This is because a consumer’s expected type Eh[x]
decreases in h and so does the instantaneous expected surplus from the next seller,
g(x)(x − p), if g′(x) ≥ 0. Since consumers become increasingly pessimistic for higher
search histories, continuation values are decreasing in h, implying that K∗ decreases
gradually. That is, consumers sample K∗ = K sellers if s > sˆ(K)K where sK(K) ∈
{s : VK(p(K), s) = 0}. Since p(K) is decreasing in K, dynamic search inconsistencies
as in the case of g′(x) < 0 cannot emerge. Hence, the market remains active for all
s < s1(1). Moreover, consumers never have to choose mixed stopping rules.
2.5.3 Comparative Statics of Tracking
Since search persistence decreases gradually with search costs and V1(p(1), s) = V1(p1, s),
it follows that consumers search both under tracking and no tracking iff s < sˆ1(1).
Contrary to the case of g′(x) < 0, there thus exists no level of search costs for which
tracking must lead to higher profits and consumer surplus due to a market breakdown
without tracking. The comparison of prices is immediate after switching the sign of
g′(x) in the proof of proposition 2.5:
Corollary 2.2 For any search persistence K∗ > 1,
p1 ≥ p(K∗) ≥ pK∗ .
with strict inequality if g′(x) > 0.
By corollary 2.2, sellers maximize profits by charging search history dependent prices,
which differ from the uniform price without tracking. That is, reduced asymmetric
information due to tracking enables sellers to extract more expected surplus from a
consumer with a particular history h. Unless g′(x) = 0, I obtain:
Lemma 10 If K∗ is weakly higher under tracking than under no tracking, sellers’
profits are strictly larger under search with than under search without tracking.
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Figure a) shows consumer surplus as a function of search costs. Figure b) shows total profits as a
function of search costs. Orange represents search without tracking, blue search with tracking.
Figure 2.3: Search costs, consumer surplus and profits
To obtain specific results on the effect of search costs, I again impose additional
structure. Consider a linear matching probability functiong(x) = 0.1x, which is in-
creasing in x. As before, let the type x be uniformly distributed on [0, 1].16 The total
number of sellers is held constant at N = 10 but consumers may sample only K∗ ≤ N .
The computation proceeds as follows. First, I compute prices under search with
tracking for any history h and under search without tracking for any search persistence
K∗. Second, by calculating continuation values for every possible history, I obtain the
optimal search persistence K∗ as described in section 5.1 and 5.2 for every level of
search costs. Recall that the decreasing price path under search with tracking may
not constitute an equilibrium if search costs are too low or potential gains from price
savings too high. While not displayed here, the maximum price difference a consumer
can expect amounts to roughly ∆p = 0.005. Since the highest matching probability a
consumer might have equals 0.1, condition 2.8, which ensures that a unique equilibrium
exists, is satisfied for s > 0.0005. Figure (3.4a) shows that tracking hardly affects
consumer surplus. That is, gains for longer searching consumers from lower prices are
offset by higher starting prices for all consumers. In contrast, profits can be much larger
due to tracking as shown in figure (3.4b). In fact, this is because K∗ decreases faster if
search is without tracking. While under tracking, consumers with long search histories
may find continuing to search worthwhile such that match values are realized, the price
without tracking may prevent them from search. As the surplus left to consumers even
if they continue searching is small, there is only a marginal effect on consumer surplus.
16The slope is chosen to be small to ensure equilibrium existence.
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2.6 Application: Endogenous Tracking
In this section, I apply the consumer search framework to study whether tracking
arises endogenously. For this purpose, I consider a consumer’s dynamic choice about
preventing tracking. Since the processing of personal data seems to be the default
on the internet for its use goes far beyond price discrimination only, a seller’s choice
about tracking is only about deciding on whether to use the available data for price
discrimination. Note that this implies a seller decides about using tracking at the price
setting stage. Hence, the problem is simply part of his profit maximization. More
precisely, if anything but a search history-independent price is optimal, it must hold
that using tracking is the dominant strategy.
To model a consumer’s tracking choice, I assume that every time before she samples
a seller, she can either disclose her entire search history, i.e. allow tracking (T) or not
disclose her search history and thus not allow tracking (NT). Search histories contain
the number of all sellers previously visited, independently of whether the consumer
had chosen NT or T when sampling previous sellers.17 In reality, consumers usually
also have the option to erase their histories, for example by deleting cookies. In the
discussion section, I show that the predictions I obtain are robust to this extension if
sellers can distinguish between a consumer who deletes her cookies and a consumer who
just started searching for a particular product. Briefly, this assumption is motivated
by the observation that by deleting cookies, consumers erase their entire search profile.
However, a consumer who has not deleted cookies but just started searching for a
product should still have an “unrelated” search history. The signal sent to sellers when
deleting cookies is then identical to choosing NT and, thus, is redundant. Denote a
consumer’s tracking decision by d ∈ {T,NT}.
Timing. At first, sellers set prices for every possible search history and choice
of d and nature draws each consumer’s type. Consumers search by sampling sellers
sequentially at a cost s per seller. Prior to each search attempt, consumers choose
d. Sellers observes a consumer’s search history h if d = T and nothing but d = NT
otherwise. The consumer observe the price conditional on her disclosure strategy and
search history as well as her match utility. Lastly, she decides whether to buy, to return
to a previous seller, to continue or to stop search.
17Web-browsing with the “do not track” request option, where cookies are still stored on the con-
sumer’s device but simply not processed, fits this assumption fairly well. However, results are robust
to the modified assumption that search histories contain only the number of sellers for which tracking
had been enabled. This is because the search history a consumer can disclose would still be weakly
increasing in the number of sellers and thus not affect the price path with tracking.
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Equilibrium concept. As before, the equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Extending the strategy space by the choice of d implies additional PBE
conditions which are not present in the baseline mode. First, consumers choose d in
order to maximize their expected surplus. Second, sellers’ beliefs about a consumer’s
search history must be consistent with the consumers’ disclosure strategy. Third,
consumer’s beliefs about prices must be consistent with sellers’ equilibrium pricing
strategies, and, thus, with their own disclosure strategy.
I analyze the cases of g′(x) < 0 and g′(x) ≥ 0 separately and begin with g′(x) < 0.
Denote by p(NT ) the uniform price set by sellers upon observing the choice NT. For
prices under tracking, use the previous notation pk with the index indicating the seller’s
position in the consumer’s search process. Note that the choice about d ∈ {T,NT} is
without commitment and only affects the information revealed to the next seller while
the prices from additional sellers remain unaffected. Hence, the consumer’s decision to
disclose her history is purely myopic as it only depends on the difference between the
next price she can expect under tracking peh+1 and no tracking p
e(NT ). If pek = p
e(NT )
for some consumer with history h = k − 1, I impose that a consumer stays with
the default option, which is search with tracking. This tie-breaking rule is without
loss of generality as the alternative rule would imply the same equilibrium outcome.
Since consumers choose d = T prior to sampling seller k if only if pe(NT ) ≥ pk, it
is sufficient to restrict attention to single cut-off strategies, where such a strategy is
defined as follows:
Choose NT ∀ h ≥ hˆ ∈ N (2.9)
For brevity, denote the above defined single cut-off strategy by hˆ ≤ K∗. To see why
this restriction does not constrain equilibrium strategies, suppose that pe(NT ) < pek
such that a consumer chooses d = NT at seller k. Since her search history at any
forthcoming seller will be h > k, forthcoming sellers’ prices always satisfy pe(NT ) <
pej ∀ j > k. Consequently, d = NT must be optimal for all h ≥ k if it is optimal at k.
In any PBE, sellers anticipate the equilibrium strategy hˆ and can thus condition
p(NT ) on h ≥ hˆ when observing d = NT . Denote the profit-maximizing price condi-
tional on the cut-off strategy hˆ by p(hˆ). Then, p(NT ) = p(hˆ) in equilibrium. Recall
that by previous notation, phˆ+1 denotes the price set by a seller who observes a brows-
ing history hˆ and thus knows that his position in the consumer’s search process is hˆ+1.
Without imposing equilibrium strategies yet, the following lemma compares prices with
tracking and without tracking for arbitrary single cut-off strategies hˆ.
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Lemma 11 Given hˆ, there always exists a unique optimal price p(hˆ) with
p(hˆ) > phˆ+1 ∀ hˆ < K∗ − 1,
and p(hˆ) = phˆ+1 for hˆ = K
∗.
The intuition behind lemma 11 is the following. When hiding the search history for
all histories h ≥ hˆ, sellers observing d = NT attach positive probabilities on all histories
h ≥ hˆ and zero probability on h < hˆ. Most importantly, P(h > hˆ) > 0 ∀ hˆ < K∗ − 1,
and hence the optimal price conditional on observing d = NT is chosen with respect
to a weighted demand function that is always less elastic than expected demand from
a consumer disclosing h = hˆ (implying P(h = hˆ) = 1).
By lemma 11, a consumer whose search history equals the cut-off history is charged
a lower price if she allows tracking (d = T ) than if she does not (d = NT ). However,
by construction, a consumer with a history of h = hˆ chooses d = NT , implying that
profitable deviations exist at least for some consumers. The uniqueness result in the
following proposition is an immediate consequence of this contradiction.
Proposition 2.10 There always exists a unique PBE with the disclosure strategy hˆ =
K∗ and a conditional no tracking-price p(NT ) = pK∗.
Proposition 2.10 states that the search history is always disclosed in the unique
equilibrium, leading to unrestricted tracking and price discrimination. Existence can
be shown by means of an example. Simply consider an equilibrium with search history-
based prices p1 < p2 < ... < pK∗ , a disclosure strategy hˆ = K
∗ and a no tracking-price
p(NT ) = pK∗ . Since K
∗ is the maximum number of sellers a consumer is willing to
sample, hˆ = K∗ means that no actively searching consumer chooses d = NT and
sellers should never observe NT . Denote by µ(h) ∈ [0, 1] a seller’s out-of-equilibrium
belief that the search history of a consumer having chosen NT equals h. Suppose
it satisfies µ(h) = 0 ∀h < hˆ such that µ(K∗) = 1. Since pK∗ maximizes profits
conditional on µ(K∗) = 1, sellers have no incentive to deviate from p(NT ) = pK∗ .
Besides, consumers have no incentive to deviate to another disclosure strategy hˆ′ < hˆ
since p(NT ) ≥ pk ∀ k ≤ K∗.
The uniqueness result is based on an unravveling mechanism similar to Milgrom
and Roberts (1986). For any alternative cut-off strategy hˆ < K∗, sellers’ beliefs must
satisfy µ(h) = 0 ∀ h < hˆ. Hence, the optimal price conditional on observing NT
satisfies p(NT ) = p(hˆ) > phˆ+1 by lemma 11. Since consumers with a search history
h = hˆ can obtain the price phˆ+1 by allowing tracking prior to sampling seller k = hˆ+1,
they always have an incentive to deviate from any cut-off strategy hˆ < K∗.
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2.6.1 Increasing Matching Probability
If g′(x) ≥ 0 but not too large, prices are monotone decreasing in search histories as
shown in section 2.5. Thus, it follows that the optimal disclosure strategy belongs to
the set of single cut-off strategies as well. However, the reverse pricing pattern requires
to slightly adjust the notion of single-cut-off strategies, abbreviated by hˇ:
Choose NT ∀ h ≤ hˇ (2.10)
Denote by p(hˇ) the seller’s optimal price conditional NT and the consumer cut-off
strategy hˇ. Analogously to lemma 11, one can show that:
Lemma 12 Given hˇ, there always exists a unique optimal price p(hˇ) which satisfies
p(hˇ) > phˇ+1 ∀ hˇ > 0,
and p(hˇ) = phˇ+1 for hˇ = 0.
The distinction between a a search history h and the corresponding position h+ 1 in
the search process of a seller observing h is again crucial to understand the implications
of lemma 12. For illustration, suppose that hˇ = 1 implying that consumers choose
d = NT if h ∈ {0, 1}. In any PBE, sellers would know that h ∈ {0, 1} if d = NT and
h 6≥ 1. By lemma 12, the resulting optimal price p(NT ) then exceeds p1, the price
sellers would set if they knew that h = 1 with certainty. However, any consumer with a
history of h = 1 can choose d = T and convey their history to sellers, thereby obtaining
a lower price than p(NT ). The example shows that hˇ = 1 cannot be an equilibrium
strategy for consumers. In fact, the unraveling argument applies again for any cut-off
strategy hˇ > 0 such that complete tracking remains as the unique equilibrium:
Proposition 2.11 There always exists a unique PBE with the disclosure strategy hˇ = 0
and a conditional no tracking-price p(NT ) = p1.
While the unraveling mechanism illustrated in the above example is reversed com-
pared to proposition 2.10, the proof of proposition 2.11 is otherwise identical. For any
cut-off strategy hˇ > 0 where NT is chosen from consumers with strictly positive search
histories, there always exists consumers who are better off from tracking even though
their history belongs to h ≤ hˇ. Hence, only hˇ = 0 constitutes an equilibrium strategy.
The major implication of propositions 2.10 and 2.11 is that there is no privacy in
the market because consumers rationally approve tracking at all stages during the
search process. Since the consumers’ best-response to price discrimination is a myopic
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decision based merely on the very next seller’s price, the equilibrium outcome need not
be consumer surplus maximizing.
2.7 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the robustness of my findings via several extensions to the
model. Some extensions constitute an entirely new model for future research which
cannot be discussed in every detail here. In this case, I only provide a brief discussion
of what changes to expect. Lastly, I explain how the model contributes to the discussion
of whether random search can be stable (Armstrong, 2017).
No commitment
Since consumers search with free recall, sellers might not only be interested in discrim-
inating between consumers, but also to discriminate a consumer based on whether she
arrives for the first time or whether she is returning. Indeed, Armstrong and Zhou
(2010) focus on this issue. In my baseline model, the timing does not allow for within
consumer price discrimination. Instead, I implicitely assume that sellers can commit
to a price they will charge from returning consumers under the constraint that this
price is equal to the price charged at the first encounter. Indeed, this is not without
loss of generality. Due to free recall, a multiplicity of equlibria might arise without
commitment since consumers could form any beliefs about the return-price. However,
the commitment assumption could be relaxed by introducing a small but positive cost
 for returning to a previous seller. This is because when a consumer with history h
decides to return to some seller k < h, she does so only if she expects vik > p
R
k +, where
pRk is the expected return-price. Hence, sellers have an incentive to raise their price
at least by , making returning not worthwhile for some consumers. This argument
holds for any pRk < v¯ such that the arising hold-up problem prevents any consumer
from returning if sellers have no commitment power. The reason why the Diamond
Paradox arises in the market for returning consumers but not in the market for “fresh”
consumers is because only in the former, consumers already know their willingness to
pay, rendering their return decision informative for sellers.18
18This point is also made in Armstrong and Zhou (2010)
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Heterogeneous search costs
Another dimension in which consumers naturally differ from one another might be the
individual search cost. Should we expect countervailing effects from introducing search
cost heterogeneity into the current framework, mitigating the search dynamics and
welfare implications derived? Heterogeneous search costs imply that consumers differ
with respect to their search persistence K∗. Under search with tracking, prices do not
depend on K∗. Thus, there are no new qualitative effects of search cost heterogeneity,
despite leading to heterogeneous stopping by consumers.
Under search without tracking, heterogeneous search costs mitigate the dynamic
search inconsistency problem. Since for any marginal increase in search costs, there is
only a marginal consumer reducing her search persistence, there are no jumps in K∗
and prices react smoothly to changes in search costs. That is, there is again no effect
of search cost heterogeneity except for making mixed stopping rules disappear. The
inefficiency problem due to market inactivity as stated in proposition 2.6 also persists
under search cost heterogeneity. While indeed some consumer will always search for
reasonable levels of search costs, those with low search costs search particularly long,
thereby driving up the price without tracking. Hence, consumers with high search
costs abstain from search entirely, driving up prices even more and exlcuding additional
consumers from participating in search.
Deleting cookies
By deleting cookies. consumers might be able to reset their their seacrh history to
h = 0 and thereby trick sellers. However, it is possible to show that deleting cookies
and not allowing tracking are equivalent with respect to their signal under some mild
assumptions. These are: (1) cookies saved on a device cannot be manipulated but only
erased completely or not at all. While a minority of internet users might be capable of
deleting only particular cookies from their computer, the majority of users is restricted
to the standard software which typically enforces this all or nothing property. And (2),
sellers can distinguish between a consumer who deleted all her cookies and a consumer
who only began searching for a product.
Note also that this second assumption can be derived from more fundamental as-
sumptions about online browsing. A consumer who only begins searching for a partic-
ular product still has a non-empty browsing history including search for other product
categories and various online services. Denote this “extended” browsing history by H.
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The browsing history H is empty only if a consumer deletes her cookies and otherwise
satisfies H 6∈ ∅. In addition, note that h = 0 6⇒ H ∈ ∅.
Denote the choice of deleting cookies by t ∈ {KC,DC}, where DC denotes the
choice to delete cookies while K refers to keeping them. Focusing on sellers’ belief
about a consumer’s (history-) type induced by the signal t = DC, it turns out there
is no difference to the signal d = NT . Under NT , sellers cannot observe h. Under
t = DC, sellers observe h = 0 but know that the consumer has deleted cookies since
H ∈ ∅. Hence, they know that they do not know the true h, which is equivalent to not
knowing h at all.
Denote by {d, t} the consumer’s action tuple regarding the decision to allow tracking
and keep her cookies. Due to identical signaling effects, it holds that sellers’ beliefs
satisfy:
µ(h|T ∧DH) = µ(h|NT ∧DH) = µ(h|NT ∧KH) ∀ h.
Since the sellers’ beliefs determine prices, these actions are thus payoff-equivalent from
the perspective of consumers as well.
Now suppose that a fraction of consumers indeed searches with a new device and
that her browsing history cannot be distinguished from a consumer who deletes her
cookies. Equivalently, there might be a fraction of consumers who always disable
tracking by default because they have a strong preference for privacy. If the fraction
of those consumers is sufficiently large, the equilibrium from proposition 2.10 cannot
be sustained since sellers must attach positive probability on shorter search histories
conditional on observing NT (or equivalently, DC).
Notably, the first order condition of a seller observing NT shows that the optimal
no tracking price p(NT ) is weakly decreasing in the cut-off strategy hˆ.19 Besides, phˆ+1,
the price a consumer with a history h = hˆ would obtain if she chose T, is increasing
as shown by lemma 2. Denote by α the fraction of consumers who disable tracking by
default/ begin search with new devices. It follows that:
Corollary 2.3 For α > 0 but not too large, there exists a unique PBE with the dis-
closure strategy 0 < hˆ ≤ K∗ and the no tracking price p(NT ) solves
p(NT ) = arg max
p
(
(1− α)
K∗∑
k=hˆ+1
φkDk(p) + α
K∗∑
k=1
φkDk(p)
)
p.
19See the proof of lemma 11
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Stable random search
According to Armstrong (2017) random search in the WAR model is unstable. He
argues that random search from the part of consumers depends crucially on consumers’
expectations about other consumers’ perfectly random search behavior. If instead, one
seller S becomes more salient than its competitors such that both consumers and sellers
should expect that an arbitrarily small but positive mass of consumers is more likely
to sample S first, S will optimally set a lower price than its competitors, as shown by
Armstrong and Zhou (2011) or Zhou (2011). If consumers are free to choose at what
seller to begin searching while all sellers’ products are ex ante identical, this creates
an incentive for all consumers to begin searching at seller S. Consequently, the seller
sampled first is not a random choice and search becomes partially ordered. Similarly,
consumer beliefs about which seller to sample afterwards can tip easily and so can
beliefs about all sellers’ position in the search process. Then, random search becomes
perfectly ordered as the same argument applies to the second seller etc.
The market tipping property of random search prevails because sellers who are vis-
ited first have an incentive to price lower than sellers who are sampled later in the
search process. In the current framework instead, this is not true if g(x) is weakly
increasing, suggesting that random search would be stable. Suppose that a positive
mass of consumers would not search randomly but begin with a particular seller M
such that M has a larger share of consumers with shorter search histories. As g(x)
is increasing and high types are less likely to be among consumers with longer search
histories, seller M has an incentive to raise its price above the uniform price charged
by others.20 Hence, the more salient seller M sets the highest price if g′(x) > 0. This
prevents the search market from tipping as due to its higher price, consumers would
avoid searching for seller M first, including those that were expected to sample it first
on purpose. Consequently, consumers prefer to search randomly over coordinating on
more salient sellers.
2.8 Conclusion
Most of users’ activities across the internet are tracked by third parties. Accessing
these browsing data is particularly attractive to sellers if the average search behavior
varies across different consumer types. Then, tracking a consumer’s search path enables
sellers to learn about a consumer’s willingness to pay and gives rise to search path-
20By not raising the price by too much, consumer’s stopping rule would remain unaffected so that
the stopping rule remains unaffected at least for small price deviations.
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dependent price discrimination. This paper presents a rich and tractable framework
integrating consumer heterogeneity and tracking into a model of sequential consumers
search to address the major implications of tracking for market outcomes.
First, I show that, in the unique equilibrium, tracking implies search history-dependent
pricing. Specifically, prices increase in the order of search if the difference between con-
sumer types is the peculiarity and nicheness of their taste. Since niche consumers are
more likely to search longer, demand from consumers with long search histories is less
elastic. Consequently, sellers set higher prices conditional on observing longer search
histories.
Second, I compare the market outcome under search with tracking with the unique
equilibrium under search without tracking to evaluate its welfare consequences. Be-
cause initial prices are lower while later prices are higher than the price under search
without tracking, the surplus of niche consumers decreases while the surplus of mass
consumers increases due to tracking. Besides, overall welfare effects depend how track-
ing affects consumers’ search persistence, which, in turn, depends on the level of search
costs. For a wide range of intermediate search costs, consumers sample more sellers in
the absence of tracking because the average no-tracking price makes continuing search
with a long search history more attractive. This may cause welfare losses due to for-
gone matches, particularly at the cost of sellers who would have extracted most of the
matching surplus. However, tracking increases welfare if search costs are very low such
that search persistence remains unaffected and if search costs are very high. In the
latter case, this is because low prices conditional on short search histories ensure that
consumers have an incentive to begin searching, thus keeping the market active. In the
absence of tracking instead, the no-tracking price is often too high, thus leading to a
market breakdown for the same level of search costs. Perhaps surprisingly, consumers
may always be better off from tracking whereas sellers make less profits at least for
some search costs.
Third, I investigate whether tracking prevails endogenously when consumers can
dynamically opt out from tracking. I find that, in the unique equilibrium, consumers
always prefer to disclose their search history as the price conditional on hiding it always
exceeds the price at least some consumers could obtain after disclosing it. Therefore,
the entire search history is disclosed in equilibrium. Even though the equilibrium is
unique, the full tracking prediction is not cast in stone. As discussed in the previous
section, partial tracking, where consumers disclose their search history only up to some
threshold, obtains if a positive mass of consumers always disables tracking by default.
Besides, the endogenous tracking result is interesting not only because it explains
why many internet users do not prevent tracking, but also because it has important
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implications for policy makers. That is, if tracking is surplus-increasing, no intervention
is necessary because tracking prevails even though it entails increasing prices.
Often, sellers refrain from personalized pricing because of consumers’ prejudices
against price discrimination or legal uncertainty. Then, improved targeting consti-
tutes an alternative practice to capitalize on traceable search histories. That is, a
seller possessing multiple products of the same category might be able to use infor-
mation conveyed through search histories to offer more suitable products to individual
consumers. Following Johnson and Myatt (2006), a seller’s product choice could be in-
tegrated in this paper’s framework by allowing sellers to rotate the matching probability
function. Again, it would be interesting to examine whether the profit-maximizing de-
sign induces inefficiently low search persistence or whether it can be welfare increasing
as well.
Finally, Turow et al. (2009) find that the majority of consumers oppose personal-
ized pricing, thus confirming the anecdotal evidence that significant prejudices against
tracking still prevail. In the light of the fact that tracking often has desirable conse-
quences for consumer surplus and welfare, the question of where this negative view
comes from deserves more attention. If consumers obtain additional utility from
anonymity, avoidance of tracking and personalized pricing may, of course, be wel-
fare maximizing despite the foregone matching surplus. If, however, the preference for
anonymity is based on false beliefs about the consequences of tracking, consumers may
be harmed from being misinformed.

3 Heterogeneous Fairness Views1
3.1 Introduction
Distributional preferences are important inputs into social decision making, including
taxation, redistribution and charitable giving. Different studies suggest that distribu-
tional preferences depend on people’s fairness ideals. Many people are either egalitari-
ans or libertarians, meaning that they either support or oppose redistribution always,
irrespective of what they believe about the source of the inequality. The remaining
fraction may be considered as liberal egalitarians, who are in favor of some redistri-
bution unless they hold the poor fully responsible for their economic situation. Often
however, only imperfect information is available about the source of economic success
or failure. As a consequence, support for redistribution not only depends on one’s fair-
ness ideal, but also on what is believed about the factors causing economic inequality.
In the light of this multiplicity of factors driving people’s fairness views, it is not too
surprising that many of the most frequently debated topics in everyday politics center
around inequality and support for redistribution. Yet, despite the apparent heterogene-
ity in distributional preferences, our understanding of their premises, people’s fairness
ideals and beliefs about the accountability for economic success, is still incomplete. Be-
cause support for redistributive policies can neither be reasonably predicted nor fully
understood without knowing why people have heterogeneous preferences, advancing
our knowledge about what shapes these premises is a prerequisite for effective policy
making. In this paper, I explore one possible explanation for the heterogeneity in the
afore-mentioned dimensions, which is variation in the experience of economic success
and failure.
Most importantly, I ask whether experience leads to systematically different beliefs
about the influence of luck or effort when facing uncertainty about the source of in-
equality. To address this question, I use an experimental design that allows me to
1I am very grateful to Henrik Orzen, Dietmar Fehr, Hans-Peter Gru¨ner, Justin Leduc, Nikos
Nikiforakis, Jean-Robert Tyran and Stephan Meier for helpful comments and valuable suggestions.
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observe distributive preferences under uncertainty and, more importantly, relate those
preferences to participants’ beliefs by comparing choices with those made under cer-
tainty about the earnings procedure. Additionally, I investigate whether experience
affects the adoption of different fairness ideals by measuring distributive preferences
while leaving no room for reasonably different beliefs about the role of luck.
In any natural environment, experience is endogenous and depends on a large number
of unobservables. Moreover, any natural environment exhibits some degree of uncer-
tainty about the process leading to inequality. However, relating people’s distributive
choices under uncertainty to their beliefs about the role of luck requires knowledge
about the counter-factual choice under certainty. An experiment, consisting of a real-
effort and a redistribution phase, can solve this causal inference problem associated
with real-world data. In the different treatments, I vary the earnings procedure as
well as the information provided about it while holding income associated with success
(20 EUR) and failure (5 EUR) constant. That is, subjects are randomly matched into
pairs such that one subject per pair experiences success while the other one experiences
failure. In the redistribution phase, all participants can redistribute income from the
subject that has received 20 EUR (success) to the subject that has received 5 EUR
(failure) within another pair in the role of a spectator. In the EFFORT earnings condi-
tion, high and low income are assigned based on relative performance in one’s pair. In
the RANDOM earnings condition, high and low income are assigned randomly. In the
FULL INFORMATION treatment, participants learn about the earnings procedure
after the real-effort phase and before the redistribution phase. In contrast, they only
know that both procedures are equally likely and identical for all subjects of the same
session in the UNCERTAINTY treatment.
In the UNCERTAINTY treatment, high income spectators redistribute as much as
in the RANDOM earnings condition with FULL INFORMATION whereas low income
spectators redistribute as little as in the EFFORT earnings condition with FULL IN-
FORMATION. Since the information provided and the resulting room for subjective
beliefs is the only difference between the treatments FULL INFORMATION and UN-
CERTAINTY, I can interpret the effect of uncertainty on participants’ beliefs directly
from observing actual choices without having to rely on elicited beliefs. Consequently,
the data strongly suggests that high (low) income spectators believe that luck (effort),
rather than effort (luck), has determined everyone’s income.
In the FULL INFORMATION treatment, high income spectators redistribute signifi-
cantly less than low income spectators, irrespective of the earnings procedure (EFFORT
or RANDOM). Moreover, all spectators redistribute more on average when earnings
are determined randomly. Hence, the diametrically opposed effects of different experi-
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ences imply that distributional preferences of high and low income spectators are more
aligned under uncertainty than under full information, though a significant difference
exists in all treatments. Surprisingly, the majority of high income spectators do not
equalize income but allow successful subjects to take home 50% more than unsuccess-
ful subjects on average in the RANDOM earnings condition. Since success depends
only on chance in this treatment, differences in distributive preferences can neither be
due to different beliefs about the influence of luck nor due to self-selection. Rather,
experience-dependent fairness ideals can explain the observed distributional preferences
as a large fraction of 23% of high income spectators redistribute little or nothing to
the poorer subject, in line with the libertarian fairness ideal. By contrast, low income
spectators equalize income almost always. Survey responses given at the end of the
experiment support this conclusion. Even when success is determined randomly and,
thus, completely exogenous, the self-reported fairness ideals of high income subjects
are more often libertarian than those of low income subjects.
Recently, Deffains et al. (2016) and Cassar and Klein (2017) concluded from their
experiments that a self-serving bias drives differences in distributive preferences be-
tween high and low income earners. According to a self-serving bias, high income
spectators attribute their success to internal factors such as hard work whereas low
income spectators attribute their failure to external factors such as bad luck. With the
present design, I can explicitly test for the presence of an effective self-serving bias.
If high income spectators attributed their high income to their own effort while low
income spectators attributed their low income to bad luck, the former should consider
the effort-dependent earnings procedure more likely while the latter should tend to
believe that earnings have been assigned randomly. Interestingly, I find exactly the
opposite. That is, it strongly appears that a self-effacing bias, not a self-serving bias,
affects beliefs and distributional preferences under uncertainty.
Since the difference in demand for redistribution between high and low income sub-
jects is persistent across across treatments, a natural question to ask is whether only the
experience of success, only the experience of failure, or the experience of both influence
distributional preferences. In an additional information treatment, denoted by VOI, I
observe participants’ choices after they learn about the earnings procedure (EFFORT
or RANDOM) but before they are informed about their own income.2 First, I find that
there is no difference in choices between those who (will) receive a high and those who
(will) receive a low income, implying that the difference in preferences indeed comes
from different experiences. Second, comparing the average transfer of all spectators
from the VOI treatment with that of high and low income spectators in the differ-
2Since this environment resembles the concept of making a decision behind the veil of ignorance
(Rawls, 1971), the treatment is abbreviated by VOI.
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ent earnings procedures in the FULL INFORMATION treatments permits to observe
what type of experience induces a change in distributional preferences. Indeed, I find
that the experience of both success and failure changes distributional preferences. De-
pending on the earnings procedure, experiencing success reduces redistribution by high
income spectators by 20 to 30% while it raises redistribution by low income spectators
by 15 to 30%.
In the spirit of Smith (1759), economists, moral philosophers, and social scientists in
general are often interested in the views of an impartial observer when evaluating the
(in-)justice of unequal wealth distributions. Yet, as Konow (2008) notes, the concept of
an ideal spectator by Smith (1759), who is fully informed and perfectly unbiased, does
probably not exist in the real world. My findings strongly support his claim, showing
that it holds even in clean and fully controlled laboratory environments. Specifically,
the commonly used spectator method does not always elicit unbiased fairness views
even though it eliminates the trade-off between self-interest and other-regarding pref-
erences. Consequently, understanding how income affects fairness views both under
certainty and uncertainty has important implications not only for public economics
and political economy, but also for the design of experiments in general. More pre-
cisely, how should experimental economists deal with the effect of experience when
they can control it? On the one hand, experience appears to be a prerequisite for
informedness. How shall spectators assess the deservingness of high and low income,
respectively, without experiencing the difficulty of a task themselves? On the other
hand, the results from this experiment show that experience induces a bias towards
the group the experience is being shared with. As the data from the VOI treatment
suggest, the benefits from admitting experience can be obtained without inducing a
bias by emplyong the spectator or third party observer method at the interim stage.
That is, prior to learning the outcome but after participating in the real-effort phase,
subjects are better informed and more likely to be unbiased.
3.2 Literature
This paper is most closely related to the experimental literature on people’s fairness
views. Employing an experiment that consists of an earnings and a redistribution
phase, Cappelen et al. (2007) estimate that there is considerable heterogeneity in fair-
ness ideals. While few participants act like libertarians who oppose any redistribution
in their experiment, they conclude that the majority of participants either has a strict
egalitarian or a liberal egalitarian fairness ideal. The fairness principle followed by lib-
eral egalitarians is closely related to application of the accountability principle. Using a
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series of dictator games, Konow (2000) examines the extent to which the accountability
principle can explain the willingness to redistribute and finds that whether dictators
hold receivers accountable for their disadvantageous bargaining position explains a lot
of the dictators’ choices behavior. The experiment presented in this paper relies heavily
on the prevalence of the liberal egalitarian fairness ideal. If uncertainty leads to dif-
ferent beliefs about the role of luck, it has an effect on people’s choices only if support
for redistribution indeed depends on those beliefs, as it should be the case for liberal
egalitarians. Moreover, this paper also contributes to this literature by pointing out
new explanations for the adoption of different fairness ideals.
Extending the above line of research, Cappelen et al. (2013) study fairness views with
respect to risk taking by letting participants choose between risky and safe options in
the first stage of their experiment. Subsequently, neutral spectators, who have not par-
ticipated in the first stage, can redistribute income within pairs of participants with
heterogeneous earnings. Generally, they find that redistribution is considerably lower
if inequality prevails after participants chose differently risky options, even though
most spectators compensate others for bad luck conditional on choices being identi-
cal. Mollerstrom et al. (2015) study fairness views under risk taking as well and find
differences between environments involving controllable (chosen) and uncontrollable
(forced) risk. Overall, these studies emphasize that preferences for redistribution de-
pend on a number of different principles, some of which may be applicable only to quite
specific earnings procedures. In contrast, the current paper focuses on the influence of
experiencing either success or failure in general.
The effect of the earnings procedure is also explored in Durante et al. (2014) and
Cappelen et al. (2010). In addition, the authors of the the latter work examine the
effect of the participants’ institutional background on their fairness considerations. In
the sense that one’s background and the chosen field of study is as assiciated with
distinctive experiences in life, their work is related to mine. Their results suggest that
business students with work experience are most likely to hold other people accountable
for their economic situation. If the business school alumni indeed experienced more
economic success than the other groups in their expexperiment, their findings would
be in line with the conclusions drawn in this paper. Similarly, Alma˚s et al. (2010) find
that the strict egalitarian fairness ideal is more prevalent among children with a weaker
economic background. However, because economic background or the choice of study
field might be correlated with fairness ideals for others reason, these studies cannot
identify any causal relationship.
Recently, the causal relationship between experience and distributional preferences
has been experimentally investigated in two closely related studies. mIn Deffains et al.
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(2016), subjects participate in a real-effort task to earn their endowments before making
redistributive choices as spectators. They find that successful subjects accept signif-
icantly higher levels of inequality than unsuccessful subjects. They control for the
difficulty of the task and, thus, for success, exogeneously and conclude that the dif-
ference in distributive preferences emerges from different beliefs about the importance
of luck and effort in the task. Cassar and Klein (2017) also examine distributional
preferences from spectators who have taken part in the earnings phase that leads to
inequality between others. High or low income is assigned to subjects either randomly
or based on relative performance. The chosen procedure varies across groups and is
announced to all involved parties prior to the redistribution phase. Similarly to this
paper, they find that distributive preferences depend on experience. Like Deffains et al.
(2016), they conclude that either different beliefs about the role of luck or an in-group
bias explains their results. However, they do not control for uncertainty exogeneously
and, thus, do not test for an effective self-serving bias directly. Besides, they interpret
their result in a way suggesting that only people experiencing failure but not those
experiencing success are biased towards others who have experienced failure under the
same procedure. My conclusion based on the comparison of the treatments FULL IN-
FORMATION and VOI is different. In contrast, I find that distributional preferences
of both successful and unsuccessful subjects are strongly influenced by their experience.
Though seemingly similar, the self-serving bias is different from the self-confirmation
bias invoked by Konow (2000). The latter results from the desire to reduce cognitive
dissonance when facing a trade-off between choosing a fair allocation and maximizing
own material benefits. In contrast, a self-serving bias emerges when individuals at-
tribute failure to external factors beyond their control but attribute success to their
own effort and choices (Miller et al. (1975), Bradley (1978)).
Besides, there is a large empirical literature documenting the relationship between an
individual’s belief about the role of luck for economic success and her or his support for
redistribution. Based on survey data from 12 countries, Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002) find
that not only income, but also a respondent’s belief that “hard work is key” negatively
affects support for redistribution. Fong (2001) presents similar findings from another
survey. Likewise, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that both the expected future
income and perceived equality of opportunity explain support for redistribution. The
present work contributes to this literature by exploring both a potential source of those
heterogeneous beliefs as well as their causal impact on distributional preferences.
A positive relationship between the degree of luck involved in the earnings process
and the support for redistribution is also at the core of several theoretical works on
the political economy of redistribution. Piketty (1995) models household income as a
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process that depends on luck, effort, and ancestry. In equilibrium, dynasties with bad
luck develop more pessimistic beliefs, thus, exert less effort and, still, strongly support
redistributive politics. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show that a society may either be
in an equilibrium with a high dependence of income on luck, high redistribution and
low effort, or in an equilibrium with a limited role of luck, little redistribution and high
effort. Although the experiment is not designed to explicitly test any of these theories,
it sheds light on a mechanism underlying all of them, the formation of beliefs about
the role of luck under uncertainty.
Finally, this paper contributes to the debate about the the relationship between in-
come and giving. From an empirical perspective, the effect of income on the willingness
to give seems ambiguous. Some studies find a positive relationship (Eckel et al., 2007),
some find a U-shaped relationship (Auten et al., 2000), and others find no relationship
between income and giving (Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) or Buckley and Croson
(2006)). This opposed evidence might partially be due to confounding factors influ-
encing the decision to give. One of these factors has recently been identified by Erkal
et al. (2011) who report evidence from a real-effort experiment in which more pro-social
agents exert less effort than less pro-social agents. The relatively modest willingness
to give among the richest subjects they observe in the data thus is the result of a self-
selection of less pro-social subjects into high income ranks. The potential dependence
of distributional preferences on experience, which is the focus of this paper, constitutes
another possible explanation.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment has two main stages. The first stage is a production phase involving
a real-effort task, which is identical across all treatments. Whether income is assigned
to subjects based on their effort or randomly is determined only after the first stage
is completed. In the second stage, participants can redistribute earnings between two
other participants as spectators. Finally, all participants answer several belief and
survey questions.
3.3.1 Real-Effort Task
At the beginning of the real-effort task, participants are matched into pairs. Depending
on the treatment, which is not revealed to participants before the real-effort task is
completed, relative performance within a pair determines the pre-redistribution stage
earnings. The task requires participants to encrypt fictional and randomly generated
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words by using a code key which assigns a three digit number to each letter of the latin
alphabet. Both the word that has to be encrypted and the code key change once a word
is encrypted correctly. The change of the code key not only concerns the numbers that
have to be used to translate each letter, but also the ordering of the letters. The task
has been developed by Benndorf et al. (2014) to minimize learning and is essentially a
modified version of the encryption task used in Erkal et al. (2011). During the task,
participants can keep track of the number of correctly encrypted words. If the entered
solution is incorrect, the coding table does not change and they have to try again.
Performance in the task yields a score, which is measured as the number of correctly
encrypted words. Figure (B.1) in the appendix shows a screenshot of the task. All
participants have 25 minutes in total to work on the encryption task.
3.3.2 Redistribution Task
Upon completion of the real-effort task, one subject in a pair receives 20 EUR while
the other one receives 5 EUR. In the redistribution phase, those earnings are subject to
change depending on other participants’ redistributive choices. This is because every
subject is given the opportunity to change the distribution of earnings within another
pair. That is, they can choose to transfer any amount between 0 EUR and 15 EUR (in
10 cents increments) from the high income participant to the low income participant
of another pair. This range is chosen such that each participant is secured a minimum
pay of 5 EUR.3 To select their preferred transfer, subjects can use the slider displayed
at the bottom of their screens (see figure (B.2) in the appendix). For every interim
position of the slider, the screen visualizes how the transfer implied by the slider’s
position affects the other subjects’ earnings. Participants have to confirm the final
slider position before moving on to the belief elicitation task. When making their
redistribution decision, subjects only know their own score from the encryption task
but never those from the subjects affected by their redistribution decision.
The instructions (see section B.3) emphasize to participants that their decisions
are made for another pair and do never affect themselves. They also know that it is
impossible that their own earnings are affected by the decision of someone from the
group for which they choose a transfer. In addition, it is also explained to them that
their choice is implemented only with a probability of 50%. This is because when all
3Negative transfers that shift earnings from the poorer to the richer subject are not allowed to
ensure a minimum pay to all participants without requiring a show-up fee. Yet, exactly the same
outcome space would obtain even without restricting transfers by paying a show-up fee of 5 EUR to
all participants and by setting the high income equal to 15 EUR and the low income equal to 0 EUR.
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subjects make a choice for exactly one pair, there are twice as many decisions as there
are pairs.
3.3.3 Treatments
The treatments variations in this experiment are organized along two dimensions. The
first dimension concerns the conditions that determine who receives the high income
of 20 EUR and who receives the low income of 5 EUR in pair. In the effort condition
(E), the subject with the higher score receives 20 EUR while the subject with the lower
score receives 5 EUR.4 In the random earnings condition (R), high and low incomes are
assigned randomly within each pair. At the beginning of the experiment, participants
know only that both earnings procedures are equally likely and that all participants of
the same session are subject to the same procedure. The second dimension concerns
information that can be of three different kinds. In the full information treatment (FI),
subjects learn about the earnings procedure that is chosen for their session before they
make their redistributive choices. Also, they learn about their own income from the
real-effort phase when making the redistribtuion decision. In the second information
treatment, subjects receive no information about how income has been awarded and
thus remain uncertain about the underlying earnings procedure (UP). Yet, they still
know about their own income from the real-effort phase while choosing the transfer
for the other pair. In a third treatment, subjects learn about the earnings procedure
but receive no information about their own income prior to making a decision in the
redistribution task. As subjects in this treatment decide without knowing where they
stand, it resembles the veil of ignorance condition suggested by Rawls (1971) and is
therefore abbreviated by VOI.
To summarize, the experiment employs a 2 × 3 design. The earnings conditions ef-
fort (E) and random (R) are combined with one of the three information treatments,
which are full information (FI), uncertain earnings procedure (UP) and veil of igno-
rance (VOI). The information treatments FI and UP are the main treatments in this
experiment as the comparison of them permits to investigate the effects of uncertainty
in the light of heterogeneous experiences of economics success. Because subjects might
be biased in favor of participants who experience the same outcome as they do, the
VOI treatment offers an interesting benchmark that allows to observe distributional
preferences of a spectator who cannot associate her or himself with either subject in
the other pair.
4Recall that a subject’s score is his or her number of correctly encoded words.
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3.3.4 Belief and Survey Questions
Immediately after completing the redistribution task, participants are informed about
the outcome of the redistribution phase. For participants in the VOI treatment, this
means that only then, they learn about both their income from the real-effort phase
and the transfer chosen for their pair. Only afterwards, subjects’ beliefs about the
impact of luck in the earnings procedure are elicited. Upon completion of the belief
elicitation stage, subjects respond to two additional survey questions regarding their
general attitudes towards inequality and redistribution.
Belief elicitation. In all treatments, subjects indicate how strongly they believe
that the high income of 20 EUR has been allocated to the subject with the higher
score within their own pair. That is, a participant who earned 5 EUR before the
redistribution phase is asked whether he believes that his score is below his opponent’s
whereas a participant who earned 20 EUR is asked whether she believes that her score is
above her opponent’s. In addition, subjects are asked a second belief question if they
are in the UP treatment, where they have not received information about whether
effort or luck has determined income. The question asks subjects how certain they
are that income has been based in relative performance on their session or, in other
words, whether they believe that they are in treatment E. For each question, subjects
could choose a probability between zero and one hundred percent in increments of ten
percent. Figure (B.3) and figure (B.4) in the appendix contain the exact questions as
displayed on the subjects’ screens.
The belief elicitation is not incentivized. Naturally, this increases the risk of not
measuring true beliefs, for example because stating particular beliefs might allow the
respondent to improve his or her self-image. However, incentivizing respondents by
rewarding them if their stated belief is sufficiently correct may induce participants
to reevaluate the situation. Yet, I am interested in what participants (subconsciously)
believe while making their decision. Since additional incentives are likely to increase the
gap between actual beliefs when making a decision and stated beliefs in this experiment,
they are omitted.
Survey. The first question addresses participants’ fairness ideals. The first part of
the question describes a situation in which there is great economic inequality between
two individuals who are about to retire. The second part asks under what conditions
participants would be against redistribution between the two, offering four different
choices, excluding “no opinion”(see figure B.5). The available options range from (I)
unconditional opposition over opposing redistribution only if either (II) mostly effort
and individual choices have determined income or if (III) both individuals had equal
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opportunities and mostly effort and individual choices have determined income to (IV)
unconditional support for redistribution. Roughly speaking, each of these options cor-
responds to a particular fairness ideal. Notably, I offer subjects two characterizations
of the liberal egalitarian fairness ideal, one that includes equality of opportunity as
a necessary condition for no redistribution and one that does not, in order to make
the classification less coarse. Additionally, subjects indicate how much they believe
economic success in Germany is driven by luck versus hard work in the second survey
question. Similar questions exist in the General Social Survey (GSS) or the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme (ISSP), allowing me to observe how the student
sample under consideration here compares with a more representative sample of the
population.
Asking participants about their fairness views and beliefs about the role of luck in
the real world also serves another purpose. If there are no treatment effects, it could
be because all participants are strict libertarians who oppose any form of redistribu-
tion, irrespective of their experience or of the preceding earnings procedure. Similarly,
people who are convinced that everything depends on luck are likely to always support
redistribution, again inhibiting any treatment effects. Responses may thus by used to
explain how likely a null result is due to the composition of the subject pool.
3.3.5 Theory: Rational and Biased Beliefs
In the full information treatment, subjects know with certainty whether income in
their session has been allocated randomly (R) or based on relative performance (E).
If the average transfer of subjects experiencing success in treatment UP matches the
transfers of successful subjects in treatment FI for a particular earnings procedure,
say E, then the belief of those subjects experiencing success in treatment UP must be
similar to that of successful subjects in treatment FI + E. Since the latter group knows
that earnings are determined by relative performance with certainty, I would be able to
infer that the beliefs of high income subjects put a high weight on earnings procedure
E. Consequently, analyzing what beliefs about the role of luck participants form under
uncertainty requires only that demand for redistribution be monotonous in the belief
about the role of luck, which is a common finding in the empirical literature described
in section 3.2. However, inferring the existence of particular biases from those beliefs
requires to know what a Bayesian decision maker would believe. Importantly, the
Bayesian posterior belief in treatment UP is not necessarily identical to the prior since
the combination of both a subject’s income from the encryption task and her score
constitute an imperfect signal about the true earnings procedure.
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The main predictions concerning beliefs of a Bayesian individual about the earnings
procedure in UP are: Conditional on receiving the high income, E is more likely than
R if and only if the achieved score lies above the median score.5 Analogously, R is more
likely than E if and only if the achieved score lies above the median score conditional on
receiving a low income. A formal proof of these statements is presented in section B.1,
though both results are quite intuitive. For example, consider a subject who knows
that her score is below the median score in the population. Then, her probability of
receiving the high income is below 50% under condition E but equal to 50% under
condition R. Hence, because receiving the high income is more likely under condition
R, the posterior attaches more weight on R when she receives the high income. The
behavioral implications for the present experiment are summarized below.
Observation 1 If subjects form rational beliefs, distributional preferences of those
receiving 20 EUR in UP should be more similar to those in FI + E if their obtained
score is above the median score and be more similar to FI + R otherwise.
Observation 2 If subjects form rational beliefs, distributional preferences of those
receiving 5 EUR in UP should be more similar to those in FI + R if their obtained
score is above the median score and be more similar to FI + E otherwise.
Importantly, I do not expect subjects to display behavior that is in line with Bayesian
updating. Instead, there are two potential biases which might be present in such an
environment according to the existing literature in psychology and experimental eco-
nomics. First, actual beliefs and distributional preferences might deviate from the
Bayesian benchmark due to a self-serving bias. If subjects are prone to a self-serving
bias, they tend to attribute success to internal factors such as own performance. Con-
versely, they attribute failure to external factors such as bad luck. Second, participants
might exhibit a self-effacing bias, which is characterized by the opposite behavior and
thus leads to opposite predictions. Prediction 1 and 2 summarize the main implication
of both biases regarding distributional choices in treatment UP.
Prediction 1 If a (strong) self-serving bias influences distributional preferences,
subjects with a score below the median score display the following behavior: low in-
come subjects choose transfers similar to the transfers chosen by low income subjects
in treatment FI + R and different from those in treatment FI + E. Conversely, high
income subjects choose transfers similar to the transfers chosen by high income subjects
in treatment FI + E and different from those in treatment FI + R.
Prediction 2 If a (strong) self-effacing bias influences distributional preferences,
subjects with a score above the median score display the following behavior: low in-
5It is assumed that a Bayesian individual knows the distribution of scores in the population
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Information Treatment FI FI UP UP VOI VOI
Earnings condition E R E R E R
Observations 64 60 32 26 16 12
Table 3.1: Number of participants per treatment
come subjects choose transfers similar to the transfers chosen by low income subjects
in treatment FI + E and different from those in treatment FI + R. Conversely, high
income subjects choose transfers similar to the transfers chosen by high income subjects
in treatment FI + R and different from those in treatment FI + E.
Another related behavioral bias known as overconfidence would have implications
similar to those of a self-serving bias. As overconfidence is associated with a too
optimistic belief concerning own performance, it can be formally modeled as a prior
that understates the median score in the population. As a consequence, high income
subjects would interpret even scores below the median as signals of condition R and
vice versa. Conversely, the effect of underconfidence is qualitatively equivalent to that
of a self-effacing bias.
3.3.6 Subject Pool and Experimental Procedures
In total, 210 subjects participated during 14 sessions in the experiment from June 27 to
July 12, 2017. Subjects were recruited via hroot, between 12 to 18 subjects participated
in each session. Each session lasted about 50 minutes and average payoffs amounted to
12.50 EUR. Payoffs were composed only of earnings and chosen transfers, there was no
show-up fee. Participants were students from the University of Heidelberg and came
from a wide range of study fields, with one quarter having a background in economics.
The language of the experiment was German.
Table 3.1 reports the number of subjects who participated in each of the treatment
conditions. Different numbers for different earnings conditions within the same infor-
mation treatment are due failure to show up of registered participants. The differences
between information treatments are on purpose however. In treatment UP, subjects
do not know whether they are in condition E or R. Consequently, their choices can be
considered jointly, making this group of participants just as large as the groups their
choices are to be compared with: FI + E and FI + R. Similarly, the choices of high
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and low income subjects are comparable in the VOI information treatments, allowing
me to merge the data as well.6
3.4 Results
I report the results from the real-effort task first. Next, results on distributional pref-
erences are presented in the following order: redistribution under full information (FI),
redistribution behind the veil of ignorance (VOI), and redistribution under uncertainty
(UP). Reported p-values are based on the non-parametric two-sided two sample Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon (or Mann-Whitney U) test.
3.4.1 Real-Effort Task
The average number of encrypted words (score) from all treatments is 109 with scores
ranging from 5 to 167 words and the median score is 108 words. Time-dependent data
show that very low scores result from participants stopping to work on the encryption
task early, not from being unable to encrypt words in general. In total, this happened
three times. Figure (3.1a) shows the average score achieved across treatments. Note
also that the apparent oversampling of high score participants in treatment condition
FI + E does not affect the interpretation of results as the subsequent analysis shows
that own performance has no effect distributional choices. According to figure (3.1b),
participants were equally productive in all rounds. That is, there was no general
tendency for participants giving up too early nor becoming better at the task over time.
This implies that learning was successfully prevented, thus making it truly costly for
subjects to continue providing effort until the end.
3.4.2 Redistribution Under Certainty
In this section, I present the results for the effort and random treatment condition
under full information. Henceforth, I use the notion of high or low income spectator
rather than high or low income subject to distinguish between the subject making a
decision and the subject being affected by it. Recall that in both treatments, decision
makers are spectators who have no stake in the decision, implying that their chosen
level of redistribution should depend only what they consider a fair distribution. In
addition, the earnings procedure is identical for all participants of the same session. If
6The results presented in the next section confirm that there are no differences in both cases.
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Confidence intervals in figure (a) are at the 90% level.
Figure 3.1: Performance encryption task
fairness views about inequality depend only on the process leading to it, there should
be no differences in distributive preferences between high and low income spectators.
However, average transfers to low income subjects vary greatly and systematically
with the spectator’s income. For the treatment FI + E, where income depends on effort,
figure (3.2) shows that high income spectators redistribute 3.58 EUR on average. In
contrast, low income spectators transfer 6.71 EUR on average, implying a relative
difference of almost 90%. Possible explanations for why there are such large and
significant differences in the preferences of spectators are discussed in great detail in
section 3.5. Briefly, an important factor is that the view held about whether the
procedure determining income is fair depends on one’s own outcome. That is, even
though income depends on effort in treatment FI + E, high income spectators were
still lucky since the choice of the encryption task was in their favor. Because the
choice of a particular task always creates unequal opportunities, treatment FI + E
still leaves room for heterogeneous judgments concerning the influence of luck.7 Yet,
inequality of opportunity does not prevail in treatment FI + R as all participants
have an equal chance of “winning” the high income. While this does certainly not
imply that people should have no demand for redistribution in R, it means that there
is no room for reasonably different views about the role of luck across high and low
income spectators. Hence, it seems implausible that distributional preferences depend
on own success or failure when success is knowingly the outcome of a purely random
process. Yet, a significant difference in the chosen transfers persists between high
and low income spectators as displayed on the right-hand side of figure (3.2). Low
income spectators redistribute 7.40 EUR on average and often choose a transfer of 7.50
7Nevertheless, the effect of luck is of course strictly smaller than the random earnings condition
(R).
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Differences between high/ low income are significant at p < 0.0001 both in FI
+ E and in FI + R. Differences between E and R are significant at p < 0.01
both conditional on high and low income. Note that a transfer of 7.50 EUR
equalizes earnings. Confidence intervals are at the 90% level.
Figure 3.2: Average transfers under full information
EUR, thereby completely equalizing both subjects’ earnings. In contrast, high income
spectators choose an average transfer of 5.07 EUR, which is about 30% lower. Looking
at the distribution of individual choices reveals that only 12 out of 30 high income
spectators choose a transfer that (almost) equalizes earnings as opposed to 25 out of
30 low income spectators.8
Recall that in the zero merit environment that treatment FI + R refers to, the
incomes of both the spectator and the subjects from the pair affected by the spectator’s
decision are assigned randomly. Consequently, the high income of the spectator is
completely exogenous and there are no systematic differences between high and low
income subjects a spectator could rely on to discriminate. Thus, while results from the
existing literature suggest that people follow a luck-egalitarian fairness ideal and do
not accept any inequality in environments that are purely luck-dependent, the opposed
evidence from this experiment suggests that experience has a fundamental influence on
whether that is true or not.
Regarding the comparison of conditions E and R, I find that redistribution is gen-
erally higher when income is assigned randomly. Compared to FI + E, high income
spectators redistribute 1.49 EUR more on average in FI + R. For low income specta-
tors, the difference amounts to 0.69 EUR only, because redistribution is already high
in FI + E. The observed difference is significant in both cases (p < 0.01). Notice that
existing research on fairness views has mostly focused on the difference in demand for
8The complete distribution of transfers is displayed in figure (3.5).
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Figure (a) displays average redistribution from high income spectators, (b) from low income
spectators. Confidence intervals at the 90% level. There are only three high income spec-
tators with below median income in FI + E, preventing the construction of a reasonable
confidence interval.
Figure 3.3: The effect of score on redistribution across treatments
redistribution induced by different earnings procedures. In this experiment, the aver-
age spectator redistributes 1.09 EUR more in treatment R than in treatment E (1.49
EUR for high and 0.69 EUR for low income spectators). In comparison, the average
difference between the transfers of high and low income spectators amounts to 2.33
EUR in treatment R and to 3.13 EUR in treatment E. Even though quantifying effect
sizes of course depends on the experimental design, those results strongly suggest that
the effect of experiencing economic success on distributional preferences can be way
larger than that of the underlying earnings procedure.
Endogeneity in treatment condition E.
Since high and low income are completely exogenous in treatment FI + R, the effect
of experiencing economic success on distributional preferences has to be be causal. In all
treatments relying on the effort based earnings procedure (E) however, any correlation
between experience in distributional preferences need not be causal per se. Instead,
those participants who oppose redistribution in general could simply be types that are
more competitive, making them more successful in the encryption task.
Figure (3.3) contains evidence against such a claim. If subjects’ performance was
correlated with their general attitude towards redistribution, higher scores should cor-
relate with lower transfers even after conditioning on the participant’s income. Yet,
across all treatments, transfers by spectators who score above the median are about
the same or even higher than those by spectators with a score below the median (see
figure 3.3a). Similarly, figure (3.3b) shows that redistribution does not depend the on
score for low income spectators either.
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In figure (a), the difference between high income (FI + E) and VOI is significant (p < 0.01).
A comparison between veil of ignorance (voi) and low income suggests a difference (p = 0.11).
In (b), the difference between low income (FI + R) and VOI is significant p = 0.02). The
comparison between VOI and high income suggests a difference (p = 0.13). Confidence
intervals at the 90% level.
Figure 3.4: Redistribution in UP and VOI
Moreover, the results from the VOI treatment show that there is no difference in
transfers between high and low income spectators when spectators do not know their
own income. Thus, the differences between high and low income spectators observed
in treatment E do not seem to be due to self-selection but due to the experience of
success or failure.
3.4.3 Redistribution Behind the Veil of Ignorance
The treatments VOI + E and VOI + R permit to observe distributional preferences
before they may be influenced through the experience of success or failure. Since the
results displayed in figure (3.3) show that transfers are independent of scores and no
information other than their own score is disclosed to spectators in the VOI treatments,
I analyze the data from high and low income spectators jointly. That is, the single right-
hand side bars in figure (3.4) contain transfer choices by all spectators in treatment
VOI + R and VOI + E, respectively. According to figure (3.4a), the transfer on
average equals the mean of transfers chosen by both high and low income spectators in
treatment FI + E, implying that both groups’ preferences are influenced through their
experience to the same extent but in opposite directions.
As figure (3.4b) shows, the same pattern can be observed in treatment VOI + R.
Again, the average of all transfers in FI + R compares with the mean transfer chosen
behind the veil of ignorance under the random earnings procedure. In contrast to
the behavior of high income spectators in FI + R, luck-egalitarianism becomes the
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Histograms of individual transfers with data organized such that the bar between x Euro
and x+1 Euro contains all observations with transfers t satisfying t ∈ [x, x+ 1).
Figure 3.5: Relative frequencies of transfers
predominant fairness ideal in the absence of any experience effects as figure (3.5f)
shows. That is, 6 out of 12 spectators choose a transfer of 7.5 EUR to equalize earnings.
Another two spectators choose 7 EUR, implying that roughly two thirds of spectators
implement almost perfect equality when their own outcome is not yet revealed to them.
Interestingly, the distribution depicted in figure (3.5f) compares considerably well with
the distribution of transfers by low income spectators in figure (3.5d), again suggesting
that high income spectators are affected by their experience more often than low income
spectators in treatment FI + R.
As mentioned in the previous section, the data shown in figure (3.4a) also addresses
the endogeneity question concerning the findings from treatment FI + E. Since the
timing of the income information constitutes the only difference between FI + E and
VOI + E, the observed differences in redistribution levels must be driven by experience
of the outcome rather than by self-selection.
3.4.4 Redistribution Under Uncertainty
I here present data from the UP treatments in which subjects remain uncertain about
the earnings procedure. As explained in section 3.3.4, comparing the transfers under
uncertainty with those chosen under full information allows to make an inference about
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The difference between high income (UP) and high income (FI + E) is signifi-
cant at p < 0.01. The difference between low income (UP) and low income (FI
+ R) is also significant at p < 0.05. Confidence intervals are at the 90% level.
Figure 3.6: Average transfers under certainty
subjects’ beliefs. For the first part of this analysis, I analyze the data from the different
earnings conditions E and R jointly.9
Figure (3.6) contains a striking result. Under uncertainty, high income spectators
choose transfers as in the full information environment with a randomness-based earn-
ings procedure (FI + R). In other words, the earnings distribution considered as fair by
high income spectators under uncertainty equals the earnings distribution considered
as fair by high income spectators who know that income has been determined based
on pure chance. Conversely, the average amount redistributed by low income specta-
tors under uncertainty almost equals the amount transferred by low income spectators
who know that earnings are based on effort (FI + E). Notably, the difference with
respect to the other treatment (FI + R for low income spectators and FI + E for high
income spectators) is always significant. That is, high income spectators distribute
significantly more to the poorer subject under uncertainty (p < 0.01) than when they
know for sure that the earnings procedure is based on effort (FI + E). Besides, low
income spectators redistribute significantly less to the poorer subject (p < 0.05) than
when they know for sure that luck has determined income (FI + R), implying that the
9The data shows that transfers are independent of the actual earnings procedure both for high and
low income spectators. This finding seems in line with evidence presented in the previous section.
Even though the fraction of spectators with an above median score among high income spectators
is larger in treatment UP + E than in treatment UP + R, there is no significant difference because
transfers are completely independent of scores.
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difference between high and low income spectators under uncertainty is significantly
smaller than in any of the full information treatments.
At first glance, this behavior seems incompatible with the notion of a self-serving
bias. Instead of inferring from their own success that relative performance must have
determined income, high income spectators seem to act exactly in the opposite way.
Yet, interpreting the above results in favor of (or against) a particular bias would be
premature. This is because in order to formally reject the influence of a self-serving
bias, I must reject that the average transfer of high income spectators in UP is larger
than the transfer a Bayesian high income spectator with an average score would choose
(and vice versa for low income spectators). Predicting what the average transfer should
be if spectators formed Bayesian beliefs about the earnings procedure depends both
on the exact distribution of achieved scores among high and low income spectators
and on how beliefs map into transfers. Since the distribution of scores is random
and the mapping from beliefs to transfers unknown, I use what is probably the best
available heuristic: I compute the (equally weighted) average of transfers chosen by
fully informed high (low) income spectators in both treatments FI + R and FI + E.
For high income spectators, the heuristically computed average amounts to 4.33
EUR. Analogously, I obtain an average transfer of 7.06 EUR for low income spectators.
By constructing a hypothetical sample in which all high income spectators’ choices
equal 4.33 EUR and all low income spectators’ choices equal 7.06 EUR, I test whether
the transfers chosen under uncertainty differ significantly from the predicted Bayesian
benchmark (BB). The non-parametric test shows that the average transfer of high
income spectators under uncertainty (5.13 EUR) is still significantly larger than the
benchmark of 4.33 EUR. This result strongly rejects a self-serving bias and provides
evidence in support of a self-effacing bias among high income spectators. For low
income spectators, the difference between the average transfer under uncertainty (6.72
EUR) and the computed benchmark of 7.06 EUR is significant as well, implying that
low income spectators also display no self-serving but a self-effacing bias. For reference,
all p-values computed for the above comparisons are displayed in table 3.2.
The relative frequencies of transfers across treatments as displayed in figure (3.7)
support the general picture of high income spectators under uncertainty behaving as
in treatment FI + R and low income spectators behaving as in FI + E. In contrast to
the apparent differences between high and low income spectators in the FI treatments
(see figure 3.5), the distributions of transfers by high and low income spectators under
uncertainty are strikingly similar. In line with the comparison of the average transfers,
this shows that uncertainty harmonizes distributive preferences, making support for
redistribution across different income classes more aligned. Moreover, the congruence
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Income low low low high high high
UP compared with FI+E FI+R BB FI+E FI+R BB
p values 0.4243 0.0313 0.01094 0.0045 0.6577 0.0000
The first row indicates whether the test includes observations from low or high
income spectators. The second row indicates the treatment combination that
the choices of low/ high income spectators from treatment UP are compared
with. Reported p-values are based on a two-sided, two-sample Mann-Whitney
U test.
Table 3.2: Comparison of FI and UP treatments
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Histograms of individual transfers with data organized such that the bar be-
tween x Euro and x+1 Euro contains all observations with transfers t satisfying
t ∈ [x, x+ 1).
Figure 3.7: Distribution of individual transfers under uncertainty (UP)
of distributions displayed in figure (3.7a) and (3.5d) as well as in figure (3.7b) and (3.5b)
is remarkable, thus confirming the above conclusion about the influence of a self-effacing
bias. To summarize the overall comparison between UP and FI, I find that uncertainty
harmonizes distributive preferences, making support for redistribution across different
income classes more aligned.
Additional evidence against a self-serving bias can be found in the data by contrast-
ing the results with prediction 1 and 2. Figure (3.8) shows the average transfer of
participants divided by the median score across the treatment combinations FI + E,
FI + R, UP (both R + E) conditional on either (a) high or (b) low income.10 According
to prediction 1, high income spectators with a below median score should (still) believe
that their success is the result of high performance, making them consider condition E
10Observations from the VOI treatment are not included here because transfers cannot reasonably
be conditioned on income when subjects have no information about their income.
3.4 Results 69
7.67
4.85 4.84
3.15
5.50 5.29
0
5
10
15
m
ea
n 
of
 re
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
 weakly below median above median  
FI + E FI + R
UP
(a) High income
6.88
7.47
6.70 6.46
7.33
6.79
0
5
10
15
m
ea
n 
of
 re
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
 weakly below median above median  
FI + E FI + R
UP
(b) Low income
Figure (a) shows the average transfer of high income spectators divided by score (above or
below median) and by treatment. Figure (b) shows the analogue information for low income
spectators. Confidence intervals at the 90% level.
Figure 3.8: Redistribution by score and treatment
more likely than R. As a result, their transfers should be more similar to those of high
income spectators in treatment FI + E. Figure (3.8a) shows that conditional on a below
median score, the average transfer of high income spectators in treatment UP perfectly
matches that of high income spectators in treatment FI + R (4.85 EUR and 4.84 EUR).
Analogously, transfers chosen by low income spectators with a below median score are
very similar to the transfers of low income spectators with a below median score in
treatment FI + E (6.70 EUR and 6.88 EUR) as depicted in figure (3.8b). Both findings
stand in sharp contrast to prediction 1 and, thus, to the implications of a self-serving
bias.
Yet again, the data fully supports prediction 2 and the presence of a self-effacing bias.
Conditional on a score above the median score, I observe that redistributions by high
income spectators in UP are similar to redistributions by high income spectators in
treatment FI + R (5.29 EUR and 5.50 EUR, see figure (3.8a)). Likewise, low income
spectators with an above median score redistribute 6.79 EUR on average, which is
closer to the average of 6.46 EUR of low income spectators in FI + E than to the
average of 7.33 EUR of low income spectators in FI + R (see figure 3.8b).
3.4.5 Elicited Beliefs
Beliefs in the belief elicitation task are measured on a nominal scale using percentages.
Recall that the question that is asked across all treatments concerns the probability
people attach to the event that relative income in their own pair reflects relative per-
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Question: “What do you think is the probability that your earned income
coincides with your relative performance in the tournament?” Figures are in
percentages. Confidence intervals are at the 90% level.
Figure 3.9: Elicited beliefs about the influence of luck
formance.11 That is, if a subject is 100% certain that her performance was higher in
her pair while she has received 5 EUR only, she chooses 0%. Alternatively, a subject
that is undecided about that question may select 50% and so forth.
Subjects’ beliefs elicited through this first question are displayed in figure (3.9). In
treatment FI + E, both high and low income subjects should be certain that their
income has been the result of relative performance. Stated beliefs are quite close to
100% and much higher than in the other treatments, verifying most participants trusted
the instructions and understood the earnings conditions well. In treatment FI + R,
the distribution of income is completely random. Thus, relative performance coincides
with relative income in only about 50% of all pairs, which should be the average belief
if beliefs were unbiased. The corresponding bar shows a magnitude of slightly less than
50%, indicating that subjects might have been slightly underconfident.
Lastly, observe that beliefs of high income subjects under uncertainty (UP) roughly
match the average of all high income spectators’ beliefs in FI + I and FI + R, which
appears reasonable without any further assumptions. However, the average belief of
low income subjects in treatment UP is just as low as in FI + R. At first glance,
this may seem to be in line with a self-serving bias, which Deffains et al. (2016) infer
from elicited beliefs as well. However, the data depicted in figure (3.10a), which again
11The ensure participants understood this question, the following explanation was displayed below
the question: “If you have earned 5 EUR, we would like to know how certain you are that you had
the lower score in your group. If you have earned 20 EUR, we would like to know how certain you
are that you had achieved the higher score in your group?”.
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Figure (a) reports elicited beliefs about the influence of luck as explained in figure (3.9).
Figure (b) reports elicited beliefs from the following question: “What to you think is the
likelihood that your session was part of world 1?” Answer scale from 0% (extremely unlikely)
to 100% (extremely likely). Confidence intervals are at the 90% level.
Figure 3.10: Elicited beliefs by income and score
divides the observations into above and below median scorers, casts doubt on this
conclusion. As the right-hand side bar shows, the low average belief of low income
subjects is strongly driven by above median scorers. By construction, the probability
that an above median scorer with a low income receives the income corresponding to
his or her relative performance must be higher in UP than in FI + R. This is because
in 50% of the sessions included in UP, the earnings procedure is E, implying that a
low income can be the result of bad luck in only about 50% of the cases. Yet, the
mean belief of above median scorers in UP is lower than in FI + R, suggesting that
one should be cautious when interpreting beliefs of this group.
Figure (3.10a) also hints at whether the results are due to underconfidence that is
specific to the encryption task or whether a general self-effacing bias prevails under
uncertainty. If participants are simply too underconfident regarding that particular
task, the belief of high income subjects with a below median score should be lower than
that of low income subjects with a below median score.12 However, such a difference
does not exist.
Recall that the second belief question, which is asked only in treatment UP, is about
what participants think about the likelihood that earnings procedure E has been used
in their session. Figure (3.10b) shows what participants infer about the earnings pro-
cedure of their session from their own outcome. As expected, the low belief of above
median scorers with a low income translates into a low probability attached to E. All
other sub-groups have intermediate beliefs about the probability of E, as implied by
12A low belief refers to a low probability attached to the event that relative income reflects relative
performance.
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Figure (a) and (b) report responses from 210 participants in all treatments. Recall that
the type I liberal egalitarian fairness ideal indicates a concern for equality of opportunity
whereas the type II does not (see section 3.3.4). Confidence intervals are at the 90% level.
Figure 3.11: Distribution of survey responses
their beliefs about the influence of luck on their own outcome. Roughly speaking, these
results support the claim that subjects were able to make the correct inference about
the earnings procedure (R or E) in their session from their own outcome. Yet, the
analysis of elicited beliefs is not as conclusive as the results obtained from the compar-
ison of the main treatments. That is, it neither supports nor contracts the previous
findings as the variance in the belief data seems to high.
3.4.6 Survey Responses
The distribution of survey responses is displayed in figure (3.11). Out of those who
selected anything but “no opinion”, one third of respondents states a general fairness
view that is in line with strict egalitarianism. About one half agrees with one of the
two options in line with liberal egalitarianism whereas only about 10 percent selected
the libertarian fairness ideal. This distribution shown in figure 3.11a roughly complies
with the results obtained from the structural estimation by Cappelen et al. (2007)
based on an experiment with Norwegian students.
According to figure (3.11b), about 80% of the participants believe that effort is at
least as important as luck for earning a high income in Germany. This high value seems
in line with existing research. In the 1992 ISSP, 87% of west Germans say that hard
work is at least fairly important to get ahead in life. In summary, the survey responses
suggest that the subject pool seems fairly standard with respect to both the prevalence
of different fairness ideals and the perceived importance of luck for economic success
in general.
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3.5 Discussion
The heterogeneity in distributive preferences arising from different experiences of suc-
cess is also present in Deffains et al. (2016) and Cassar and Klein (2017). By eliciting
beliefs about the role of luck in the earnings procedure, the authors find that a self-
serving bias explains the differences in distributive preferences in an effort-dependent
environment similar to my treatment FI + E.13 Their argument is that luck is inherent
in almost any real-effort task, especially if random matching with an opponent player
is involved. Hence, it is possible that participants form opposed beliefs about the
role of luck affecting distributive preferences. Since I find strong evidence against the
presence of such a self-serving bias, why then do distributional preferences persistently
differ with income, even the earnings procedure is known to be random?
A promising explanation concerns the effect of experience and on the adoption of
different fairness ideal as it may explain many of the results obtained. In treatment FI
+ R, differences in distributive preferences cannot be reasonably due to heterogeneous
beliefs about whether inequality is due to factors that were under individual control,
since people cannot be held accountable for (forced) bad luck. Instead, high income
spectators might view the procedural fairness of treatment condition R differently
than low income spectators. In particular, winning in this random earnings condition
could make them attach more weight to the fact that opportunities were equal ex
ante and thus make them prone to adopt a libertarian fairness ideal. In contrast, low
income spectators pay less attention to ex ante equality of opportunities and are thus
not willing to accept the resulting inequality. Importantly, heterogeneous perceptions
of equality of opportunity are not due to a self-serving bias. That is, they do not
result from participants attributing success to internal and failure to external factors.
Instead, adjusting their perceived importance of equality of opportunity helps high
income spectators to enjoy their own luck rather than feeling guilty for their opponent.
Although the presented experiment does not test for the above mentioned mechanism
explicitly, there is two pieces of evidence in the data supporting it.
First, the analysis of individual transfer decisions depicted in figure (3.5) in the
previous section has shown that a large fraction of high income spectators in treatment
FI + R distributed almost nothing, which is in line only with the libertarian fairness
ideal. Second, the data from subjects’ self-reported fairness ideals suggest a dependence
on the experience of success. Figure (3.12) illustrated the suvrey data from both
questions divided by income over different treatment combinations. I merge the data
13In the latter paper, the authors also note that a self-serving bias cannot reasonably explain all of
the observed differences since the difference persists even when earnings are allocated randomly.
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In figure (a), bar heights are based on the following nominal values assigned to survey
responses: “strict egalitarian”=1, “liberal egalitarian (I)”= 2, “liberal egalitarian (II)”=
3, “libertarian”= 4. In figure (b), bar heights are based on “hard work”=1, “mostly hard
work”=2, “hard work and luck”=3, “mostly luck”=4., etc.. Confidence intervals (at the
90% level) must be interpreted with caution as fairness ideal is (at best) an ordinal variable.
Figure 3.12: Survey responses by income
from VOI and FI in this figure because participants in the VOI treatments have already
received information regarding their income when these questions are asked, rendering
their received information participants have received in the FI and VOI treatments
equivalent. Due to the focus on equivalent information for this part of the analysis, I
distinguish between FI/ VOI + R and FI/ VOI + E but not between UP + E and UP +
R as the latter two treatment combinations are characterized by the same information
provided to participants as well. Notably, subjects’ beliefs about the importance of
hard work in real life are independent of income and treatment as shown by figure
(3.12b). Since the underlying question explicitly addresses the situation in Germany,
answers should indeed be independent of the income earned in the first phase of the
experiment. Similarly, the prevalence of the libertarian libertarian fairness ideal should
not vary with experience if individual fairness ideals were time-invariant. While this
seems obvious when success is exogenous in treatment condition R, it should also be
true in condition E. This is because the results depicted in figure (3.3) have shown that
conditional on income, transfers are completely independent of the achieved score.
However, figure (3.12) suggests that the fairness ideal of high income spectators tends
more towards libertarianism than that of a low income spectators in all three treatment
combinations. Surprisingly, the difference between high and low income subjects is
even largest when randomness has determined income.14 Hence, it seems that fairness
14Counting only individuals who state that they would always oppose redistribution (libertarian
fairness ideal) yields a similar conclusion. In the random earnings condition, four high income subjects
opt for the libertarian fairness ideal while it is selected only once by low income subjects.
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ideals, rather than beliefs about the role of luck, are influenced through the experience
of success and failure.
Most likely, the adoption of different in fairness ideals is not the only driver of the
observed differences in distributional preferences. As already noted by Cassar and Klein
(2017), in-group favoritism provides another potential explanation. In their influential
paper, Chen and Li (2009) show that assigning subjects to groups merely on the basis
of revealed preferences for Kandinsky pictures makes subjects more pro-social towards
other in-group members. When people experience either economic success or failure as
in the experiment presented, mutually exclusive income groups emerge as in the present
experiment. As a consequence, people may act more pro-socially towards members of
their own group, implying that subjects transfer less from the high to the low income
subject if they have earned a high income themselves.
3.6 Conclusion
How does the experience of success affect distributional preferences under uncertainty
differently than the experience of failure? Using an experiment in which the the earn-
ings procedure is revealed to subjects only in some but not all treatments, I find a
clear answer to this question: When participants do not know whether relative perfor-
mance or randomness has determined income, distributional choices of successful (high
income) spectators are identical to the choices of high income spectators when income
is surely based on luck. Conversely, the choices of unsuccessful (low income) spectators
are very similar to those chosen when earnings depend on performance. In general,
the experience of success is associated with significantly lower levels of redistribution
than the experience of failure. In addition, both successful and unsuccessful subjects
are in favor of more distribution when income is assigned randomly than when it is
based on relative performance. Hence, the diametrically opposed effect of experience on
distributive choices under uncertainty implies that support for redistribution becomes
more aligned when the source of inequality is unknown.
The second question this paper seeks to answer is why the experience of success
and failure leads to different preferences over redistribution. Most importantly, the
results described above reject the presence of a self-serving bias, which would make
high income subjects believe that effort, rather than luck, has lead to their success.
Instead, a self-effacing bias, which makes subjects attribute success to external factors
such as luck and failure to internal factors such as poor performance, can explain the
unambiguous conclusion from the participants’ choices under uncertainty. Ruling out a
self-serving bias as a source for the prevailing gap in distributional preferences between
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high and low income subjects calls for an alternative explanation. Interestingly, several
findings from the presented experiment point towards the same direction. First, the
distribution of individual transfers by high income spectators across all treatments
shows that a large fraction of them redistributes very little or nothing, which is a
choice that coincides exclusively with the libertarian fairness ideal. Second, a survey
conducted at the end of the experiment reveals that self-reported, general fairness
ideal are more libertarian among successful subjects. Hence, both findings suggest
that fairness ideals are affected by experience, at least in the short-term.
Charitable giving depends to a large extent on the distributional preferences of those
who have the means to give away parts of their wealth. Similarly, the power to dis-
tribute resources within organizations or the society as a whole often is in the hands
of the most (economically) successful individuals. Consequently, the bias in distribu-
tional preferences induced by the defining experience of that group constitutes a major
challenge to reaching a state in which resources are distributed just and fairly. A key
finding from my experiment is that the bias in distributional preferences does not result
from biased beliefs about the role of luck, but most likely from success-driven adoption
of the libertarian fairness ideal. Hopefully, this insight will help to design instruments
than can reduce the bias in the real-world.
4 Relative Earnings and Rank-Loss
Aversion1
4.1 Introduction
Do people value relative income as a means or as an end? In parts, the answer to this
question lies in the connection between income and status. More than a century ago,
Veblen (1899) noticed that people may seek to signal high status by adopting certain
behaviors. An important component of the resulting status expressing behavior consti-
tutes the increased consumption of “positional goods” (Frank, 1985). Indeed, evidence
suggests that this form of behavior leads to real material benefits. For example, Ball
et al. (2001) find that status increases the chances of obtaining better economic out-
comes even in a competitive market environment. Naturally, conspicuous consumption
may signal high status only if it outweighs that of others. As a consequence, relative
income is valued as a means but not necessarily as an end.
In contrast, others have emphasized the role of relative income without invoking the
argument of relative consumption (Robson, 1992). If we subscribe to the view that
people’s preferences have been shaped by natural selection, we may conclude quickly
that striving for better relative positions is an integral part of human nature and,
thus, constitutes a means as well as an end. The reason is that in the major part of
the course of human history, a better social standing has been associated with both
higher survival rates and more descendants (Robson, 2001). At first glance, evidence
in favor of such a general notion of rank concerns may seem widely available. Not
only does happiness decrease in the income of those living close by (Blanchflower and
Oswald, 2004), but also does job satisfaction in the income of one’s peers (Card et al.,
2012). While arguing that low relative income with respect to the entire society affects
the ability to compete in conspicuous consumption seems plausible, it does not when
1I thank Henrik Orzen, Hans-Peter Gru¨ner, Justin Leduc, Stefan Penczynski and Sander Renes for
valuable comments.
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referring to a few coworkers’ income. Does this mean that income rank is valued in
its own right? Not necessarily! In fact, evidence in support of a preference for higher
relative income presented in many empirical studies may result from a strong aversion
to disadvantageous inequality. For example, Card et al. (2012) are able to explain their
results with an adopted version of the inequaity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999).2
Hence, existing evidence in support of pure rank-utility is highly inconclusive. Yet,
gaining a full understanding of why and when people care about relative income is
crucial for predicting the magnitude as well as the widespread of preferences for higher
income ranks. In economics, accounting for such preferences is indispensable as they
sometimes determine the limits to redistribution (Corneo and Gruner, 2000).3 There-
fore, this paper addresses the question whether relative income matters to people in
the absence of any additional motives. More precisely, I report results from a labora-
tory experiment designed to test whether people refrain from giving up their (earned)
income rank when maintaining the ranking neither reduces inequality nor has any
status implications that could translate into material benefits. Instead, participants
must trade off their income ranks with higher inequality while own income remains
unaffected by their choice. That is, following an earnings phase, participants must dis-
tribute additional windfall money either to a poorer or richer participant, sometimes
requiring them to give up their earned rank. Hence, the design allows to distinguish
between two different explanations of rank concerns that usually point in the same
direction.
The results suggest that rank-loss aversion affects some people’s behavior, making
them accept more inequality than in the absence of the rank-inequality trade-off. More
precisely, I observe that when giving to the poorer recipient would require to give up
one’s rank, the average transfer to the poorer recipient is about 20% below the level
prevailing in any other situation. While this decrease turns out to be significant only
in some estimations, the effect on the number of choices leading to an overall increase
of inequality always is. That is, I observe that when the earnings difference to the
lower ranked participant is sufficiently low, 35% of participants facing such a situation
give less than 50 % of the money to the poorer recipient, as compared to 7% to 21%
in alternative situations. Here, estimation results confirm that the prevalence of this
inequality increasing choice almost doubles from 17% to 30% when one’s rank is at
stake. In addition, the experimental design allows to investigate differences in rank-
2This includes the effect of no increase in job satisfaction when learning that one’s peers earn less
then oneself.
3The authors show that when signals of status are noisy, rank-utility effects may prevent desirable
redistribution even if it is income rank-preserving.
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loss aversion across several ranks as participants are matched into groups of six people
with different endowments. Perhaps surprisingly, I do not find any evidence in support
of abnormally stark rank concerns for particular positions in the income distribution.4
This includes the second-to-last place even though subjects at this rank fall into the
last place when giving up their rank, which people should be most averse to according
to (Kuziemko et al., 2014).
At the beginning of the experiment, all subjects take part in a very brief estimation
task in which they compete against other members of their group. The more precise a
participant’s guess relative to that of the other group members, the more she is allowed
to earn in the subsequent real-effort task. Upon successful completion of the real-effort
task, those with the best guess in the estimation task can earn up to 12 EUR. The
second best guess allows to earn 10 EUR, the third best 8 EUR, the fourth best 6 EUR,
the fifth best 4 EUR and the sixth best 2 EUR, respectively. Following the earnings
procedure, participants are asked to repeatedly distribute additional money to two
other members of their group. The trade-off between keeping one’s rank and raising
(not reducing) overall inequality arises because participants ranked second to fifth can
distribute the additional money only to the subjects who are ranked one position below
or one position above themselves. Asking individuals to distribute additional money
consecutively for several times allows to investigate whether being in the position in
which giving to the poorer recipient implies a rank loss leads to distributive behavior
that significantly deviates from that in other situations.5
The experiment is designed such that the pattern of transfers chosen by rank-
concerned participants differs from that of participants without rank-concerns would.
I obtain those diametrically opposed predictions by integrating rank concerns into a
modified version of the the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999): Subjects who value
their income rank simply as an end reduce the share they give to the poorer recipient
when the difference in income between themselves and the lower ranked participant
is small (but not too small). In some extreme cases, this implies that less than 50%
of the money is given to the poorer recipient, thereby leading to an increase of the
overall inequality. After the share distributed to the poorer recipient is reduced for
one two consecutive rounds, it is likely to increase again once participants finally give
up their rank in order to prevent a too stark increase in inequality. That is, rank loss
aversion implies a non-monotonic relationship between the share that is distributed to
4The no-difference finding applies only to subjects ranked second to second-to-last as the experi-
mental design does not permit to analyze rank concerns associated with the first and last place.
5Since total earnings of the recipients are accumulative, the actual number of repetitions is random
and thus unknown to participants.
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the poorer recipient and the earnings difference between him or her and the decision
maker.
Different (regression) models consistently estimate the effect of rank-loss aversion to
raise the frequency of giving less than half of the money to the lower ranked recipient
from about 17 to at least 30%. Yet, the negative effect of rank-loss aversion on the
absolute level of giving to the poorer recipient is estimated to be significant only for
some specifications of the estimated model. Nevertheless, the consistently estimated
significant increase in the number of people choosing to give less than 50% strongly
suggests that rank-loss aversion influences some people’s behavior, though it may be
difficult to observe the effects on the aggregate level always.
4.2 Literature
This paper is related to an important strand of research that empirically investigates
the relationship between income and happiness. Exploring survey data from the UK,
Boyce et al. (2010) find that percentile in the income distribution predicts life satis-
faction better than absolute income. Likewise, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) and
Luttmer (2005) find that own well-being is decreasing in the income of those living
close. Using an experiment with hypothetical choice questions, Mujcic and Frijters
(2012) observe that income rank matters irrespective of absolute income to Australian
university students. Others have focused on smaller peer groups and investigated the
relationship between happiness and income relative to one’s peers. Clark and Oswald
(1996) obtain results that are consistent with job satisfaction being dependent on rel-
ative but not on absolute income. More recently, Card et al. (2012) collected field
experimental evidence showing that job satisfaction decreases when people learn that
they are earning less than their peers. More generally, much of this literature con-
tributes to the discussion of the Easterlin-Paradox (Easterlin, 1974), emphasizing that
relative income, rather than absolute income, determines individual happiness.
As Heffetz and Frank (2011) note, the desire for relative income and status are closely
related to the literature on social preferences. Seminal works in this area are from Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), and
Engelmann and Strobel (2004). The link to this literature persists because in most
cases, positional concerns can be explained by inequity aversion, and the aversion to
disadvantageous inequality in particular. Indeed, Card et al. (2012) are able to show
that their results match predictions obtained from a modified version of the inequity-
aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Importantly, this holds for both of their
main findings: a decrease in job satisfaction after learning about peers with higher
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income and almost no effect on job satisfaction when learning about peers with lower
income.
As already indicated, this paper contributes to the literature on status seeking behav-
ior in more general. Beginning with Veblen (1899), many economists have argued that
people value status and associated investments in conspicuous consumption goods be-
cause it allows them to achieve improved economic outcomes. Building on the closely
related assumption that people have a desire for higher relative income, theoretical
contributions such as Frank (1985), Robson (1992), Corneo and Gruner (2000) and
Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) have explored the implications of status concerns for
demand, inequality, growth and redistribution, respectively. The findings from this
experiment lend credibility to these mostly theoretical works as they provide evidence
in support of one of their key underlying assumptions.
Over the last decades, plenty of evidence in support of both status having positive
effects on economic outcomes and people thus seeking for higher status has been doc-
umented. In Ball and Eckel (1996), Ball and Eckel (1998) and Ball et al. (2001), the
authors manipulate status in the lab and observe that a higher status often leads to
more favorable outcomes for those holding it. Rablen and Oswald (2008) find status
effects outside the lab by estimating that winning a nobel price prolongs the winner’s
lifetime by one to two years. In the majority of the experimental research investigating
the effects of status, the award of status is salient. As a consequence, the awardee of
high status is treated differently by others in subsequent social interactions, which is
often beneficial for the awardee. Instead, this papers ask the slightly different question
whether people seek higher income ranks in the absence of any public announcements.
Even though this is the case in many real world applications, evidence showing that
people care about private income ranks as they care about publicly awarded status is
still scarce.
The work by Dijk et al. (2014) is among the very few papers trying to answer whether
pure income rank concerns affect behavior. Comparing portfolio investment decisions
in the lab, the authors observe that information about peers’ performance induces in-
vestment choices that compare with those made under a tournament incentive scheme.
Hence, they conclude that rank matters even in the absence of additional material
incentives. In Kirchler et al. (2018), the authors bring the lab into the field, confirming
most of the evidence that peer comparisons induce more risk-taking, especially among
professional investors. Another work belonging to this area is the work by Kuziemko
et al. (2014), which also closest to my paper in terms of the experimental design. In a
series of experiments and surveys, the authors collect evidence in support of last-place
aversion, which can be seen as a rank-specific status or rank concern. Yet, their identifi-
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cation relies on inter-rank comparisons, preventing them from learning anything about
an aversion to give up one’s rank across all ranks. Moreover, rank in their experiment
is assigned randomly wheres it is associated with some merit in this.
More broadly, this paper is also related to the experimental literature on distribu-
tional preferences in large groups. While the research question investigated by Durante
et al. (2014) or Erkal et al. (2011) is different from mine, rank-loss aversion is likely to
influence individual behavior in their experiments as well, thereby changing how their
data can and possibly even should be interpreted. For example, selfishness is not the
only explanation for the relatively low transfers chosen by participants ranked first in
Erkal et al. (2011). Instead, participants ranked first may fear a loss of their rank most
when choosing a transfer that is too high even without being most rank-loss averse.
This is because they can be almost certain that they will not receive any transfer
from other members of their group, while any other member may receive up to several
transfers.
To summarize, the existing literature has focused on when and why people value
status and relative income. As the present papers addresses the lack of evidence in
support of pure income rank concerns, its major contribution lies in this area. In
addition, though to a much lesser extent, I contribute to the literature on the behavioral
implications of status. A common finding from this mostly experimental research is
that those with an advantageous position are the least helpful and most greedy (Piff
et al. (2010), Guinote et al. (2015), Piff et al. (2012)). Using a dictator game to measure
social preferences of different status groups, Fisman et al. (2015) also find that high
status subjects are least pro-social. The experimental findings presented in this paper
complement this line of research by showing that people at any rank, not only those
with a high status, may act less pro-social if it enables them to preserve the existing
ranking.
4.3 Theory and Experiment
4.3.1 Experimental Design
The experimental design aims at identifying the effects of rank-loss aversion. To gen-
erate a ranking, the experiment uses a real-effort task (first stage). To detect potential
effects of rank-loss aversion, the experiment forces participants to trade off their rank
with reducing overall inequality in a distribution task (second stage).
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At the beginning of the first stage, subjects are randomly matched into groups of six
and then perform a brief estimation task to determine a preliminary ranking.6 As a
part of the estimation task, subjects are shown a large table containing 1,200 numbers
which are either one or zero for 15 seconds. Afterwards, they are asked to provide an
estimate of the number of zeros in the table that they have seen. Based on the relative
precision of the estimate within their group, subjects are assigned tasks of varying
difficulty for the subsequent real-effort phase.7 The assignments are fixed across all
groups and depend only on relative performance. If all subjects successfully complete
their task, those facing the more difficult task also achieve higher earnings and the
preliminary ranking equals the final ranking.
The real-effort task is based on Abeler et al. (2011). Subjects are required to count
the number of zeros in as many tables as their assignment prescribes (see figure (C.2)
in appendix C). If subjects count correctly, they are rewarded with 0.50 EUR per
table. Subjects ranked first after the estimation task may count up to 24 tables. From
the second to sixth rank, the assigned upper limits are 20, 16, 12, 8, and 4 tables.
All subjects, irrespective of their rank, are given 20 minutes to complete this task.
Fulfilling the assignment is voluntary and subjects are free to count fewer tables, but
not more. Hence, a subject ranked first in the estimation task can at most earn 12 EUR,
a subject ranked second at most 10 EUR and so forth. The total time of 20 minutes is
chosen such that almost all participants are able to reach their implied earnings cap,
though it certainly requires higher effort from those at higher ranks. When a subject
completes her assignment before the time is over, her screen switches to an article about
Mannheim, which is copied from the English Wikipedia. Prompting participants to
read the article is simply a measure to keep them focused and concentrated.
During the second stage, subjects decide on how to divide additional windfall gains
between two others members of the same group. To create the afore mentioned trade-
off, the two possible recipients are the subjects ranked one position above and one
position below the subject making a decision if she is ranked second to second-to-
last. That is, someone ranked second can distribute to the participants ranked first
or third, someone ranked third to the participants ranked second or fourth, and so
forth. Importantly, a subject’s rank in this second stage refers to the income ranking
obtained after the real-effort phase. By construction of the experiment, the choice
sets of subjects ranked first and last have to be different. If ranked first, subjects
must distribute the additional money between the group member ranked second and
the member ranked last. If ranked last, subjects distribute between those ranked first
6Each subject in a group is assigned a (group) unique ID from the list Blue, Brown, Green, Orange,
Red, and Yellow. In the on-screen instructions, participants are henceforth referred to as player [color].
7If a tie occurs, the computer allocates the higher rank randomly.
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and fifth in their own group. Despite the resulting disadvantage of not being able to
explore the degree of rank-loss aversion among subjects ranked first and last, assigning
systematically different recipients to those subjects also has the advantage of creating
a control group as they never face the inequality-rank trade-off.
Distributing additional money takes place over several, consecutive rounds, with
transfers accumulating over rounds. While the instructions only mention that the
number of rounds is determined randomly, it is, in fact, five plus a random number
drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean equal to one. In each round, the ad-
ditional money that must be distributed between the two recipients amounts to 1.00
EUR. Using a slider, participants can select the share they wish to distribute to each
of the other participants with a precision of 0.01 EUR (see figure (C.3) in appendix
C). Besides, the screen shows a large table containing information about all group
members income during the entire course of this task. Importantly, the figure showing
the post-distribution income (see column “total income” in figure (C.3) in appendix C)
is updated immediately whenever the slider is moved by the participant. Likewise, the
ranking positions are adjusted instantly in response to a change of a subject’s income
rank.
Because subjects never know whether there will be another round, they should never
withhold money from a recipient with the intention to compensate him or her in the
subsequent round. Instead, they should always distribute the money such that the
resulting accumulated earnings allocation matches their (constrained) most preferred
distribution. After some rounds, the income difference with respect to the poorer
recipient becomes small, resulting in the intended trade-off requiring subjects to choose
between reducing inequality further or preserving the ranking. At the end of the
distribution task, all decisions of a single participant per group are implemented. This
rules out strategic behavior and permits to interpret the observed decisions as the
expression of individual preferences.
Upon completion of the distribution task, all subjects are asked to participate in
a simplified trust game prior to learning the outcome of the distribution phase. Par-
ticipants are informed about the existence of this last part at the beginning of the
experiment. Yet, they receive no information about this part except that the major
share of their earnings from this experiment will be determined during the first part.8
A comment on the design.
The earnings scheme resulting from the tournament to allocate earnings implies that
differences in income between adjacent ranks are constant. As a result, distributional
8In the trust game, I measure heterogeneity in trust and trustworthiness across income ranks.
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choices of subjects are not only comparable to subjects at identical ranks in other
groups, but to other subjects within the same group as well. While constant payoffs
are a major advantage of using a tournament, a standard tournament typically leads
to several issues that would be detrimental to identifying the consequences of rank-loss
aversion. Below, I discuss those issues in more detail and explain how the chosen design
resolves them.
First, if the differences in income determined by a fixed-prize tournament are not
proportional to the differences in performance, participants are likely to be malevolent
towards higher ranked participants (Grund and Sliwka, 2005). The resulting envious-
ness or guilt from the perspective of those winning the higher prize may significantly
affect distributional preferences. As differences in performance (and the underlying
effort) are naturally small for those with an average position, this described type of
malevolence or guilt would therefore systematically distort the experiment’s key trade-
off between the preference for an equal distribution and rank-loss aversion.
Second, when evaluating inequality, subjects may not only pay attention to others’
income, but also to the effort provided to earn it. As Abeler et al. (2011) point out,
the counting task certainly entails a positive cost of effort since it is very tedious. Ac-
cording to the theory described in section 4.3.2, costs of effort influence a participant’s
distribution decision if she takes effort into account while evaluating the degree of in-
equality. Assigning tasks of varying and predefined length to participants based on a
very brief estimation task makes the effort provision roughly proportional to earned
income. It thus constitutes another measure to improve comparability across ranks.
Third, using the estimation task to indirectly determine final income while the vast
majority of effort must be provided in another task separates skill and talent in the
real-effort task from the attained income rank. That is, subjects ranked second will
not necessarily find the real-effort task easier than subjects ranked second-to-last since
the second place does not result from being second best in the real-effort task. Sep-
arating skill from income is again crucial when relying on the comparability of the
rank-inequality trade-off. Due to the potential connection between income and effort,
the rank-inequality trade-off would be different across ranks if the perceived cost of
effort was. Separating income from skill that facilitates earning the income prevents
this distortionary effect as well as other endogeneity problems typically resulting from
self-selection.
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4.3.2 Theoretical Framework
Suppose that an ordering y1 < y2 < ... < y6 exists regarding the income levels of all
members of a group. Further, assume that utility is additively separable in “standard
utility” and rank utility. Denote by Ri individual i’s actual rank after redistribution
and by Rei her income from the real-effort phase. A simple way to incorporate rank-loss
aversion into individual i’s preferences is to write her utility as follows:
Γi(γ, yi) = Ui(·) +G(Rei , Ri) (4.1)
where Ui(·) captures i’s “standard” social preferences neglecting rank-loss aversion and
where the additional term G(Rei , Ri) captures utility from her final rank Ri, which
depends on her earned rank Rei as well. The general idea of combining the preference
for a particular rank with existing models of social preferences as in (4.1) is borrowed
from Kuziemko et al. (2014). Nevertheless, I deviate from Kuziemko et al. (2014)
in three ways. First, I assume that not only people in the second-to-last but in any
place are rank-loss averse. Second, I account for the recent evidence on fairness views
by assuming that people care not only about self-centered inequality, but also about
inequality between others, which helps to derive more reasonable predictions.9 Finally,
the differences in design between the distribution phase in Kuziemko et al. (2014) and
this experiment require to derive new predictions that account for several consecutive
distribution rounds.
In the experiment, participants first attain a particular rank according to their per-
formance and can then choose actions that either preserve their rank or make them
fall behind by one position. Hence, the experiment explores the change in utility from
giving up a position, but does not measure absolute utility from rank. Thus, testable
predictions rely only on the difference in those utilities, which I denote by R′:
R′ = G(Rei , R
e
i )−G(Rei , Rei − 1) (4.2)
Even though this assumption can be relaxed, for simplicity assume that R′ is constant
across all ranks. Naturally, the functional form assumptions regarding Ui(·) influence
the predictions from any model of rank-loss aversion, even more so when accounting for
preferences over inequality between others. To provide a general overview of predictions
that could obtain, I first discuss those resulting from three of the most prominent social
preference models.
9A motivation for this assumption is given later in this section.
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According to the equity-reciprocity model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), utility
depends on two factors: own income yi and the individual share of the total surplus
y¯. Since the design keeps own income yi constant while not allowing participants to
influence y¯ (the decision maker must distribute all of the additional money), the model
predicts that participants would always be indifferent between giving to the richer
or poorer recipient. With rank-loss aversion instead, participants would always give
everything to the richer recipient if this is necessary to secure R′, the additional utility
from keeping her earned rank.
Similarly, Charness and Rabin (2002) suggest that taking into account preferences
over yi
y¯
, yi and the income of the poorest player is sufficient to explain individual
behavior in distribution games. By design, the second-to-last ranked player is the only
participant who can give to the poorest (last-ranked) subject. This means that all
but the participant ranked second-to-last, should be indifferent between giving to the
richer or poorer recipient.10 Yet, when accounting for rank-loss aversion, predictions
are identical for all subjects, including those ranked second-to-last. The reason why
someone ranked second-to-last will give everything to the richer recipient if necessary
to secure R′ is because she becomes the poorest member of the group herself by giving
up her rank. When this happens, she cannot make the poorest member any richer and
the incentive to give up her rank vanishes.
The third model is the one by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which again leads to quite
similar predictions. The authors assume that utility of individual i is given by:
Ui(yi) = yi − αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{yj − yi, 0} − βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max{yi − yj, 0}
where βi ≤ αi, 0 ≤ βi < 1 and yi represents i’s monetary payoff. The model predicts
that a decision maker should strictly prefer giving to the poorer of the two recipients
if the poorer recipient’s income puts him in the domain of advantageous inequality.
Otherwise, she should be indifferent between giving to either subject. Accounting for
rank-loss aversion makes the indifference disappear. Instead, the prediction is that
participants would give up to 100% of the additional money to the richer recipient to
prevent the loss of R′.
Notably, the models discussed were developed to mainly explain behavior in games
which require people to trade off own material interests with giving a fair share to
others. As a consequence, it was sufficient to build these models on purely self-centered
10In fact, the last-ranked subject is included in the first ranked subjects’ choice sets as well. Yet, a
subject ranked first never faces a trade-off between giving to the poorer recipient or maintaining her
rank in this experiment. Thus, the prediction is to give to the poorer recipient always.
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other-regarding preferences, that take into account only comparisons between others
and oneself.11 Instead, the experiment requires participants to be spectators and choose
a distribution of money between other recipients without being able to give anything
to themselves. Besides, the prediction of distributing all of the additional money to
the richer recipient, even when R′ is arbitrarily small, seems quite implausible and not
very robust in the light of the existing experimental evidence on general fairness views.
Specifically, Cappelen et al. (2007) as well as Cappelen et al. (2010) have found that
people also care about how wealth is distributed among others. That is, they tend to
accept inequality between others if they hold them accountable for the outcome but
support redistribution to reduce the inequality otherwise. To account for such general
fairness concerns, I add an additional term capturing disutility from inequality between
others to the framework by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). This extended version of the
inequity-aversion model writes:
Ui(yi) =yi − αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max
{
yj − yi, 0
}− βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max
{
yi − yj, 0
}
(4.3)
− 1
n− 1γ
n∑
j 6=i
( n∑
k 6=i,j
max
{
yk − yj, 0
})
(4.4)
where 0 < γ < 1 is the weight attached to the cost arising from inequality between
others. The linearity and additive separability of the utility function as well as the
experimental design simplify predicting behavior in the distribution task significantly.
If there was a fourth participant who was in the domain of disadvantageous inequality
with respect to the richer recipient but in the domain of advantageous inequality with
respect to the poorer recipient, the disutility from that additional inequality would
matter for the decision of how much to give to the poorer and richer recipient as well.
Yet, all other subjects are either richer than both or poorer than both recipients as
the recipients the money can be distributed to are ranked exactly one position above
or below the spectator. Consequently, the shape of the utility function implies that
how the additional money is distributed between the two recipients does not affect
utlity from inequality with respect to any other participant. Therefore, it is sufficient
to consider only the spectator’s income and that of the two recipients when deriving
predictions for the experiment’s distribution task.
Consider an individual i with income yi and an earned rank Ri ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}. Denote
the poorer recipient’s earnings at the beginning of any round by y and the richer
recipient’s earnings by y¯, respectively. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be the predicted amount given to
the poorer recipient. Further, denote by ∆ ∈ R the difference in total income between
11The model by Charness and Rabin (2002) is an exception as the wealth of the poorest recipient
matters independetly of own income. Yet, the design still leads to identical predictions in this case.
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subject i, who chooses a transfer δ, and the poorer recipient at the beginning of a
round. Then, i keeps her rank Ri and does not lose R
′ iff
y + δ ≤ yi ⇔ δ ≤ yi − y. (4.5)
The constraint (4.5) is binding if the amount i would choose to give to the poorer
recipient in the absence of rank concerns, denoted by δ∗, violates (4.5). To investigate
the trade-off that arises when (4.5) is binding, I derive the optimal choice of δ∗ first.
From (4.3), the solution to δ∗ can be obtained as follows:12
δ∗ = arg max
δ∈[0,1]
(
−α[max{y¯ + (1− δ)− yi, 0}+ max{y + δ − yi, 0}]
−β[max{yi − (y + δ), 0}]− γ[max{y¯ + (1− δ)− (y + δ)}])
For ∆ ≥ 1, i always gains (δ · β) from giving the entire share (δ = 1) to the poorer
recipient as it reduces advantageous inequality and minimizes the additional loss from
an increase in disadvantageous inequality (1− δ) · α. For ∆ < 1 instead, i’s disutility
from disadvantageous inequality does not depend on how the amount of (1 − ∆) is
distributed between the poorer and richer recipient. Yet, the choice of δ still affects
i’s (dis-)utility from inequality between others according to −γ(1 − 2δ) ∀ δ < y¯−y+1
2
.
Therefore, i is not indifferent between giving to either recipient for ∆ ≤ 1 (and even
∆ ≤ 0) but prefers to reduce the persisting inequality further. Once equality between
the two recipients has been reached, i splits the money equally to prevent additional
inequality.13 Formally, subject i chooses:
δ∗ = min{y¯ − y, 1}+ 1
2
(
1−min{y¯ − y, 1}) (4.6)
=
1
2
(
1 + min{y¯ − y, 1}) ∀ y¯ ≥ y (4.7)
Notice that the transfer given in (4.7) accounts for preferences over all domains of
inequality since ∆ ≥ 0 ⇒ y¯ − y > 1, implying that whenever there is advantageous
inequality gives rise to a higher transfer, inequality between others does as well. How-
ever, δ∗ is the optimal choice only in the absence of rank-loss aversion. If instead,
i’s preferences exhibit rank loss-aversion as suggested in (4.1), a trade-off arises that
sometimes implies a different choice. Importantly, a different choice occurs only if (4.5)
12The constant yi as well as the standardization by 1/(N − 1) are omitted as they do not affect i’s
choice.
13Since people have exerted effort to earn their income, people may consider some part of the
persisting inequality as justified and may not seek to reduce it until full equality prevails. This
possibility is explored in the next subsection.
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is binding as an individual need not give up R′ and can simply benefit from reducing
both advantageous inequality and inequality between others otherwise. Conditional on
preserving the ranking, i still wants to reduce inequality as much as possible. Thus,
the optimal rank-preserving choice δ˜ satisfies δ˜ = min
{
max{yi − y, 0}, 1
}
. Hence,
δ∗ = δ˜ = 1 if ∆ = yi − y ≥ 1 but δ∗ > δ˜ otherwise. Then, for ∆ < 1, i chooses
δ = δ˜ instead of δ∗ if not giving up her rank outweighs the differences in utility from
inequality between others. Formally, the condition writes:
γ
([
y¯ + (1− (yi − y))−
(
y + (yi − y)
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequality given δ˜
− [y¯ + (1− δ∗)− (y + δ∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequality given δ∗
)
≤R′
⇔ 2(δ∗ − (yi − y)) ≤R′/γ
By (4.7), δ∗ = 1 if y¯− y ≥ 1, and δ∗ = 1/2 + 1/2(y¯− y) otherwise. Substituting δ∗ into
the above inequality yields Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.1 The amount given to the poorer recipient δ depends on ∆ as follows:
δ =

1 if ∆ ≥ 1
yi − y︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ˜
if 1 > ∆ ≥ 1− R
′
2γ
1/2 + 1/2
(
min{y¯ − y, 1})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=δ∗
if ∆ < 1− R
′
2γ
.
(4.8)
By proposition 4.1, δ depends on y¯− y for ∆ < 1− R′
2γ
. Substituting y = yi−∆ into
the third line of (4.8), I obtain that
δ∗ =
{
1 if ∆ ≥ 1 + yi − y¯
1/2 + 1/2(y¯ − y) if ∆ < 1 + yi − y¯
(4.9)
The step-wise characterization of δ(∆) shows that the amount given to the poorer
recipient is largest for ∆ ≥ 1 and ∆ ∈ [1 + yi − y¯, 1 − R′2γ ). Moreover, i may never
want to give up her rank but choose δ = δ˜ = ∆ for any ∆ ∈ [0, 1] if the degree of
rank-loss aversion is too strong in the sense that R′ ≥ 2γ. This is because in that
case, the condition ∆ ≥ 1− R′
2γ
stated in (4.8) holds always. Yet, if i reaches ∆ < 0 at
some point, it means that her degree of rank-loss aversion satisfies R′ < 2γ. That is,
conditional on observing choices for ∆ < 0, I obtain that:
Corollary 4.1 δ(∆) is non-monotonic in ∆ and has a local minimum at ∆ = 1− R′
2γ
.
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4.3.2.1 Accounting for effort
Eventually, participants assess inequality and relative standing in terms of both people’s
income and the effort exerted to earn it. That is, subject i might care about how her
income (yi( net of the cost of effort (ci) compares with any other subject’s net income
yj − cj, j 6= i. Formally, this can be accounted for by substituting yi − ci for yi into
the equations (4.3) to (4.9) derived above. Since the difficulty of the task is chosen
such that all subjects deliberately complete their assignments, I assume that y > c for
all ranks. Besides, the proportional relationship between the the number of correctly
counted tables and earned income suggests that cost of effort is a proportional function
of yj.
14 Thus, assume that cj(yj) = a · yj, a ∈ (0, 1), implying that that the degree of
inequality between i and j given by (1−a)(yi− yj). Overall, all threshold levels stated
in proposition (4.1) have to be multiplied by 1/(1 − a), which raises the critical level
of ∆ where giving is predicted to be minimal. To see why, note that giving is lowest
if (1 − a)(yi − y) = 1 − R′/2γ. By solving for ∆ = yi − y, I immediately obtain the
following result:
Corollary 4.2 If costs of effort matter to an individual’s assessment of inequality, δ
is minimal at ∆ = 1
1−a(1−R′/2γ) > (1−R′/2γ).
The prediction of corollary 4.2 is rather intuitive. If costs of effort reduce the per-
ceived inequality from differences in income, the poorer recipient, who has exerted less
effort but whose earnings after having received additional money are almost as high as
those of subject i, may even be considered better off than i. Thus, one might want to
argue that in such a case, the higher rank is already lost to the poorer recipient despite
a still positive income gap. Consequently, δ is chosen to be lowest when the decision
maker is still better off including her higher incurred costs of effort, which coincides
with a larger income gap than in the absence of any costs of effort.
4.3.3 Identification and Hypotheses
Some additional assumption regarding the magnitude and distribution of the rank-loss
aversion parameter R′ as well as the inequality aversion parameter γ are necessary in
order to obtain testable implications from the model derived in section 4.3.2. Since the
degree of rank loss-aversion may vary substantially across individuals, the first objective
is to find the interval that captures most people’s critical difference ∆ = 1 − R′/(2γ)
where the amount given to the poorer recipient is predicted to be lowest. The main
14The analysis of the data presented in section 4.4 will confirm the simplifying assumptions made
here. That is, almost all participants count as many tables as possible and total counting time, which
seems to be a more accurate measure of effort, is almost proportional to earned income as well.
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part of the empirical analysis relies on the assumption that this critical interval is
given by [0.25, 0.75). The subsequent paragraphs provide the underlying arguments for
this choice. Moreover, I present results from an alternative specification of the critical
interval in the robustness check in section 4.5
Note that the value of γ, which measures disutitlity from inequality between others,
should not exceed the values of α or β for most participants. Otherwise, an individual
would be more concerned about inequality between others than between others and
him or herself, which seems unlikely. Besides, most experimental results confirm that
people dislike disadvantageous inequality more than advantageous inequality, implying
β < α. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that a β which is distributed between 0 and 0.6
with mean 0.31 can explain individual behavior across multiple games. Thus, a value
of γ = 0.25, which implies that disutility from inequality between others is slightly
lower than disutility from advantageous inequality appears reasonable. Concerning
the distribution of R′, I assume that 2γ > R′ constitutes an upper bound since an
individual would never want to give up her rank in the experiment otherwise. As
there may as well be some people who do not care about their rank, suppose that
R′ ≥ 0 constitutes the lower bound of the distribution of R′. Consequently, the critical
threshold, 1 − R′/2γ, where the transfer to the poorer recipient is minimal should be
distributed over the interval [0, 0.5). Importantly, this interval is not yet the interval
in which I expect to observe the lowest transfers by most individuals for two reasons.
First, the threshold ∆ = 1 − R′/2γ is to be multiplied by 1/(1 − a) where a is the
relative cost of effort to obtain one unit of y whenever costs of effort enter inequal-
ity concerns. In Abeler et al. (2011), subjects find it worthwhile to exert the effort
necessary to count the number of zeros for 10 cents per table. In my experiment, the
effort required to count all zeros is higher because I chose the ratio between zeros and
ones is to be more balanced.15 Therefore, I assume that a = 1/3, expanding the crit-
ical interval to [0, 0.75). Second, the theory predicts not only that giving is lowest at
∆ = 1−R′/2γ, but also that it is increasing over the entire interval [1−R′/2γ, 1]. Due
to the endogeneity of ∆, very few participants will in fact make a decision when being
exactly at their critical threshold. Rather, most observations that are affected by rank
loss-aversion belong to the entire interval [1−R′/2γ, 1].
Hence it is advisable to include observations with larger values of ∆ > 1/(1− a)(1−
R′/2γ) as well by extending the interval to [0, 1). Yet, an interval that is too large
will almost surely contain both low and high transfers to the poorer recipient from the
same individual. To see why, notice that for a particular level of individual rank-loss
15The size of the number tables is identical in Abeler et al. (2011) and my experiment (150 randomly
ordered zeros and ones). Yet, the mean probability that a zero is drawn amounts to roughly 50% in
my experiment, while it equals 30% in theirs.
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aversion, almost every participant will at least once not be affected by the inequality-
rank trade-off despite ∆ ∈ [0, 1). This is because the income difference ∆ is either
still too large for ∆ smaller but close to one, or too small, implying that the rank is
already lost for ∆ larger but close to zero. As a consequence, the chance of detecting
an effect of rank-loss aversion would be mitigated through the use of an interval that
is too large. Relying on the smaller interval [0.25, 0, 75) is an approach to reduce this
problem.
To allow for a reasonable comparison between giving behavior within the critical
interval and that within other regions of ∆, I construct additional intervals of identical
width outside of [0.25, 0.75). In the regression analysis, dummy variables indicate
whether the choice of δ belongs to a particular interval Dj where D1 = 1 if ∆ ∈
[1.25,∞), D2 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [0.75, 1.25), D3 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75), D4 = 1 if ∆ ∈
[−0.25, 0.25), D5 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [−0.75,−0.25), D6 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [−1.25,−0.75), D7 = 1 if
∆ ∈ [−1.75,−1.25), D8 = 1 if ∆ ∈ (−∞,−1.75) and Dj = 0 ∀ j otherwise.
To explore the effect of rank loss-aversion (D3 = 1), I focus on two outcomes that can
be computed from the available data. The first variable is called min giving : Instead
of taking into account all decisions, min giving takes on the value of the lowest amount
given to the poorer recipient within each interval. This method successfully deals with
the problem that arises when multiple decisions are observed within [0.25, 0.75). That
is, based on the theory derived in section 4.3.2, I expect participants to give less than
usual to the poorer recipient first and then decide to give up their rank in the next
round, distributing a significantly higher share to the poorer recipient again. Unless an
individual’s threshold of 1−′ /2γ is smaller than 0.25, it is possible that both decisions
are made when ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75). Focusing on the lowest transfer is a way to handle
those misleading observations without changing the interpretation of any potential
effect for D3 = 1.
In addition, I consider the relative frequency of giving less than 50% of the money
to the poorer recipient such that inequality is, as a consequence, increasing. The
corresponding outcome less than half is a dummy variable that takes a value of one
if a subject chooses δ < 0.5 in any given interval at least once and a value of zero
otherwise. Counting only one event per individual and interval is again crucial as
potential consequences of rank-loss aversion can hardly be detected otherwise for the
same reason justifying the focus on the lowest transfer per interval when considering
min giving.
Notably, it is difficult to find a reasonable explanation for why participants whould
give less than 50% to the poorer recipient without accounting for rank-loss aver-
sion. Hence, an increase in the frequency of such choices would provide evidence that
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some people are rank-loss averse. Additionally, focusing on the extreme outcome of
less than half =1 may be a more effective way of detecting the consequences of rank loss
aversion. Simply because the task asks subjects to select any amount “between” 0 EUR
and 1 EUR, most of them are going to distribute at least some positive amount to the
richer recipient as well, implying δ < 1 across all intervals. If there is only some addi-
tional noise in the decision making process, identifying a statistical difference between
the averages of min giving when ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) and min giving when ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75)
becomes incredibly hard unless the number of observations is very large. In contrast,
the theory unambiguously predicts that people should be giving less than 50% only if
it is necessary to maintain their rank, but never otherwise. Moreover, it seems unlikely
that many participants make a “mistake” and sometimes choose a share smaller than
the salient threshold of 50% by accident. Hence, a small number of observations with
subjects giving less than 50% for ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) may be sufficient to identify an effect
of rank loss-aversion when it should never be observed for ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75).
Notice that the experiment generates multiple observations from each individual
such that each round of making a distribution decision corresponds to a new period.
To account for the implied panel structure of the experimental data, variables are
indexed by t in the following regression models. That is, Ditj, corresponds to subject
i’s decision in round t.16 An important advantage of the panel structure is that it
allows to include individual fixed-effects. Since individual fixed effects control for all
time-invariant characteristics of an individual such as gender, social background or
education, those variables need not to be included in the regression analysis. The first
estimation builds on the following individual fixed-effects model:
Yit = αi +
∑
j 6=3
βjD
it
j + it (M1)
where it is an idiosyncratic error term. The dependent variable Yit is replaced either
by min giving or by the dummy variable less than half. Accordingly, the estimated
coefficient for βj can be interpreted either as the predicted absolute change in the lowest
transfer (to the poorer recipient) per decision maker or as the change in the relative
16The outcome variable Yit is not only a panel variable, but also highly auto correlated. This is
because min givingi,t−1 in period t − 1 determines ∆t in period t and, thus, Ditj ∀ j. However, the
design rules out any causal effect of Yi,t−1 on Yi,t as uncertainty about the total number of rounds
incentivizes subjects to decide in any round as if the current round is the last round. That is, when
choosing how to divide the additional money in the first round, subjects select the allocation they
would be most satisfied with if the experiment ended afterwards. In the following round(s), subjects
do not have to compensate a recipient for a low transfer in any previous round as that transfer was
simply just. Consequently, what matters to subjects when distributing the additional money in round
t is not the total amount already distributed but what the final allocation resulting from the decision
in round t would be. The perfect collinearity of ∆it and the final allocation in round t for any transfer
δt ensures that the effect of the latter is captured by the use of the interval dummies Dj .
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frequency of giving less than 50% when ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75). For Yit = min givingit, the
formal hypothesis writes:
H0 : βj ≤ 0 vs. H1 : βj > 0 ∀ j 6= 3
while it is reversed for the outcome less than half. This is because less than half refers
to the frequency of giving less than half, implying that a decline in the transfer to the
poorer recipient corresponds to an increase of the frequency of less than half. In what
follows, I will only state hypotheses regarding min giving explicitly, though the reverse
hypotheses are always implied for the outcome less than half.
As a consequence of the missing values from most individuals for at least some
intervals due to the endogeneity of ∆, estimating M1 may lack sufficient power to yield
significant differences with respect to the other intervals when these are considered
separately. By comparing the outcome Yit when ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) with the mean of all
other outcomes when ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75), the problem of insufficient power is less severe.
The corresponding fixed-effects model writes:
Yit = αi + β3D
it
3 + it (M2)
When estimating M2, I omit all observations with ∆ ∈ (−∞,−1.75). The reason is
that depending on an individual’s aversion to inequality betwen others γ, (−∞,−1.75)
is likely to overlap with ∆ < 1+yi− y¯. By equation (4.9), giving to the poorer recipient
may decrease and be as low 50% in this region of ∆. Thus, including these observations
would mitigate the effect relative to ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75).17 Formally, the hypothesis is:
H0 : β3 ≥ 0 vs. H1 : β3 < 0.
In addition, I test for rank-specific effects by interacting rank-specific dummies with
the critical interval dummy D3. Subject i’s earned rank is denoted by Ranki, with the
time index being omitted as it remains constant over time. The model with interaction
effects writes:
Yit = αi +
5∑
r=2
βr
(
Dit3 × 1Ranki=r
)
+ it (M3)
17If ∆ < −1.75 , the poorer receiver has received more that 3.75 EUR already. For this to happen
within six or less preceding rounds, the richer recipient may not have received more than 2.25 EUR,
putting him almost at par with the poorer recipient (net of effort).
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where the coefficients βr identify the effect of being in the critical interval ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75)
relative to ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75) for a particular rank r. Importantly, the base effect of one’s
rank is controlled for through including individual fixed effects. For the dependent
variable min giving, the hypotheses are:
H0 : βr ≥ 0 vs. H1 : βr < 0 ∀ r = 2, 3, 4, 5.
To estimate the models M1, M2 and M3, I rely only on the data obtained from
subjects ranked second to fifth. As the sets of recipients subjects ranked first and
last must distribute to differ systematically from the choice set associated with ranks
second to fifth, subjects ranked first and last do never face the inequality-rank trade-off.
That is, the theoretical prediction of a local decrease in giving to the poorer recipient
due to rank-loss aversion does not hold for the group of subjects ranked first or last.
Hence, this group can be considered as a control group while those ranked second to
second-to-last can be considered as the treatment group. To exploit the systematic
treatment variation across ranks, model M4 relies on a difference-in-difference (DiD)
estimation approach.
When comparing the outcomes min giving and less than half across all ranks using a
DiD estimator, ∆ is not a useful predictor as it differs systematically for those ranked
first and last by design. Yet, there exists a simple one-to-one mapping from ∆ to
the accumulated amount distributed to the poorer recipient. Since the difference to
the poorer recipient is always equal to 2 EUR (except once), this relationship can be
expressed by G = 2 − ∆ for all participants ranked second to fifth, where G denotes
the total amount given to the poorer recipient. Based on this relationship, the critical
interval in terms ofG for which theory predicts a decline in transfers to poorer recipients
within the treatment group is given by (1.25, 1.75].
Additionally, using the DiD approach makes it possible to identify the effects of
rank-loss aversion without relying on the non-monotonicity prediction that requires
to take into account decisions from all intervals. Rather, I can restrict attention to
those intervals that are perfectly comparable if there was no rank-loss aversion when
evauluating the behavior of the treatment group against that of the control group. The
range for which I can reliably claim that the theoretical predictions would be identical
if there was no rank-loss aversion is broadly given by G ≤ 1.75. This is because for
G > 1.75, the total earnings gap between the recipients of subjects ranked second to
second-to-last has become quite small whereas it is still large between the recipients of
subjects ranked first and last. Hence, other motives such as the aversion to inequality
between others could drive predictions apart even if rank-loss aversion was absent in
both groups.
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Analogously to the analysis relying on the income difference ∆ as the main predictor,
the intervals used to compute min giving and less than half using the DiD approach
are given by [0, 0.75], (0.75, 1.25] and G ∈ (1.25, 1.75]. Likewise, interval dummies
{Gj}j=1,2,3 satisfy G1 = 1 if G ∈ [0, 0.75], G2 = 1 if G ∈ (0.75, 1.25], G3 = 1 if G ∈
(1.25, 1.75] and Gj = 0 otherwise. To test whether G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] affects min giving
and less than half among subjects ranked second to second-to-last (treatment group),
I estimate the following individual fixed-effects model:
Yit = αi + β11Ranki∈{2,3,4,5} + β2
(
1Ranki∈{2,3,4,5} ×Git3
)
+ β3G
it
3 + it (M4)
where β1 can be omitted due to the inclusion of individual fixed effects. The formal
hypothesis is
H0 : β2 ≥ 0 vs. H1 : β2 < 0.
In addition, the DiD model offers an alternative test of rank-specific effects, comple-
menting model M3. The corresponding model writes:
Yit = αi +
6∑
r=1
ηr1Ranki=r +
5∑
r=2
βr
(
Git3 × 1Ranki=r
)
+ β3G
it
3 + it (M4’)
with hypotheses identical to M3.
4.3.4 Subject Pool and Experimental Procedures
The experiment was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 90 subjects
(18 per session) participated in the experiment at the Mannheim Laboratory for Ex-
perimental Economics (mLab) from march to april, 2016. Participants were recruited
via the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner et al., 2003). Since instructions were in
English, many participants were exchange students. The majority of participants were
students enrolled in business or economics-related degree programs. Moreover, 50 par-
ticipants were male. A session lasted 70 minutes and yielded average earnings of 11
EUR, including a show up fee of 3 EUR.
4.4 Results
I first report results on the estimation and real-effort task before exploring the effects
of rank-loss aversion in the distribution task.
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Mean deviation of guessed from true value ± 2 SEs
Figure 4.1: Accuracy in the estimation task
4.4.1 Real-Effort Task
Figure 4.1 shows that performance in the estimation task, which indirectly determines
the income ranking, varies greatly even after conditioning on the rank achieved within
one’s group. That is, even though the estimates of subjects ranked first seem more
precise on average, they are not distinctively more precise than those of the other
subjects. The lack of significant differences implies that attaining a certain rank is likely
to be the results of (matching) luck rather than skill. Thus, the rank assignment may
be assumed to be almost random, suggesting that potential rank-specific differences
are not due to self-selection.
In the real-effort task, 89 out of 90 participants accomplished to count the maximum
number of tables assigned to them based on their ranking from the estimation task.
The participant who failed to complete all tables still managed to count 15 out of 16
tables, leading to an income of 7.50 EUR instead of 8.00 EUR. Figure 4.2 shows the
average time participants needed to complete their task. In line with the assumptions
made in section 4.3.2, the data indicate an almost proportional relationship between
counting time and the number of tables assigned to participants.
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Figure 4.2: Time in the counting task
Since all participants (with only one exception) have reached the earnings cap implied
by the assigned number of tables, the ranking produced through the estimation task
is identical to the pre-distribution phase income ranking. This means that the income
difference between participants at adjacent ranks always amounts to 2 EUR while the
effort difference always amounts to 4 tables. Thanks to this consistency, choices can
easily be compared across different ranks and groups.
4.4.2 Distribution Task
The experiment asks participants to make consecutive distribution decision over multi-
ple rounds. Since for each individual, the number of rounds equals five plus a random
variable drawn from a Poisson process with mean one, only seven participants were
asked to make more than seven distribution decisions. Since the trade-off between
inequality aversion and rank-loss aversion always emerges in the first couple of rounds,
I omit the data collected after round seven from those seven individuals in order to
have a panel panel that is more balanced. Importantly, omitting these observations
has no effect on differences in min giving or less than half between the critical interval
[0.25, 0.75) and the neighboring intervals.
Figure 4.3 shows how the outcome variable min giving varies with the accumulated
amount (G) already given to the poorer recipient. Recall that due to the fixed earn-
ings scheme, there is a direct link between G and the income difference to the poorer
recipient ∆ = 2 − G for those participants ranked second to fifth. That is, the in-
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(b) Rank concerns possible
Figure (a) contains the data from participants ranked first and sixth who never face the trade-
off between inequality and rank. Figure (b) contains data from participants ranked second
to fifth, who are predicted to face the rank-inequality trade-off when G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] ⇔
∆ ∈ [0.25, 0, 75). Per interval, only the lowest transfer to the poorer recipient (min giving)
is considered, ruling out multiple observations per interval from the same individual.
Figure 4.3: Minimum giving and accumulated transfers
terval (1.25, 1.75] corresponds to the difference interval [0.25, 0, 75) where the theory
based on rank-loss aversion predicts that transfers to the poorer recipient from those
ranked second to fifth will be lowest. According to figure 4.3b, the mean of the lowest
transfers for G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] indeed lies below that in any other interval. In contrast,
no such non-monotonic pattern can be found in figure 4.3a, which contains data from
participants ranked first and last. Even though looking at the raw data (figure 4.3b)
suggests quite a large decline in min giving of almost 20% relative to the other inter-
vals, the empirical analysis does not consistently confirm this view. Table 4.1 contains
the regression results corresponding to the identification strategy described in section
4.3.3. In column (model) M1, min giving is not significantly smaller for ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75)
than for any other interval. Estimating model M2 is more efficient than M1 as it only
assumes an effect of ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) relative to ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75), implying more obser-
vations within a single comparison category. Yet. estimating M2 confirms the results
obtained from M1 as the coefficient is neither economically nor statistically significant.
Note that for estimating M1 and M2, it is implicitly assumed that the effect of rank-
loss aversion is similar across ranks. Potential rank-dependent effects are analyzed in
the third column of table 4.1, which presents the results obtained from estimating M3.
Contrary to the research on last-place aversion by Kuziemko et al. (2014), I find no
evidence that rank-loss aversion is particularly strong among subjects ranked second-
to-last. Instead, I observe a significant decrease of transfers by participants ranked
fourth (p-value<0.01, one-sided t-test). To the best of my knowledge, there is no
theoretical argument for why people should be averse to giving up the fourth rank but
should not be concerned about other ranks. Rather, it seems likely that the group
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(b) Rank concerns possible
Figure (a) contains the data from participants ranked first and sixth who never face the trade-
off between inequality and rank. Figure (b) contains data from participants ranked second
to fifth, who are predicted to face the rank-inequality trade-off when G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] ⇔
∆ ∈ [0.25, 0, 75). Per interval, the outcome less than half is taken into account at most once
from each individual.
Figure 4.4: Frequencies of giving less than 50% to poorer recipients
of participants ranked fourth exhibits a large degree of rank loss-aversion by accident.
Hence, this finding suggests that rank-loss aversion does affect the behavior of some
people, even though it may not be visible on the aggregate level.
As argued in section 4.3.3, the relative frequency of choices that involve a share of
less than 50% for the poorer recipient is another outcome of interest. Figure 4.4 depicts
how less than half varies across different intervals for G or ∆, respectively. The large
spike in less than half observed in figure 4.4b at G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] turns out to be sig-
nificant this time. Estimation results from M1 (first column) show that less than half
is significantly more frequent when ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) than within most other intervals
(one-sided t-test). The average magnitude of the effect may be observed most easily by
focusing on the coefficient β3 obtained from estimating M2. As displayed in the second
column, less than half is chosen significantly more frequently for ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) than
for ∆ 6∈ [0.25, 0.75). With a coefficient of 0.126 (p-value<0.05, one-sided t-test) and
a constant of 0.168, the result suggests that the frequency of less than half almost
doubles when rank-loss aversion plays a role. Finally, the third column (M3) shows
that there are almost no rank-specific effects. While the direction of the effect is pos-
itive and comparable in magnitude across all ranks, less than half increases (weakly)
significantly when ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75) only for participants ranked second.
As explained in section 4.3.3, I can also test for the effect of rank-loss aversion
by exploiting the differences in the predictions between different ranks. Specifically,
participants ranked first or sixth never need to give up their rank in order to reduce
overall inequality. Hence, neither should min giving decrease nor should less than half
102 4 Rank-Loss Aversion
Model (M1) (M2) (M3)
Dependent variable: min giving min giving min giving
D1 0.0779*
(0.0523)
D2 0.00472
(0.0492)
D4 -0.0719
(0.0595)
D5 -0.0216
(0.0580)
D6 -0.0157
(0.0570)
D7 -0.0408
(0.0975)
D8 -0.271***
(0.0746)
D3 -0.0195
(0.0432)
D3 × (Rank = 2) 0.0349
(0.0423)
D3 × (Rank = 3) 0.0162
(0.0897)
D3 × (Rank = 4) -0.161***
(0.0670)
D3 × (Rank = 5) 0.0407
(0.107)
Constant 0.659*** 0.638*** 0.638***
(= D3 for M1) (0.0404) (0.00514) (0.00489)
Observations 336 294 294
Clustered SE in parentheses, One-sided test: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4.1: Regression min giving
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Model: (M1) (M2) (M3)
Dependent variable: less than half (lth) lth lth
D1 -0.163**
(0.0699)
D2 -0.0631
(0.0817)
D4 -0.135*
(0.0970)
D5 -0.0845
(0.0994)
D6 -0.114*
(0.0764)
D7 -0.113
(0.0923)
D8 -0.0898
(0.0830)
D3 0.126**
(0.0695)
D3 × (Rank = 2) 0.151*
(0.109)
D3 × (Rank = 3) 0.0433
(0.106)
D3 × (Rank = 4) 0.189
(0.158)
D3 × (Rank = 5) 0.123
(0.164)
Constant 0.268*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.0648) (0.00749) (0.00746)
Observations 382 325 325
Clustered SE in parentheses, One-sided test: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4.2: Regression less than half
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increase for those subjects when G ∈ (1.25, 1.75]. This implied difference in distributive
choices can easily be seen in the data by comparings the graphs depicted in figure 4.4.
Moreover, table 4.3 contains the estimation results using the DiD approach M4. As
shown in the first column, being in the treatment group (ranked second to fifth) causes
a significant reduction by 0.2 EUR (33% when compared to the constant) in giving to
the poorer recipient for G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] (p-value<0.01, one-sided t-test). The analysis
of rank-dependent effects on min giving in (M4’) provides further evidence in support
of the previous findings. As before, the negative effect of G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] is econom-
ically and statistically most significant for participants ranked fourth (p-value<0.01,
one-sided t-test). Moreover, I find a negative effect for subjects ranked second (p-
value<0.05, one-sided t-test) as well as for subjects ranked third (p-value<0.10, one-
sided t-test). Perhaps surprisingly, the only group that seems consistently unconcerned
about their rank giving up their rank is the group of subjects ranked second-to-last,
contradicting the theory of last-place aversion. Concerning the other outcome vari-
able less than half, the DiD method estimates a positive and significant effect of 0.201
(p-value<0.10, one-sided t-test) of G ∈ (1.25, 1.75] (⇔ ∆ ∈ [0.25, 0.75)), though the
coefficient is less significant than those obtained from M1 and M2. In addition, esti-
mating M4’ confirms that the increase in the frequency of giving less than 50% of the
money to the poorer recipient is increasing most among subjects ranked fourth and
second.
To summarize, I consistently find a positive effect on the frequency of giving less
than 50% due to rank-loss aversion. Yet, the negative effect on the lowest transfer is
significant only by using the DiD approach or by focusing on the subset of subjects
ranked fourth. Hence, rank-loss aversion seems to affect at least some people’s choices,
though questions remain about the magnitude of the effect on the aggregate level.
4.5 Robustness Check
The estimates obtained in the previous section strongly depend on the choice of the
interval for which the effects of rank-loss aversion are predicted to be observable. Even
though the respective interval has been derived based on a theory of rank-loss aversion,
the discretion of the researcher when making assumptions about individual preferences
challenges the credibility of the identification in section 4.4. The reason is that for any
randomly generated panel, there always exists an interval for ∆ in which transfers to
the poorer recipient are significantly lower than the average outside of the interval if
the respective interval can be chosen to be arbitrarily small. To provide some evidence
that the observed effects are not just the consequence of a random process, I report re-
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Model: (M4) (M4’) (M4) (M4’)
Dependent variable: min giving min giving less than half less than half
Rank ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} 0 0
(.) (.)
D3× (Rank ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}) -0.197*** 0.201*
(0.0727) (0.127)
D3 0.0951** 0.0951** -1.85e-16 7.71e-17
(0.0562) (0.0565) (0.105) (0.105)
D3 × (Rank = 2) -0.194** 0.300*
(0.0834) (0.187)
D3 × (Rank = 3) -0.156* 0.101
(0.107) (0.124)
D3 × (Rank = 4) -0.349*** 0.288*
(0.0957) (0.203)
D3 × (Rank = 5) -0.0906 0.118
(0.121) (0.179)
Constant 0.640*** 0.640*** 0.183*** 0.183***
(0.00682) (0.00651) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Observations 261 261 263 263
Clustered SE in parentheses, One-sided test: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4.3: DiD regression
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sults from an alternative interval specification in this section. The alternative interval
boundaries can be obtained from the previous ones by adding the constant 0.25, im-
plying a new critical interval of [0.5, 1). This interval still lies within the range of [0, 1),
for which theory predicts that transfers to the poorer recipient would be lower. Yet, it
differs significantly from [0.25, 0.75), implying that finding again an effect that is simply
the consequence of a purely random process is highly unlikely. The remaining intervals
and corresponding dummy variables are given by: D1 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [1.5,∞), D2 = 1 if
∆ ∈ [1, 1.5), D3 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [0.5, 1), D4 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [0, 0.5), D5 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [−0.5, 0),
D6 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [−1,−0.5), D7 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [−1.5,−1), D8 = 1 if ∆ ∈ [−2,−1.5], D9 = 1
if ∆ ∈ (−∞,−2) and Dj = 0 ∀ j, otherwise.
The main conclusion of this section will be that most results are robust to this
alternative interval specification, suggesting that the findings do not obtain from ac-
cidentally picking the right interval. Table 4.4 shows the results from estimating the
effect of ∆ ∈ [0.5, 1) on min giving. As in the previous section, it cannot be unam-
biguously established that transfers to the poorer recipient are significantly higher if
Dj 6=3 = 1 than if D3 = 1. Contrary to the main analysis however, the estimate obtained
from M2 suggests that ∆ ∈ [0.5, 1) leads to a significant decline (p<0.05, one-sided
t-test) when compared to the average across all other intervals. As in table 4.1, all
coefficients obtained from the rank-specific estimation M3 have a negative sign with
only the coefficient for participants ranked fourth being significant (p<0.01, one-sided
t-test).
Similarly, most results concerning the effect on less than half found in the main
analysis can be reproduced using the alternative interval specification. According to
table 4.5, participants choose less than half most often when ∆ ∈ [0.5, 1). Except
for ∆ ∈ [−0.5, 0) and ∆ ∈ [−2, 1.5), the obtained coefficients are always significant,
including the coefficients β2 and β4, which refer to the intervals before and after the
critical interval [0.5, 1). Compared to the case ∆ ∈ [1, 1.5), the frequency of giving
less than half declines by 0.158 (p<0.05, one-sided t-test) from 0.327 for ∆ ∈ [0.5, 1)
and it declines by 0.186 (p<0.05, one-sided t-test) when compared to ∆ ∈ [0, 0.5).
Thus, the robustness check lends strong support to the non-monotonicity prediction
derived in section 4.3.2. As in the main analysis, comparing Dj 6=3 = 1 with D3 = 1 in
(M2) yields a significant difference of 0.178 (p<0.01, one-sided t-test). Similarly, the
rank-specific analysis (M3) yields positive estimates for all ranks as well. Yet, only the
fourth and fifth rank are estimated to affect the outcome significantly.
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the DiD model (M4) are presented in table
4.6. Recall that the interval dummies represent the total amount transferred to the
poorer recipient (G) rather than the earnings difference to the poorer recipient (∆)
4.5 Robustness Check 107
here. While this ensures the necessary comparability between participants ranked first
or sixth and all other participants, it does not change the interpretation of the results
due to the existing one-to-one relationship ( G = 2 −∆) between G and ∆, implying
that D3 = 1 iff G3 = 1 for participants ranked second to second-to-last. Notice that
due to the consideration of the alternative interval specification, the condition for G
corresponding to ∆ ∈ [0.5, 1) is G ∈ (1, 1.5]. The first column shows that the effect of
G ∈ (1, 1.5] on min giving is significant (p<0.05, one-sided t-test). With a magnitude
of -0.177, the effect compares with the one obtained from the analogue estimation in the
main analysis (-0.197). Similarly, the estimated effect on less than half also shows a
significant increase by 0.354 (p<0.01, one-sided t-test). Additionally, the rank-specific
analysis from estimating M4’ confirms the existing findings.
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Model (M1) (M2) (M3)
Dependent variable: min giving min giving min giving
D1 0.154***
(0.0504)
D2 0.0888**
(0.0433)
D4 0.0226
(0.0504)
D5 -0.000830
(0.0632)
D6 0.0335
(0.0561)
D7 0.0418
(0.0650)
D8 -0.131*
(0.0829)
D9 -0.209***
(0.0792)
D3 -0.0769**
(0.0403)
D3 × (Rank = 2) -0.0489
(0.0604)
D3 × (Rank = 3) -0.0802
(0.0907)
D3 × (Rank = 4) -0.178***
(0.0726)
D3 × (Rank = 5) -0.00971
(0.0839)
Constant 0.596*** 0.646*** 0.646***
(0.0359) (0.00416) (0.00428)
Observations 330 310 294
Clustered SE in parentheses, One-sided test: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4.4: Regression min giving (robustness)
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Model: (M1) (M2) (M3)
Dependent variable: less than half (lth) lth lth
D1 -0.230***
(0.0784)
D2 -0.158**
(0.0719)
D4 -0.186**
(0.101)
D5 -0.115
(0.108)
D6 -0.164**
(0.0800)
D7 -0.170**
(0.0832)
D8 -0.101
(0.113)
D9 -0.161**
(0.0933)
D3 0.178***
(0.0734)
D3 × (Rank = 2) 0.113
(0.135)
D3 × (Rank = 3) 0.174
(0.135)
D3 × (Rank = 4) 0.271*
(0.169)
D3 × (Rank = 5) 0.165*
(0.126)
Constant 0.327*** 0.165*** 0.166***
(0.0694) (0.00700) (0.00740)
Observations 382 346 324
Clustered SE in parentheses, One-sided test: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4.5: Regression less than half (robustness)
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Model: (M4) (M4’) (M4) (M4’)
Dependent variable: min giving min giving less than half less than half
Rank ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} 0 0
(.) (.)
D3× (Rank ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}) -0.177** 0.354***
(0.0825) (0.124)
D3 0.0667 0.0667 -0.193** -0.193**
(0.0711) (0.0716) (0.108) (0.109)
D3 × (Rank = 2) -0.0797 0.193*
(0.0808) (0.139)
D3 × (Rank = 3) -0.159* 0.296**
(0.115) (0.127)
D3 × (Rank = 4) -0.330*** 0.546***
(0.100) (0.202)
D3 × (Rank = 5) -0.140 0.382***
(0.123) (0.138)
Constant 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.190*** 0.189***
(0.00684) (0.00654) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Observations 245 245 247 247
Clustered SE in parentheses, One-sided test: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4.6: DiD regression (robustness)
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I report results from an experiment designed to test whether people are
averse to a loss of their income rank when absolute income is held constant. The design
forces participants into a trade-off requiring them to forego the opportunity to decrease
inequality unless they give up their rank. Even though payoffs from the experiment are
not affected by a change in one’s relative position, people tend to reduce the amount
they distribute to the poorer recipient when distributing the normal amount would
cause loss of their rank. The effect is statistically significant in some but not all
regression specifications. In addition, I consistently estimate that significantly more
people give less than 50% of the total transfer to the poorer of the two recipients
when their rank is at stake. In other words, participants are more likely to choose an
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allocation that increases inequality in their group if such a choice preserves the existing
ranking.
Those findings lend credibility to an entire strand of literature focusing on the impli-
cations of people competing for higher relative income. While the existing experimental
evidence is limited to high status (first place) loving and low status (last place) aver-
sion, my results suggest that people value any income rank even in the absence of any
real status implication or additional material benefits. Importantly, the trade-off be-
tween inequality and rank also rules out inequality aversion as a potential explanation.
Yet, the regression-dependent variations in the magnitude and significance of the effect
suggest that the data is not fully conclusive and calls for further research concerning
the effects of rank-loss aversion.
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A Appendix Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Section 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. In Part I, I show that if consumers follow the stopping rule as specified in lemma
1, there is a unique sequence of increasing prices that maximize profits, denoted by
{p+k }k=1,...,N . Under the equilibrium stopping ruleR∗, consumers always buy if vik > pk.
Taking all other forthcoming sellers’ expected prices as given, a price by seller k can
induce a different stopping rule for at least some types x ∈ X if pk > pek+1 + δ, δ > 0
such that those types find continuing to search worthwhile despite vik > pk. In Part
II, I show that any price pk > p
+
k inducing an alternative stopping rule cannot be
profitable if it is not profitable under R∗.
Part I
Existence. Define qk(p) := −Dk(p)D′k(p) such that the FOC writes: p = qk(p) ∀ k =
1, ..., N . Next, write
qk(p) =
∫ 1
p
g(x)fk(x)dx
g(p)fk(p)
and observe that qk(p) is continuous ∀p > 0 and satisifes: limp→v qk(p) > 0 and
limp→1 qk(p) = 0. Hence, there always exists a p ∈ R that solves p = qk(p).
Uniqueness. Define θk(x) := g(x)fk(x) ∀ k ≥ 1. Then, expected demand at seller
k conditional on observing a history h = k − 1 writes:
Dk(p) =
∫ 1
p
θk(x)dx = Θk(1)−Θk(p),
where Θk(·) is the antiderivative of θk(·). Thus, I can rewrite qk(p) as:
qk(p) =
Θk(1)−Θk(p)
−θk(p) .
Notice that that θk(p) is log-concave for all k since first, θ1(x) = f1(x)g(x) = f(x)g(x) is
log-concave as multiplication preserves log-concavity and because second, log-concavity
of θk(p) implies log-concavity of θt(p) ∀ t ≥ k. The second statement follows from:
θk+1 = g(x)fk+1(x) =
g(x)
(
1− g(x))fk(x)∫ 1
v
(
1− g(t))fk(t)dt = 1− g(x)Ck θk(x),
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where Ck is a constant. The argument in footnote 1 shows that log-concavity of g(x)
implies log-concavity of 1 − g(x) ∀x ∈ {x : g(x) ≤ 1}. Again, multiplication of two
positive and log-concave functions preserves log-concavity. Hence, log-concavity of
θk(x) implies log-concavity of θk+1(x). Consequently, θk(p) is log-concave ∀ k ≤ K∗.
Further, log-concavity of θk(p) implies log-concavity of the anti-derivative Θk(p).
Define ∆k(p) =
(
Θk(1) − Θk(p)
)/
Ok where Ok :=
∫ 1
v
g(x)fk(x)dx is a normalization
to make ∆k(p) a probability measure. Then, ∆k(p) is log-concave over its positive
domain1. Rewriting qk(p) yields:
qk(p) =
∆(p)
−∆′(p)
Ok
Ok
As ∆k(p) is a log-concave probability distribution, qk(p) is decreasing (see Bagnoli and
Bergstrom (2005) and, thus, has a unique fix point.
The unique sequence of prices is increasing in k. Consider again qk(p) for
arbitrary k:
qk(p) ≤ qk+1(p) iff
∫ 1
p
g(x)fk(x)dx
g(p)fk(p)
≤
∫ 1
p
g(x)
(
1−g(x)
)
fk(x)∫ 1
v
(
1−g(t)
)
fk(t)dt
dx
1−g(p)∫ 1
v
(
1−g(t)
)
fk(t)dt
g(p)f(p)
(A.1)
⇔
∫ 1
p
g(x)
(
1− g(p))fk(x)dx ≤∫ 1
p
g(x)
(
1− g(x))fk(x)dx (A.2)
⇔
∫ 1
p
g(x)
(
g(p)− g(x))fk(x)dx ≥0 iff g′(x) < 0 (A.3)
Because inequality (A.3) always holds for g′(x) < 0, qk(p) ≤ qk+1(p) holds as well. The
following proof goes by contradiction. Hence, assume that p∗k+1 < p
∗
k for at least some
k. Then, A.3 implies that:
p∗k+1 = qk+1(p
∗
k+1) > qk(p
∗
k+1)
As qk() is decreasing, it follows from the assumption of p
∗
k+1 < p
∗
k that:
qk(p
∗
k+1) > qk(p
∗
k)
1Subtracting Θk(1) preserves log-concavity. Further, multiplication with a log-concave function
(i.e. (−1) ) preserves log-concavity over the composed function’s positive domain and Ok is just a
constant.
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But then uniqueness of p = qk(p) implies p
∗
k+1 = qk+1(p
∗
k+1) > qk(p
∗
k) = p
∗
k, contradict-
ing the assumption.
Part II
Now consider seller k setting a price p′k > p
+
k such that continuing to search is
worthwhile for at least some consumers, i.e. ∃x ∈ X s.th. Vk+1(xi) > 0 even if vik > p′k.
If for some type x, Vk+1(xi) > 0 even if vik > p
′
k , then x ∈ Xˆk, with
Xˆk := {x ∈ X : g(x)
(
p′k − pk+1
)
> s}. (A.4)
This is because pek+2 > p
e
k+1, and hence the surplus from sampling any seller beyond
the next seller cannot be positive if the surplus from sampling only the next seller is
not positive. By construction, ∃! x¯ ∈ Xˆk (with x¯ > p′k) s.th. x ∈ Xˆ ⇒ x > x¯. If
xi > x¯, consumer i might return with some probability and buy from k. Denote that
probability by ρ. It is sufficient to note that ρ ≤ 1 ∀xi > x¯ with strict inequality for
a positive mass of consumers(If ρ = 1 always, there would be no reason to continue
search in the first place. Hence, it would not correspond to prices that lead to an
alternative stopping rule for at least some consumers.) Due to p′k > p
e
k+1 + δ, seller k’s
demand Dˆk(p) under any alternative stopping rule writes
Dˆk(p) =
∫ x¯
p
ρ · g(x)fk(x)dx+
∫ v¯
x¯
g(x)fk(x)dx (A.5)
<
∫ x¯
p
g(x)fk(x)dx+
∫ v¯
x¯
g(x)fk(x)dx = Dk(p). (A.6)
where Dk(p) denotes the demand if consumers always followed R∗. As shown in Part
I, the problem maxpDk(p)p has a unique solution at p = p
+
k and thus:
p+k ·Dk(p+k ) > p′k ·Dk(p′k) ∀ p′k 6= p+k
Therefore, it follows from inequality (A.6) that:
p+k ·Dk(p+k ) > p′k · Dˆk(p′k)
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Define j∗ = sup{k : pek < p+k , k ≤ N}. By construction, it holds that pej∗ <
pek ∀ k ≥ j∗, implying that for pj∗ = pej∗ , a consumer buys from j∗ if vij∗ ≥ pej∗ . Notice
also that it does not matter whether a consumer with history h = j∗−1 has encountered
other matches previously. Since pej∗ < p
e
k ∀ k > j∗, the fact that sampling j∗ must have
been worthwhile to a consumer implies that pej∗ < pk ∀ k ∈ {j < j∗ : vij > 0}. Thus,
all consumers arriving at seller j∗ will buy if vij∗ > pj∗ and pj∗ ≤ pej∗ + δ, where
δ > 0 is determined such that for prices pj∗ > p
e
j∗ + δ, some consumers are induced
to continue searching or return to a previous seller despite vij∗ > pj∗ . Hence, for any
price pj∗ ≤ pej∗ + δ, seller j∗ has full monopoly power. Thus, if the price belongs to this
interval, it solves
max
p
(
pDj∗
(
p
))
Consequently, there always exists a profitable deviation from pj∗ = p
e
j∗ < p
e
j∗ + δ if
∂ppDj∗(p)|p=pe
j∗ > 0. Let p˜ = mink<j∗{pk : vik > pk} and denote by Xˆ :=
{
x ∈
X : g(x)
(
min{x, p˜} − pej∗
)
> s
}
the set of consumers whose expected surplus from
sampling j∗ despite available matches is positive due to potential price savings. If
potential savings in the price are sufficiently low, Xˆ ⊆ ∅. Then, consumers follow
R∗ and seller j∗’s demand is fully captured by the expression given for Dj∗(p). From
lemma 2, we know that
pej∗ < p
+
j∗ =
Dj∗(p
+
j∗)
−D′j∗(p+j∗)
<
Dj∗(p
e
j∗)
−D′j∗(pej∗)
(A.7)
where the second inequality holds as Dj∗(p) is log-concave under R∗ such that the
RHS of the FOC is decreasing in p. Hence, ∂ppDj∗(p)|p=pe
j∗ > 0, rendering p
′
j∗ > p
e
j∗ a
profitable deviation.
Next, consider the case where some types’ stopping behavior does change such that
Xˆ 6⊆ ∅ and denote by Dˆj∗(p) the resulting expected demand at seller j∗. As before,
denote by fk(x) the PDF of arriving consumers if they follow R∗ such that Xˆ ⊆ ∅ and
but by fˆk(x) the PDF of types if Xˆ 6⊆ ∅. By construction, ∃ x ∈ R s.th. x ∈ Xˆ ⇒ x ≥
x. For f(x) and fˆ(x), this implies
fj∗
(
x,R′) ≥ fj∗(x,R∗)∀ x ≥ x,
with strict inequality for all x ∈ Xˆ. By continuity of g(x), ∫
x∈Xˆ dx > 0 and since fˆj∗(x)
is a PDF, it follows that fˆj∗(x) = z · fj∗(x) ∀ x < x where z < 1 is a normalization. I
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can thus conclude about the RHS of (A.7) that:
Dj∗(p)
−D′j∗(p)
=
∫ x
p
g(x)fj∗(x)dx+
∫ v¯
x
g(x)fj∗(x)dx
−g(p)fj∗(x)
<
∫ x
p
g(x)fj∗(x)dx+
∫ v¯
x
(1/z)g(x)fˆj∗(x)dx
−g(p)fj∗(x)
=
z
∫ x
p
g(x)fj∗(x)dx+
∫ v¯
x
g(x)fˆj∗(x)dx
−z · g(p)fj∗(x)
=
Dˆj∗(p)
−Dˆ′j∗(p)
∀ p < pej∗ + δ
Combining the above inequality with (A.7) yields:
pej∗ <
Dˆj∗(p
e
j∗)
−Dˆ′j∗(pej∗)
and thus ∂ppDˆj∗(p)|p=pe
j∗ > 0. Consequently, seller j
∗ would always deviate to a higher
price p > pej∗ if p
e
j∗ < p
+
j∗ and hence, p
e
j∗ ≥ p+j∗ .
As pej∗ < p
+
j∗ is eliminated, another seller j
∗ = sup{k : pek < p+k , k ≤ N} might exist.
However, by going backwards and using the same argument as above, any pek < p
+
k can
be ruled out until j∗ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. Begin with the first seller a consumer samples, i.e. k = 1. By Lemma 3,
pek ≥ p+k ∀ k and thus p+1 < pek ∀ k > 1. Define Xˆ1 as in (A.4). Then ∃!δ > 0 s.th. Xˆ1 ⊆ ∅
iff p1 ≤ p+1 + δ. Note that Xˆ1 ⊆ ∅ induces consumers to adopt the search behavior R∗
and by Part I of lemma 2, p+1 = argmax D1(p)p where D1(p) is a hypothetical demand
function for p1 > p
+
1 +δ that would prevail if continuing to search despite a match were
ruled out by assumption (and consumers followed R∗).
It remains to show that p1 = p
+
1 yields larger profits than any price p1 > p
+
1 + δ,
inducing a stopping rule different from R∗ for at least some types. I use the notation of
the previous proof and denote the demand that arises under an alternative stopping rule
by Dˆ(p). By Part II of lemma 2, Xˆ1 6⊂ ∅ implies that p′1D1(p) > p′1Dˆ1(p′1) ∀ p′1 > p+1 +δ
and thus
p+1 ·D1(p+1 ) > p+1 + δ (A.8)
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Hence, profits are maximized globally at p+1 = argmax D1(p) ·p, irrespective of whether
other prices could induce an alternative stopping rule.
Next, consider seller k = 2. Since p1 = p
+
1 < p
e
k ∀ k > 1, any consumer sampling
k = 2 satisfies vi1 = 0. Hence, the distribution of arriving consumers f2(x) is equal
to (2.1) as derived under the consumers’ stopping rule R∗. Also, vi1 = 0 implies that
consumers never return to the previous seller and thus always buy if both vi2 > p2 and
Xˆ2 ⊆ ∅. Since p2 ≤ p+2 + δ ⇒ Xˆ2 ⊆ ∅, the previous argument for seller k = 1 now
applies to k = 2. By induction, this implies pk = p
+
k ∀k ≤ N .
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. The FOC from the maximization problem (2.7) in the main text writes:
0 =
N∑
i=1
φi
(
pD′i(p) +Di(p)
)
= p
N∑
i=1
φiD
′
i(p) +
N∑
i=1
φiDi(p)
Define q˜(K∗, p) =
∑K∗
i=1 φiDi(p)
−∑K∗i=1 φiD′i(p) . Then price p maximizing (2.7) must solve q˜(K∗, p) = p,
where φk is defined by (2.6). Rewriting q˜ yields:
q˜(p) =
∑K∗
i=1 φiΘi(1)−
∑K∗
i=1 φiΘi(p)
−∑K∗i=1 φiθi(p)
As Θi(p) is log-concave ∀ i,
∑K∗
i=1 φiΘi(p) is log-concave. By the same argument made
in proving proposition 1, this implies that ∆¯(p) =
∑K∗
i=1 φiΘi(1) −
∑K∗
i=1 φiΘi(p) is
log-concave. This permits to write q˜(p) = ∆¯(p)−∆¯′(p) . By Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005),
log-concavity of ∆¯(p) is sufficient that q˜(p) is decreasing in p. Further, it holds that
limp→v q˜(p) > 0 and limp→1 q˜(p) = 0. Hence, the price p solving the FOC p = q˜(p)
exists and is unique.2
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof is based on the following algebraic property:
x1
y1
<
x2
y2
⇒ x1
y1
<
φ1x1 + φ2x2
φ1y1 + φ2y2
<
x2
y2
for x, y, φ > 0 (A.9)
2The existence and unique proofs are basically identical to those used in proving lemma 2.
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Suppose φ1, φ2 > 0. The LHS follows from the following algebra:
x1
y1
<
x2
y2
⇔ φ1x1y2 < φ1x2y1
⇔φ1x1y2 + φ2x1y1 < φ1x2y1 + φ2x1y1
⇔x1(φ1y1 + φ2y2) < y1(φ1x1 + φ2x2)
⇔x1
y1
<
φ1x1 + φ2x2
φ1y1 + φ2y2
.
The proof of the RHS of inequality (A.9) is a tautology. Iterating over inequality
(A.9) implies that
∑K∗
i=1 φiDi(p)
−∑K∗i=1 φiD′i(p) < DK∗ (p)−D′K∗ (p) . Besides, the proof of lemma 2 tells us
that DK∗ (p)−D′
K∗ (p)
<
DK∗+1(p)
−D′
K∗+1(p)
. Writing x1 =
∑K∗
i=1 φiDi(p), y1 = −
∑K∗
i=1 φiD
′
i(p), x2 =
DK∗+1(p). and y2 = −D′K∗+1(p), it follows from inequality (A.9) that:∑K∗
i=1 φiDi(p)
−∑K∗i=1 φiD′i(p) <
∑K∗
i=1 φiDi(p) + φK∗+1DK∗+1(p)
−∑K∗i=1 φiD′i(p) + φK∗+1D′K∗+1(p) .
Hence, q˜(p,K∗) < q˜(p,K∗ + 1) and more generally, q˜(p,K∗) < q˜(p,K∗2) if K
∗
2 > K
∗
1 .
Since profit maximization implies q˜(p,K∗1 , hˆ) = p(K
∗
1) and q˜(p,K
∗
2 , hˆ) = p(K
∗
2), it
follows that p(K∗2) > p(K
∗
1).
Proof of Proposition 2.3
The statement follows immediately from the fact that p(K∗) is increasing in K∗ (lemma
4) if K∗ is weakly decreasing in s. while p(K∗) is increasing in K∗. The argument
below, including the subsequent lemmata 13, 14 and 15, shows that K∗ is weakly
decreasing in s.
For the simplest case, suppose that Vk
(
K∗, p
(
K∗(s)
)
, s
)
> 0 ∀ k ≤ N .3 Then, K∗ =
N is the unique equilibrium. Otherwise however, whether an equilibrium with active
search exists, depends crucially on the ordering of the elements of {sˆk(K∗)}k=1,..,N for
every K∗, where
sˆk(K
∗) ∈ {s : Vk
(
K∗, p
(
K∗(s)
)
, s
)
= 0}
is the threshold level of search costs specifying that for a given price p(K∗) and search
persistence K∗, sampling seller k is worthwhile if and only if s ≤ sˆk.
It is instructive to begin with the case where consumers become more pessimistic
while searching, meaning that Vk
(
K∗, p
(
K∗(s)
)
, s
)
< Vk+1
(
K∗, p
(
K∗(s)
)
, s
) ∀ k < K∗
3I switched back to the notion of “seller k” here since I believe it makes the analysis more tractable.
Notice that this is equivalent to referring to the continuation value of a consumer with h = k − 1.
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and for all K∗. This implies that sˆk(K∗) > sˆk+1(K∗) ∀ k < K∗ such that search
persistence decreases smoothly as there are no “jumps” in K greater than one.
Lemma 13 There is a sequence of intervals {(sˆK+1(K), sˆK(K)]}K=1,..,N separated by
closed neighborhoods such that consumers follow a stopping rule in pure strategies and
sample up to
K∗ = K sellers for s ∈ (sˆK+1(K), sˆK(K)]
Lemma 14 There is a sequence of intervals {(sˆK(K), sˆK(K−1)}K=1,..,N disjoint from
the intervals characterized in lemma 13 and separated by closed neighborhoods such
that consumers follow a stopping rule in pure strategies up to seller K∗ = K − 1 and
randomize over sampling and not sampling seller K with some probability m(K) ∈
(0, 1).
Proof. Since sˆk(K
∗) > sˆk+1(K∗) ∀ k < K∗, K∗ < N only ifs > sˆN(N). Further,
because continuation values are decreasing, sˆK∗(K
∗) > sˆK∗+1(K∗ + 1) ∀ K∗ < N .
Consequently, K∗ = N − 1 if sˆN−1 < s < sˆN − ,  > 0.
At s = sˆN(N), the the direct effect of a decrease in K
∗ from N to N − 1 is zero,
since the benefit of sampling seller N is exactly offset by s. However, the indirect effort
through the price is strictly larger than zero. By proposition 4, it reduces the price and
thus raises the continuation value such that VN(N − 1, p(N − 1), sˆN(N)) > 0, implying
that consumers would actually sample N sellers.
This inconsistency arises for all search costs in the range of sˆN(N) ≤ s < sˆN(N−1) <
sˆN−1(N − 1), where sˆN(N − 1) is determined by the general rule sˆK(K − 1) ∈ {s :
VK(K, p(K − 1), s) = 0}.
For s ∈ [sˆN(N), sˆN(N−1)), consumers thus choose a mixed stopping rule, sampling
seller N only with some probability m(N) ∈ (0, 1). From substituting φ′N = φN ·m(N)
for φN into equation (2.7) and looking at the resulting FOC, it follows that the uniform
optimal price p(m(N)) is decreasing in m(N) and always satisfies p(m) ∈ (p(N −
1), p(N)
) ∀ m ∈ (0, 1).
Since VN
(
N, p
(
N
)
, s
)
< 0 < VN
(
N, p
(
N − 1), s) for s ∈ [sˆN(N), sˆN(N − 1)), there
thus always exists an m(N) ∈ (0, 1) such that VN
(
N, p(m), s
)
= 0 and Vk
(
N, p(m), s
)
>
0 ∀ k < N .
Applying a randomized stopping rule prior to any seller k < N cannot be an equilib-
rium strategy. Since Vk
(
N, p(N), s
)
> 0 ∀ k < N , it follows that Vk
(
K∗, p(m(k)), s
)
>
0 for any K∗ < N and m(k) < 1 for some seller k by proposition 4. However, random-
ization at k requires Vk = 0, thus leading to a contradiction.
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By the same argument, consumers use a only pure stopping strategies if s ∈ (sˆN(N−
1), sˆN−1(N − 1)] and (conditional on vik = 0 ∀ k < N − 1) randomize over sampling an
not sampling seller N − 1 for s ∈ (sˆN−1(N − 1), sˆN−1(N − 2)]. If the threshold levels
are ordered, this patterns repeats until K∗ = 1.
In general, the sequence of threshold levels {sˆk(K∗)}k=1,..,N need not be decreasing for
everyK∗. For every possible search persistenceK ′, define sˆ(K ′) ∈ mink
{
sˆk(K
′)
}
k=1,..,K′ .
If sˆK′(K
′) = sˆ(K ′), the stopping rule is given by lemma 4 and 5 for all s such that
K∗(s) ≥ K ′ with K∗(s) ∈ K as defined in (2.5). However, if there exists a j < K ′
with sˆj(K
′) = sˆ(K∗), consumers do not begin to randomize over sampling seller K ′ if
s > sˆK′(K
′) as specified in lemma 5. Instead, already for sˆK′(K ′)s > sj(K ′), they ran-
domize over sampling seller j and then continue sampling sellers up to K ′. Formally,
denote the upper bound on search persistence in the latter case by K∗(s) ∈ maxK
{
K :
sˆK(K) > sˆ(K)
}
and denote by j ∈ {k : sˆk(K∗) = sˆ(K∗} the seller with the lowest
threshold given K∗. Lemma 15 summarizes the general randomized stopping rule:
Lemma 15 Consumers follow a stopping rule in pure strategies up to seller j − 1
and randomize over continuing to sample seller j with some probability m(j) ∈ (0, 1)
for s ∈ (sˆj(K∗), sˆj(j − 1)]. Consumers who sample j continue sampling sellers up to
k = K∗ if vik = 0 ∀ k < K∗.
Proof. Consumers with history h = K∗ would find sampling seller K∗ worthwhile if
s ≤ sˆK∗(K∗). However, consumers do not “reach” seller K∗ when the price is p(K∗)
since sˆj(K
∗) < sˆK∗(K∗) by construction. That is, they would stop sampling at seller
j < K∗.
For j > 1, the issue is resolved with a unique mixed strategy. Randomizing over
the decision to sample seller j also affects demand at all seller k′ > j. While by
construction Vk
(
K∗, p
(
m(j), K∗
)
, s
)
> 0 ∀ j < k ≤ K∗ is unfeasible since consumers
are not indifferent, the mass of consumers is reduced by the same fraction 1−m(j) for
all sellers k > j.
As in lemma 14, there exists a m(j) ∈ (0, 1) such that Vj
(
K∗, p(m(j)), s
)
= 0 for s >
sˆj(K
∗ and where p(m) maximizes sellers profits. Notice that for m(j)→ 0, K∗ = j−1
effectively. Hence, the threshold search level for which no mixed strategy m(j) ∈ (0, 1)
can yield Vj
(
K∗, p(m(j)), s
)
= 0 is given by sˆj(j−1) sinceVj
(
j−1, p(j−1), sˆj(j−1)
)
= 0
by construction. For s < sˆj(j − 1), consumers follow again a pure stopping strategy
with K∗ = j − 1 by lemma 13.
124 Appendices
The mixed strategy equilibrium is unique. To see why, note that generally, Vj′ 6= Vj
for j 6= j′ and that randomizing over the decision to sample any seller j′ requires that
Vj′ = 0 in equilibrium. (Note that I drop some arguments of V here).
Suppose that randomizing over sampling j′ > j was an equilibrium and that m(j′) <
1. Then, a price ensuring Vj′
(
p(m(j′))
)
= 0 implies Vj(p(m(j
′)) < 0 since by construc-
tion of j, Vj(p) < Vk(p) ∀ k ≤ K∗ for any price p.4 Hence, consumers would neither
sample seller j nor any j′ > j, which is a contradiction to m(k) ∈ (0, 1). Next, sup-
pose that consumers randomize at some k′ < j. Then, Vk′
(
p(m(k′))
)
= 0 implies
Vj
(
p(m(k′))
)
< 0. However, then consumers sample at most k′ < j sellers, and it fol-
lows from proposition 4 that p(m(k′)) < p(m(j)) ∀m(j) ∈ [0, 1]. But Vj
(
p(m(k′))
)
> 0,
which is a contradiction.
To conclude, consumers’ search persistence is always weakly decreasing in the level
of search costs s, though it may involve mixing over sampling additional sellers or
discontinuous jumps if search costs are above a certain threshold. Hence, proposition
2.3 obtains.
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Note that p(m(j)) is increasing in m(j) only if j > 1. Too see why, consider
the FOC for a randomized stopping rule m(j):
p =
∑j−1
i=1 φiDi(p) +m(j)
∑K∗
i=j φiDi(p)
−
(∑j−1
i=1 φiD
′
i(p) +m(j)
∑K∗
i=j φiD
′
i(p)
) (A.10)
If j = 1, m(j) cancels out from the RHS of (A.10). Thus, randomizing with m(j) < 1
has no effect on on the equilibrium price. Consequently, no mixed strategy m(j) for
j = 1 exists that renders V1 = 0. Moreover, as shown in the proof of lemma 13 and 14,
there also exists no mixed strategy for m(k) ∈ (0, 1) for k > j = 1.
4Seller j is defined in the main text.
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A.2 Proofs of Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. Using inequality (A.9), it follows immediately that:
D1∗(p)
−D′1∗(p)
<
∑K∗
i=1 φiDi(p)
−∑K∗i=1 φiD′i(p) < DK∗(p)−D′K∗(p)
Since by lemma 2, prices with and without tracking are unique, the stated result
obtains.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. The proof is provided in the main text. Suppose that consumers followed the
stopping rule R∗, irrespective of the sellers price, thereby eliminating price competition
entirely as in the unique equilibrium with tracking. In principle, sellers can choose any
price, including the price they would choose if tracking were not available. However,
even when assuming that consumers follow R∗, sellers choose different prices to max-
imize profits by proposition 2.5. Hence, they cannot obtain less profits if K∗ under
search with tracking is at least as high as K∗ under search without tracking.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. The result is an immediate consequence of lemma 2.4. If given the same level of
search costs, the market is active under tracking while it is inactive under no tracking,
strictly more matches are realized under tracking, thus leading to both higher consumer
surplus and higher profits.
Formulas used in Surplus Computations
Consumer surplus is captured by the continuation value prior to sampling the first
sellers: Substituting k = 1 in equation (2.4) und using the specification for f() and g()
as provided in the main text, I obtain
V1 =
K∗∑
k=0
(∫ 1
pk
(1− x)(x− pk)
(
x
)k
dx− s
∫ 1
0
(
x
)k
dx
)
.
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Under search with tracking, a seller in position k (observing h = k − 1) maximizes
the following profit function:
pik = pk ·
(∫ 1
pk
(1− x)(x)k−1 1∫ 1
0
(x)k−1dt
dx
)
. (A.11)
To derive the uniform price without tracking conditional on search persistence K∗,
the above profit functions from equation must be weighted by φk. I do not normalize
conditional on K∗ because the sellers FOC would remain unchanged and because I look
for industry profit, not for seller profit per consumer.
Π(K∗, p) = p ·
( K∗∑
k=1
φk ·
∫ 1
p
(1− x)(x)k−1 1∫ 1
0
(x)k−1dt
dx
)
(A.12)
where the probability φk is given in its general form in (2.6) and now writes φk =∫ 1
0
(x)k−1dx. Hence, overall profits without tracking take a very simple form:
Π(K∗, p) = p ·
( K∗∑
k=1
·
∫ 1
p
(1− x)(x)k−1dx
)
(A.13)
The formulas above are implemented in a Mathematica code to derive optimal prices
for every possible K∗. Using expressions for Vk, the equilibrium K∗ is computed for
every level of search costs. The code can be obtained from the corresponding author
upon request.
A.3 Proofs of Section 2.5
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. (a) Existence and uniqueness If consumers follow R∗, seller k’s demand
writes:
Dk(p) =
∫ v¯
p
g(x)
(
1− g(x))k−1f(x)∫ 1
v
(
1− g(t))k−1f(t)dtdx
Profit maximization with respect to the above demand function yields first-order condi-
tions which are equivalent to those shown in the proof of the existence of an increasing
price sequence in proposition 1. Hence, a solution to
max
p
Dk(p)p
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exists. Further, since the FOC Dk(p)−D′k(p)
is decreasing, it is also unique. Moreover, the
same reasoning as in Part II regarding the possibility of setting to a price that changes
the stopping rule applies. Consequently, uniqueness is preserved when accounting for
deviations from R∗.
(b) Decreasing price sequence
If g′(x) > 0, the inequality in (A.3) is reversed. Hence,
qj(p) > qj+1(p) ∀ p ∈ [v, v¯].
Since the solution to qk(p) = p is unique ∀ j, it follows that pk < pk−1 ∀ k ≤ N in
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. By lemma 6, {p∗k}k=1,...,N is optimal if consumers follow R∗ always. As in any
PBE, expectations are correct, it suffices to show that given sellers’ optimal prices if
∆ˆ > g′(x) ∀ x ∈ X, applying R∗ is optimal for consumers.
Using previous notation Xˆk = {x ∈ X : g(x)
(
p′k − pk+1
)
> s}, recall that
Xˆ ⊆ ∅ ⇔ R∗ is optimal.
Hence, all types apply R∗ if
g(x)
(
pek − pek+1
) ≤ s ∀ k < N, x ∈ X
As g′(x) > 0, the type xi = v¯ has the highest probability of encountering a match.
Hence, Xˆ ⊆ ∅ if g(v¯)(pek − pek+1) ≤ s ∀ k. Equation (A.3) shows that the difference in
prices is a function of the slope of g(x). In particular, |pek−pek+1 | → 0 if g′(x)→ 0 ∀ x.
Hence, it is possible to find a g(x) sufficiently flat such that Xˆ ⊆ ∅ for every s > 0.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Replace p+k by p
∗
k in the proof of lemma 3. The result follows immediately. The
reason why the same argument as in the proof of lemma 3 applies is given in the main
text.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6
Proof. Replace p+k by p
∗
k in the proof of Proposition 2. The result follows immediately.
The reason why the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 applies is given in
the main text.
A.4 Proofs of Section 2.6
Proof of Lemma 11
Proof. (a) Existence and Uniqueness: Random consumer search from the perspec-
tive of sellers for all histories h ≥ hˆ implies that a seller at position k > hˆ computes
the probability that his position is k conditional on K∗ ≥ k > hˆ. This probability is
denoted by φk(hˆ) with:
φk(hˆ) = φk
/ K∗∑
i=hˆ+1
φi ∀ k > hˆ (A.14)
where φi is defined as in (2.6). Notice that as φk < φk+1 by construction, it also holds
that φk(hˆ) < φk+1(hˆ). Conditional on not observing the search history h, the optimal
price solves the following FOC:∑K∗
i=hˆ+1 φi(hˆ)Θi(1)−
∑K∗
i=hˆ+1 φi(hˆ)Θi(p)
−∑K∗i=hˆ+1 φi(hˆ)θi(p) = p.
Analogously to the previous arguments, it follows that the optimal price exists and is
unique for every hˆ.
(b) Comparison between p(hˆ) and phˆ+1: p(hˆ) is uniquely defined by:
p(hˆ) =
∑K∗
i=hˆ+1 φiDi
(
p(hˆ)
)
−∑K∗i=hˆ+1 φiD′i(p(hˆ)) .
Using Dhˆ+1(p)/ − D′hˆ+1(p) < ... < DK∗(p)/ − D′K∗(p) and applying inequality (A.9)
again implies: ∑K∗
i=hˆ+1 φiDi(p)
−∑K∗i=hˆ+1 φiD′i(p) >
Dhˆ+1(p)
−D′
hˆ+1
(p)
∀ p ∈ X
As phˆ+1 =
Dhˆ+1(phˆ+1)
−D′
hˆ+1
(phˆ+1)
, it follows by the same argument as in proposition 1 that
p(hˆ) > phˆ+1 ∀ 1 ≤ hˆ < K∗ − 1. If hˆ = K∗ − 1, the FOC determining p(hˆ) reduces to
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p = DK∗ (p)−D′
K∗ (p)
and is thus identical to the FOC for seller K∗ if the history hˆ is disclosed.
Hence, p(hˆ) = pK∗ for hˆ = K
∗ − 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.10
Proof. Suppose that hˆ < K∗. In equilibrium, the strategy hˆ must be optimal, i.e.
pe(NT ) < pe
hˆ+1
. In any symmetric equilibrium, sellers’ beliefs must satisfy µ(h) =
0 ∀ h < hˆ and µ(h) = φh+1 ∀h ≥ hˆ, where φh+1 equals a seller’s probability of being
in position h + 1 in a consumer’s search process as defined in (2.6). Then by Lemma
7, the seller’s optimal price conditional on hˆ satisfies p(NT ) = p(hˆ) ≥ phˆ+1 ∀ hˆ. If
hˆ = K∗, p(hˆ) ≥ phˆ+1 does not affect a consumer’s choice because she does not sample
seller hˆ + 1. However if hˆ < K∗, the optimal no tracking price p(NT ) contradicts the
expectation of pe(NT ) < pe
hˆ+1
, which is necessary to sustain the equilibrium strategy
hˆ < K∗. Besides, a price p(NT ) > pK∗ , despite being an action that is never chosen
in equilibrium, cannot be part of the seller’s equilibrium strategy. If a seller observes
the off-equilibrium choice NT , the maximum possible history can be h = K∗ − 1 as
otherwise the consumer would have ended search. Consequently, setting p′(NT ) =
pK∗ < p(NT ) constitutes a profitable deviation. Notice also that unique full disclosure
outcome is robust to assuming the opposite tie-breaking rule in favor of no disclosure if
pe(NT ) = phˆ+1. Changing the tie-breaking rule in that way allows for an equilibrium
with hˆ = K∗ − 1. However, consumers with a history h = hˆ are the only consumers
choosing no disclosure. Hence, the choice of d = NT perfectly reveals the type, sellers
set p(NT ) = phˆ+1 = pK∗ and the outcome is equivalent to the unique equilibrium under
the alternative tie-breaking rule.
Proof of Lemma 12 and Proposition 2.11
Reversing the inequality h ≥ hˆ in the proofs of Lemma 11 and Proposition 2.10 (to
h ≤ hˇ) yields the results.
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B Appendix Chapter 3
B.1 Formal Analysis of Bayesian Beliefs
For simplicity, assume that the score s is a continuous variable and denote a partici-
pant’s realized score by sˆ. Further, assume that the distribution of s in the population
is given by F (s) with the density function f(s). Denote by m¯ the median score derived
from this distribution.
Proof of Observation 1
Proof. Denote by P(A) denote the unconditional probability of some event A, where
A ∈ {E,R} represents either the earnings condition E or R. Let µ(E|sˆ ∧ H) be the
posterior that the true state of the world (session) is E conditional on having received
a high income (H). Conversely, denote by µ(E|sˆ ∧ L) the respective posterior belief
conditional on a low income (L).
Then the posterior conditional on H writes:
µ(E | sˆ ∧ H) = P(sˆ ∧ H | E)
P(sˆ ∧ H) =
∫ sˆ
f(s)ds
P(E) · ∫ sˆ f(s)ds+ P(R) · 1
2
,
where
∫ sˆ
f(s)ds equals the probability of having a higher score than a randomly drawn
opponent, which equals the probability of receiving a high income in E.
Notice that P(R) = P(E) = 1
2
and consider the following two possibilities for illustra-
tion. If sˆ is above the median score m¯, then
∫ sˆ
f(s)ds > 1
2
and thus µ(E | sˆ ∧ H) > 1
2
.
Conversely, sˆ < m¯ implies µ(E | sˆ ∧ H) < 1
2
.
Proof of Observation 2
Proof. A low income spectator’s Bayesian posterior is given by
µ(E | sˆ ∧ L) = P(sˆ ∧ L | E)
P(sˆ ∧ L) =
∫
sˆ
f(s)ds
P(E) · ∫
sˆ
f(s)ds+ P(R) · 1
2
.
Hence, a low income and sˆ > m¯ imply that µ(E | sˆ ∧ L) < 1
2
whereas µ(E | sˆ ∧ L) > 1
2
follows if sˆ < m¯.
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B.2 Paper and On Screen Instructions
Allgemeine Instruktionen
Wir begru¨en Sie herzlich und danken Ihnen fu¨r Ihre Teilnahme. Ihr Verdienst bei
diesem Experiment wird von Ihren Entscheidungen abha¨ngen. Bitte folgen Sie daher
den Instruktionen aufmerksam. Wir zahlen Sie am Ende der Session privat und in bar
aus. Bitte sprechen Sie wa¨hrend des Experiments nicht mit den anderen Teilnehmern.
Wenn Sie zu einem beliebigen Zeitpunkt Fragen haben sollten, melden Sie sich bitte.
Experiment
Im Experiment werden Sie in Gruppen von je zwei Teilnehmern eingeteilt, sodass
jede Gruppe aus einer Person A und einer Person B besteht. Das Experiment setzt
sich aus zwei Teilen zusammen. Der erste Teil beinhaltet eine Produktionsphase, in der
Sie Geld verdienen ko¨nnen. Im zweiten Teil ko¨nnen Sie das verdiente Geld innerhalb
einer anderen Gruppe zwischen Person A und Person B umverteilen. Danach ist das
Experiment beendet; es gibt also nur einen Durchgang.
Erster Teil
Im ersten Teil besteht Ihre Aufgabe darin, fiktive Wo¨rter verschlu¨sseln, indem Sie
die einzelnen Buchstaben der Wo¨rter durch dreistellige Nummern ersetzen. Welche
Nummer fu¨r welchen Buchstaben steht, wird Ihnen in einer unter dem Wort stehenden
Tabelle angezeigt. Zu Beginn gibt es eine zweiminu¨tige Probephase, in der Sie Zeit
haben, sich an die Aufgabe zu gewo¨hnen.
Beispiel: Ihnen wird das Wort LAF angezeigt. Entsprechend der auf Ihrem Bild-
schirm angezeigten Tabelle gilt: L=418, A=109, F=215. Um die Lo¨sung einzugeben,
tragen Sie diese Nummern unter die Buchstaben in die dafu¨r vorgesehenen Felder ein
und klicken auf Weiter.
Sobald Sie ein Wort korrekt verschlu¨sselt haben, gibt Ihnen das Programm ein neues
Wort zum Verschlu¨sseln vor. Auerdem a¨ndert sich die Tabelle, die Ihnen sagt, mit
welcher Nummer welcher Buchstabe u¨bersetzt werden kann. Dabei werden sowohl
die Reihenfolge der Buchstaben, welche nicht alphabetisch sein muss, als auch die
zugeho¨rigen Nummern variiert. Sie mu¨ssen also bei jedem Wort aufs Neue nachse-
hen, durch welche Nummer die gesuchten Buchstaben zu u¨bersetzen sind. Wenn Sie
auf Weiter klicken und einen Fehler bei der Verschlu¨sselung gemacht haben, werden
Ihre Eingaben gelo¨scht. Sie mu¨ssen dasselbe Wort dann erneut verschlu¨sseln. Die
Verschlu¨sselungstabelle a¨ndert sich in diesem Fall nicht.
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Sie erhalten solange neue Wo¨rter zum Verschlu¨sseln, bis die Zeit von 25 Minuten
(1500 Sekunden) abgelaufen ist. Fu¨r jedes korrekt verschlu¨sselte Wort erhalten
Sie einen Punkt.
Einkommen aus der Produktionsphase: Ihr Verdienst aus der Produktion-
sphase wird durch Ihre relative Punktzahl innerhalb Ihrer Gruppe oder vom Zufall
bestimmt. Ob Zufall u¨ber Ihren Verdienst entscheidet, ha¨ngt davon ab, ob Sie sich
in Welt 1 oder Welt 2 befinden. In Welt 1 ha¨ngt Ihr Verdienst (und auch der Verdi-
enst aller anderen Teilnehmer) ausschlielich von der relativen Punktzahl innerhalb der
Gruppe ab. Die Person mit der ho¨heren Punktzahl erha¨lt e20 und die Person mit der
niedrigeren Punktzahl erha¨lt 5. In Welt 2 wird zufa¨llig entschieden, welche Person
e20 und welche Person e5 erha¨lt. Alle Teilnehmer haben dieselbe Chance, die e20
zu erhalten, unabha¨ngig davon, ob sie Person A oder B sind. Die erreichte Punktzahl
spielt keine Rolle bei der Bestimmung des Einkommens.
Die Auswahl von Welt 1 oder Welt 2 ist fu¨r alle Teilnehmer dieses Durchgangs
identisch, sodass sich entweder alle Teilnehmer in Welt 1 oder alle Teilnehmer
in Welt 2 befinden.
Beispiel (Die Zahlen sind absichtlich unrealistisch gewa¨hlt): Nehmen Sie an, dass in
einer Gruppe Person A 1000 Punkte und Person B 2000 Punkte erreicht. In Welt 1
wu¨rde Person B sicher e20 und Person A sicher e5 erhalten. In Welt 2 kann es hinge-
gen passieren, dass Person A e20 und Person B e5 erha¨lt. Genauso wahrscheinlich
ist es jedoch, dass Person B e20 erha¨lt und Person A e5.
Ob Sie sich in diesem Durchgang des Experiments in Welt 1 oder Welt 2
befinden, erfahren Sie nicht. Diese Entscheidung ist im Vorfeld getroffen worden,
wobei die Auswahl von Welt 1 oder Welt 2 gleichwahrscheinlich war.
Nach Abschluss der Produktionsphase sehen Sie lediglich Ihre eigene Punktzahl und
Ihren Verdienst, nicht jedoch die Punktzahl der anderen Person in Ihrer Gruppe. Soll-
ten Sie sich in Welt 2 befinden, erfahren Sie auch nicht, ob die-/derjenige mit der
geringeren oder die-/derjenige mit der ho¨heren Punktzahl das Einkommen von e20
erhalten hat.
Zweiter Teil
Im zweiten Teil ko¨nnen Sie, wenn Sie mo¨chten, Einkommen innerhalb einer anderen
Gruppe umverteilen. Dabei ist es ausgeschlossen, dass Mitglieder aus der Gruppe, fu¨r
die Sie eine Umverteilungsentscheidung treffen, u¨ber die Umverteilung in Ihrer eigenen
Gruppe entscheiden.
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U¨ber die Teilnehmer dieser anderen Gruppe erfahren Sie lediglich deren Verdienst
aus der Produktionsphase, nicht jedoch die erreichten Punktzahlen.
Bei der Umverteilungsentscheidung legen Sie u¨ber einen Schiebebalken am unteren
Bildschirmrand fest, ob und wieviel Geld von der Person, die das Einkommen von e20
erzielt hat, an die Person mit dem Einkommen von e5 transferiert werden soll. Der
Schiebebalken erlaubt Ihnen, den Transfer in 10-Cent-Schritten zu bestimmen. Sie
ko¨nnen den Balken entweder durch Anklicken und Gedru¨ckthalten der linken Maus-
taste, oder durch Klicken der rechts und links davon angeordneten Pfeile bewegen. Sie
ko¨nnen maximal e15 umverteilen.
Fu¨r jede Gruppe gibt es eine Umverteilungsentscheidung von insgesamt 2 Teil-
nehmern. Das heit, dass fu¨r die Gruppe, fu¨r die Sie einen Transfer festgelegt haben,
noch die Entscheidung eines anderen Teilnehmers existiert. Der Computer bestimmt
dann zufa¨llig, wessen Entscheidung umgesetzt wird. Da entweder Ihre Entscheidung
oder die des anderen Teilnehmers umgesetzt wird, ko¨nnen Sie ihre Transferentscheidung
unabha¨ngig davon treffen, was Sie glauben, wie dieser andere Teilnehmer entschei-
den wird. Auerdem bedeutet das, dass fu¨r Ihre Wahl eine 50%ige Chance besteht,
tatsa¨chlich umgesetzt zu werden. Bitte entschieden Sie daher mit Sorgfalt.
Wenn Sie zum aktuellen Zeitpunkt Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte jetzt die Hand. An-
derenfalls bitten wir Sie, das Experiment zu starten und zuna¨chst die Versta¨ndnisfragen
zu beantworten. Ziel der Fragen ist es sicherzustellen, dass Sie die verschiedenen
Komponenten des Experiments korrekt verstanden haben. Ihre Entscheidungen und
Antworten wa¨hrend des Experiments bleiben anonym.
Weitere Hinweise
• Wa¨hrend der Produktionsphase wird Ihnen die verbleibende Zeit in Sekunden
am oberen rechten Bildschirmrand angezeigt
• Sie ko¨nnen das Nummernfeld Ihrer Tastatur verwenden. Dieses ist bereits ak-
tiviert.
• Sie ko¨nnen die Tabulator-Taste verwenden, um bei der Eingabe der Nummern
zum na¨chsten Eingabefeld zu gelangen
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Figure B.1: Encryption task
Figure B.2: Redistribution stage
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Figure B.3: Belief elicitation I
Figure B.4: Belief elicitation II
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Figure B.5: Survey questions
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C Appendix Chapter 4
C.1 Paper and On Screen Instructions
General Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. You will receive e3 as a show-up
fee for participating in this session. You may also receive additional money, depending
on the decisions you and other participants make. Upon completion of the session, this
additional amount and the show-up fee will be paid to you individually and in private.
A clear understanding of the following instructions will help you make better deci-
sions and increase your earnings. Please do not speak to other participants during the
experiment.
Part I
The experiment is divided into two parts. Below you will find the instructions for the
first part, consisting of Stage 1, Stage 2, and Stage 3. Once the first part is completed,
you will receive instructions for the second part (Stage 4). You will participate in
each stage only once. At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will randomly
match you with five other people in the room. That is, you will be part of a group of
six people. To identify each other while remaining anonymous, each one of you will
be assigned a unique name from the following list: Yellow, Blue, Green, Red, Orange,
and Brown.
Stage 1 - Estimation Task
Your relative performance in the estimation task within your group determines how
much you can work and earn during stage 2. Details on the earnings during stage 2
are given in the description of stage 2.
The task in stage 1 is the same for all participants. You will see an identical table
consisting of zeros and ones for 15 seconds. After the time has passed, the table will
disappear and you will be asked to give an estimate of how many zeros there were in the
table. Based on your and the other group members estimates, a ranking will be built
that assigns the first rank to the group member whose estimate has been closest to the
true value, the second rank to the group member whose estimate has been the second
closest to the true value, etc. In the unlikely event of a tie, the computer allocates the
higher rank based on a random process with equal chances for everyone.
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Example 1: (Note that the numbers may be very different in the actual stage 1.)
Assume that the players Green and Red both estimate that there are 8 zeros in the
table while the other players estimates are Yellow: 6, Brown: 5, Blue: 4, and Orange:
3. Furthermore, assume that the true number of zeros is 9. Then either Player Red
or Player Green will be ranked first with a 50% probability while the other one will be
ranked second. Player Yellow will be ranked third, player Brown fourth, player Blue
fifth and player Orange sixth.
Stage 2 - Counting Task
In this part of the experiment your task is to count zeros in a series of tables. The
tables are different from the one you will have seen in stage 1. The screenshot below
shows the work screen you will see later (numbers in the actual stage 2 may be very
different):
After counting the zeros, you enter the number of zeros into the box on the right
hand side of the screen. After you have entered the number, you click the OK button.
If you enter the correct result, a new table will be generated. If your input was wrong,
you have two additional attempts to enter the correct number. You therefore have a
total of three attempts to solve each table. If you enter the correct number of zeros,
you earn 1 point which is worth 50 cents. If you enter three times a wrong number
for a table, 1 point (=50 cents) will be subtracted from your earnings and a new table
will then be generated.
How many tables you can count in stage 2 (Maximum Score) depends on the rank
you acquired in stage 1:
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For example, if your stage 1 rank has been 3rd you will be asked to count zeros in
16 tables. And because each correct answer is worth 50 cents you can therefore earn
up to 16 50 = 800 cents = 8 e. In the unlikely event that you end up with a negative
point score at the end of stage 2, your earnings will be set to 0 e. That is, you cannot
accumulate negative income.
The Maximum Score includes points that are subtracted from your earnings. That
is, if your Maximum Score is 16 and you miscount two tables three times, you will be
able to see up to 18 tables in total before you reach 16 points (= 8 e) and finish stage
2. Independently of your rank, you will have 20 minutes (= 1200 seconds) to complete
stage 2. The remaining time to complete this stage will be displayed in the upper right
hand corner of the screen.
We encourage you to complete all the tables given to you. But if you do not want
to complete them all, you can simply stop at any time. If you decide to stop (or if you
finish early) please just wait and remain silent as you cannot leave this stage before the
20 minutes are up or everybody completed stage 2. To make waiting a little less boring
for those who complete their maximum number of tables early we give you access to
an article about Mannheim taken from the English Wikipedia website.
Stage 3 - Distribution Game
At the beginning of Stage 3, you will be informed of how many points and how much
money each participant in your group has acquired up to that point. During Stage 3
you will participate in the “distribution game”. The distribution game will be played
for a certain number of rounds, and this number is determined randomly. You will learn
about the number of rounds only after the last round has been completed. Hence, in
every round you should make your choices as if this round was the last round.
During each round you will be presented with a choice about how to distribute an
amount of money between two other members of your group. This money is additional
money and is not taken away from the amount of money you have received. All the
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money has to be distributed between the two and therefore your own earnings will not
be affected by your choice no matter what you do.
In each round, the amount of money you will be asked to distribute and the people
between whom you have to split the amount will remain the same. However, the
money you distribute to them accumulates over the rounds.
The figure below shows a typical screenshot from stage 3 (numbers in the actual
stage 3 may be very different):
To choose how to split the money, use the scrollbar at the bottom of the screen. By
moving the bar to the left, you can increase the amount distributed to the player whose
name appears on the left hand side and vice versa. Before you click on the scrollbar
for the first time, the computer screen will display e0 under both names, which means
that no money has been distributed yet (see screenshot). However, you will not be
able to click on “Confirm” before you use the scrollbar at least once in order to choose
how to split the money. To make fine adjustments, you may use the left/right arrow
buttons next to the scrollbar. While using the scrollbar, the columns “Distributed
Incom” and “Total Income” will update automatically. In order to implement any
choices you made, click on “Confirm”.
After everyone in your group has made his/her choices (including the last round), the
computer will randomly select one players choices and award the additional money
according to that players decisions in all rounds. That is, only one players distribution
decisions will be implemented for the entire group. This means that whenever your
decisions are chosen by the computer, everyones total income within your group will
be exactly as you chose while the other players decisions will be disregarded.
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However, neither you nor the other players in your group will be informed of the
computers random draw at that point. This information will be made available only
at the end of the experiment.
General Remarks
1. Note that all decisions will remain anonymous.
2. Always use a “.” (dot) to enter decimal numbers.
3. You may earn or lose additional money in stage 4 with some probability. However,
the significantly larger share of your earnings is determined during the first three
stages of the experiment.
You now have another 4 minutes to read the instructions again on your own. If you
have any questions now or during the experiment, please just raise your hand and I
will come to your desk to answer them in private.
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Figure C.1: Estimation task
Figure C.2: Counting task
C Appendix Chapter 4 145
Figure C.3: Distribution stage
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